Letter 106

M y tardiness in answering your letter was not due to press of business.  Do not listen to that sort of excuse; I am at liberty, and so is anyone else who wishes to be at liberty. No man is at the mercy of affairs.  He gets entangled in them of his own accord, and then flatters himself that being busy is a proof of happiness. Very well; you no doubt want to know why I did not answer the letter sooner? The matter about which you consulted me was being gathered into the fabric of my volume. For you know that I am planning to cover the whole of moral philosophy and to settle all the problems which concern it.  Therefore I hesitated whether to make you wait until the proper time came for <Ep3-217> this subject, or to pronounce judgment out of the logical order; but it seemed more kindly not to keep waiting one who comes from such a distance. So I propose both to pick this out of the proper sequence of correlated matter, and also to send you, without waiting to be asked, whatever has to do with questions of the same sort. D o you ask what these are?  Questions regarding which knowledge pleases rather than profits; for instance, your question whether the good is corporeal.6 Now the good is active: for it is beneficial; and what is active is corporeal.  The good stimulates the mind and, in a way, moulds and embraces that which is essential to the body.  The goods of the body are bodily; so therefore must be the goods of the soul.  For the soul, too, is corporeal.  Ergo, man's good must be corporeal, since man himself is corporeal.  I am sadly astray if the elements which support man and preserve or restore his health, are not bodily; therefore, his good is a body.  You will have no doubt, I am sure, that emotions are bodily things (if I may be allowed to wedge in another subject not under immediate discussion), like wrath, love, sternness; unless you doubt whether they change our features, knot our foreheads, relax the countenance, spread blushes, or drive away the blood?  What, then? Do you think that such evident marks of the body are stamped upon us by anything else than body?  And if emotions are corporeal, so are the diseases of the spirit - such as greed, cruelty, and all the faults which harden in our souls, to such an extent that they get into an incurable state.  Therefore evil is also, and all <Ep3-219> its branches - spite, hatred, pride; and so also are goods, first because they are opposite poles of the bad, and second because they will manifest to you the same symptoms.  Do you not see how a spirit of bravery makes the eye flash?  How prudence tends toward concentration? How reverence produces moderation and tranquillity?  How joy produces calm?  How sternness begets stiffness?  How gentleness produces relaxation?  These qualities are therefore bodily; for they change the tones and the shapes of substances, exercising their own power in their own kingdoms. N ow all the virtues which I have mentioned are goods, and so are their results.  Have you any doubt that whatever can touch is corporeal?  Nothing but body can touch or be touched, as Lucretius says.  Moreover, such changes as I have mentioned could not affect the body without touching it.  Therefore, they are bodily. Furthermore, any object that has power to move, force, restrain,or control,is corporeal.  Come now! Does not fear hold us back?  Does not boldness drive us ahead?  Bravery spur us on, and give us momentum?  Restraint rein us in and call us back?  Joy raise our spirits?  Sadness cast us down?  In short, any act on our part is performed at the bidding of wickedness or virtue.  Only a body can control or forcefully affect another body.  The good of the body is corporeal; a man's good is related to his bodily good; therefore, it is bodily. N ow that I have humoured your wishes, I shall anticipate your remark, when you say: "What a <Ep3-221>

[1] Tardius rescribo ad epistulas tuas, non quia districtus occupationibussum. Hanc excusationem cave audias: vaco, et omnes vacant qui volunt. Neminemres sequuntur: ipsi illas amplexantur et argumentum esse felicitatis occupationemputant. Quid ergo fuit quare non protinus rescriberem? id de quo quaerebasveniebat in contextum operis mei; [2] scis enim me moralem philosophiamvelle conplecti et omnes ad eam pertinentis quaestiones explicare. Itaquedubitavi utrum differrem te donec suus isti rei veniret locus, an ius tibiextra ordinem dicerem: humanius visum est tam longe venientem non detinere. [3] Itaque et hoc ex illa serie rerum cohaerentium excerpam et, si quaerunt eiusmodi, non quaerenti tibi ultro mittam. Quae sint haec interrogas? Quae scire magis iuvat quam prodest, sicuthoc de quo quaeris: bonum an corpus sit? [4] Bonum facit; prodest enim;quod facit corpus est. Bonum agitat animum et quodam modo format et continet, quae [ergo] propria sunt corporis. Quae corporis bona sunt corpora sunt;ergo et quae animi sunt; nam et hoc corpus est. [5] Bonum hominis necesseest corpus sit, cum ipse sit corporalis. Mentior, nisi et quae alunt illumet quae valetudinem eius vel custodiunt vel restituunt corpora sunt; ergoet bonum eius corpus est. Non puto te dubitaturum an adfectus corpora sint(ut aliud quoque de quo non quaeris infulciam), tamquam ira, amor, tristitia, nisi dubitas an vultum nobis mutent, an frontem adstringant, an faciemdiffundant, an ruborem evocent, an fugent sanguinem. Quid ergo? tam manifestasnotas corporis credis inprimi nisi a corpore? [6] Si adfectus corpora sunt, et morbi animorum, ut avaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia et in statuminemendabilem adducta; ergo et malitia et species eius omnes, malignitas, invidia, superbia; [7] ergo et bona, primum quia contraria istis sunt, deinde quia eadem tibi indicia praestabunt. An non vides quantum oculisdet vigorem fortitudo? quantam intentionem prudentia? quantam modestiamet quietem reverentia? quantam serenitatem laetitia? quantum rigorem severitas? quantam remissionem lenitas? Corpora ergo sunt quae colorem habitumque corporum mutant, quae in illis regnum suum exercent. Omnes autem quas rettuli virtutes bona sunt, et quidquid ex illis est. [8] Numquid est dubium anid quo quid tangi potest corpus sit? Tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res, ut ait Lucretius. Omnia autem ista quae dixi non mutarent corpus nisi tangerent; ergo corpora sunt. [9] Etiam nunc cui tanta vis est ut inpellat et cogat et retineatet inhibeat corpus est. Quid ergo? non timor retinet? non audacia inpellit? non fortitudo inmittit et impetum dat? non moderatio refrenat ac revocat? non gaudium extollit? non tristitia deducit? [10] Denique quidquid facimus aut malitiae aut virtutis gerimus imperio: quod imperat corpori corpus est, quod vim corpori adfert, corpus. Bonum corporis corporale est, bonum hominis et corporis bonum est; itaque corporale est. [11] Quoniam, ut voluisti, morem gessi tibi, nunc ipse dicam mihi quod dicturum esse te video: latrunculis ludimus. In supervacuis subtilitasteritur: non faciunt bonos ista sed doctos. [12] Apertior res est sapere, immo simplicior: paucis <satis> est ad mentem bonam uti litteris, sed nos ut cetera in supervacuum diffundimus, ita philosophiam ipsam. Quemadmodum omnium rerum, sic litterarum quoque intemperantia laboramus: non vitae sed scholae discimus. Vale.