Letter 109
Y ou expressed a wish to know whether a wise
man can help a wise man. For we say that the wise man is completely
endowed with every good, and has attained perfection; accordingly, the
question arises how it is possible for anyone to help a person who possesses
the Supreme Good.
G ood men are mutually helpful; for each gives
practice to the other's virtues and thus maintains wisdom at its proper
level. Each needs someone with whom he may make comparisons and investigations.
Skilled wrestlers are kept up to the mark by practice; a musician is stirred
to action by one of equal proficiency. The wise man also needs to
have his virtues kept in action; and as he prompts himself to do things,
so is he prompted by another wise man. How can a wise man help another
wise man? He can quicken his impulses, and point out to him opportunities
for honourable action. Besides, he can develop some of his own ideas;
he can impart what he has discovered. For even in the case of the
wise man something will always remain to discover, something towards which
his mind may make new ventures.
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E vil men harm evil men; each debases the other
by rousing his wrath, by approving his churlishness, and praising his pleasures;
bad men are at their worst stage when their faults are most thoroughly
intermingled, and their wickedness has been, so to speak, pooled in partnership.
Conversely, therefore, a good man will help another good man. "How?" you
ask. Because he will bring joy to the other, he will strengthen his
faith, and from the contemplation of their mutual tranquillity the delight
of both will be increased. Moreover they will communicate to each
other a knowledge of certain facts; for the wise man is not all-knowing.
And even if he were all-knowing, someone might be able to devise and point
out short cuts, by which the whole matter is more readily disseminated.
The wise will help the wise, not, mark you, because of his own strength
merely, but because of the strength of the man whom he assists. The
latter, it is true, can by himself develop his own parts; nevertheless,
even one who is running well is helped by one who cheers him on. "But the
wise man does not really help the wise; he helps himself. Let me
tell you this: strip the one of his special powers, and the other will
accomplish nothing." You might as well, on that basis, say that sweetness
is not in the honey: for it is the person himself who is to eat it, that
is so equipped, as to tongue and palate, for tasting this kind of food
that the special flavour appeals to him, and anything else displeases.
For there are certain men so affected by disease that they regard honey
as bitter. Both men should be in good health, that the one may be
helpful and the other a proper subject for help. Again they say:
"When the highest degree of heat has been attained, it is superfluous to
apply more
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heat; and wh1n the Supreme Good has been attained, it is superfluous
to have a helper. Does a completely stocked farmer ask for further
supplies from his neighbours? Does a soldier who is sufficiently
armed for going well-equipped into action need any more weapons?
Very well, neither does the wise man; for he is sufficiently equipped and
sufficiently armed for life." My answer to this is, that when one is heated
to the highest degree, one must have continued heat to maintain the highest
temperature. And if it be objected that heat is self-maintaining, I say
that there are great distinctions among the things that you are comparing;
for heat is a single thing, but helpfulness is of many kinds. Again,
heat is not helped by the addition of further heat, in order to be hot;
but the wise man cannot maintain his mental standard without intercourse
with friends of his own kind - with whom he may share his goodness.
Moreover, there is a sort of mutual friendship among all the virtues.
Thus, he who loves the virtues of certain among his peers, and in turn
exhibits his own to be loved, is helpful. Like things give pleasure,
especially when they are honourable and when men know that there is mutual
approval. And besides, none but a wise man can prompt another wise
man's soul in an intelligent way, just as man can be prompted in a rational
way by man only. As, therefore, reason is necessary for the prompting
of reason, so, in order to prompt perfect reason, there is need of perfect
reason.
S ome say that we are helped even by those
who bestow on us the so-called "indifferent" benefits, such as money, influence,
security, and all the other
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valued or essential aids to living. If we argue in this way, the
veriest fool will be said to help a wise man. Helping, however, really
means prompting the soul in accordance with Nature, both by the prompter's
excellence and by the excellence of him who is thus prompted. And
this cannot take place without advantage to the helper also. For
in training the excellence of another, a man must necessarily train his
own. But, to omit from discussion supreme goods or the things which
produce them, wise men can none the less be mutually helpful. For
the mere discovery of a sage by a sage is in itself a desirable event;
since everything good is naturally dear to the good man, and for this reason
one feels congenial with a good man as one feels congenial with oneself.
It is necessary for me to pass from this topic to another, in order to
prove my point. For the question is asked, whether the wise man will
weigh his opinions, or whether he will apply to others for advice.
Now he is compelled to do this when he approaches state and home duties
- everything, so to speak, that is mortal. He needs outside advice
on such matters, as does the physician, the pilot, the attorney, or the
pleader of cases. Hence, the wise will sometimes help the wise; for
they will persuade each other. But in these matters of great import
also, - aye, of divine import, as I have termed them, - the wise man can
also be useful by discussing honourable things in common, and by contributing
his thoughts and ideas. Moreover, it is in accordance with Nature
to show affection for our friends, and to rejoice in their advancement
as if it were absolutely our own. For if we have not done this, even
virtue, which grows strong only through exercising our perceptions, will
not abide with us. Now virtue advises us to
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arrange the present well, to take thought regarding the future, to deliberate
and apply our minds; and one who takes a friend into council with him,
can more easily apply his mind and think out his problem.
T herefore he will seek either the perfect
wise man or one who has progressed to a point bordering on perfection.
The perfect wise man, moreover, will help us if he aids our counsels with
ordinary good sense. They say that men see farther in the affairs
of others than in their own. A defect of character causes this in
those who are blinded by selflove, and whose fear in the hour of peril
takes away their clear view of that which is useful; it is when a man is
more at ease and freed from fear that he will begin to be wise. Nevertheless,
there are certain matters where even wise men see the facts more clearly
in the case of others than in their own. Moreover, the wise man will,
in company with his fellow sage, confirm the truth of that most sweet and
honourable proverb - "always desiring and always refusing the same things":
it will be a noble result when they draw the load "with equal yoke."
I have thus answered your demand, although it came under the head of subjects
which I include in my volumes On Moral Philosophy. Reflect, as I am often
wont to tell you, that there is nothing in such topics for us except mental
gymnastics. For I return again and again to the thought: "What good
does this do me? Make me more brave now, more just, more restrained!
I have not yet the opportunity to make use of my training; for I still
need the physician. Why do you ask of me a useless knowledge?
You have promised great things; test me, watch me! You assured me
that I should be
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Latin / Greek Original
[1] An sapiens sapienti prosit scire desideras. Dicimus plenum omnibono esse sapientem et summa adeptum: quomodo prodesse aliqui possit summumhabenti bonum quaeritur. Prosunt inter se boni. Exercent enim virtuteset sapientiam in suo statu continent; desiderat uterque aliquem cum quoconferat, cum quo quaerat. [2] Peritos luctandi usus exercet; musicum quiparia didicit movet. Opus est et sapienti agitatione virtutum; ita quemadmodumipse se movet, sic movetur ab alio sapiente. [3] Quid sapiens sapienti proderit? Impetum illi dabit, occasiones actionum honestarum commonstrabit. Praeter haec aliquas cogitationes suas exprimet; docebit quae invenerit. Semper enim etiam sapienti restabit quod inveniat et quo animus eius excurrat. [4] Malus malo nocet facitque peiorem, iram eius incitando, tristitiae adsentiendo, voluptates laudando; et tunc maxime laborant mali ubi plurimumvitia miscuere et in unum conlata nequitia est. Ergo ex contrario bonusbono proderit. 'Quomodo? ' inquis. [5] Gaudium illi adferet, fiduciam confirmabit;ex conspectu mutuae tranquillitatis crescet utriusque laetitia. Praeterea quarumdam illi rerum scientiam tradet; non enim omnia sapiens scit; etiamsi sciret, breviores vias rerum aliqui excogitare posset et has indicareper quas facilius totum opus circumfertur. [6] Proderit sapienti sapiens, non scilicet tantum suis viribus sed ipsius quem adiuvabit. Potest quidemille etiam relictus sibi explicare partes suas: utetur propria velocitate, sed nihilominus adiuvat etiam currentem hortator. 'Non prodest sapienti sapiens sed sibi ipse. Hoc <ut> scias, detrahe illi vim propriam et ille nihil aget.' [7] Isto modo dicas licet non essein melle dulcedinem; nam ipse ille qui esse debeat <nisi> ita aptatuslingua palatoque est ad eiusmodi gustum ut illum talis sapor capiat, offendetur;sunt enim quidam quibus morbi vitio mel amarum videatur. Oportet utrumque valere ut et ille prodesse possit et hic profuturo idonea materia sit.
[8] '<Ut> in summum' inquit 'perducto calorem calefieri supervacuumest, et in summum perducto bonum supervacuum est <si> qui prosit. Numquidinstructus omnibus rebus agricola ab alio instrui quaerit? numquid armatusmiles quantum in aciem exituro satis est ulla amplius arma desiderat? Ergonec sapiens; satis enim vitae instructus, satis armatus est. ' [9] Ad haecrespondeo: et qui in summum <perductus est calorem> opus est caloreadiecto ut summum teneat. 'Sed ipse se' inquit 'calor continet. ' Primummultum interest inter ista quae comparas. Calor enim unus est, prodesse varium est. Deinde calor non adiuvatur adiectione caloris ut caleat: sapiens non potest in habitu mentis suae stare nisi amicos aliquos similes sui admisit cum quibus virtutes suas communicet. [10] Adice nunc quod omnibus inter se virtutibus amicitia est; itaque prodest qui virtutes alicuius paris sui amat amandasque invicem praestat. Similia delectant, utique ubi honesta sunt et probare ac probari sciunt. [11] Etiam nunc sapientis animum perite movere nemo alius potest quam sapiens, sicut hominem movere rationaliter non potest nisi homo. Quomodo ergo ad rationem movendam ratione opus est, sic ut moveatur ratio perfecta opus est ratione perfecta. [12] Prodesse dicuntur et qui media nobis largiuntur, pecuniam, gratiam, incolumitatem, alia in usus vitae cara aut necessaria; in his dicetur etiam stultus prodesse sapienti. Prodesse autem est animum secundum naturam movere virtute sua. Ut eius qui movebitur, hoc non sine ipsius quoque qui proderit bono fiet; necessest enim alienam virtutem exercendo exerceat et suam. [13] Sed utremoveas ista quae aut summa bona sunt aut summorum efficientia, nihilominus prodesse inter se sapientes possunt. Invenire enim sapientem sapienti perse res expetenda est, quia natura bonum omne carum est bono et sic quisqueconciliatur bono quemadmodum sibi.
[14] Necesse est ex hac quaestione argumenti causa in alteram transeam. Quaeritur enim an deliberaturus sit sapiens, an in consilium aliquem advocaturus. Quod facere illi necessarium est cum ad haec civilia et domestica venituret, ut ita dicam, mortalia; in his sic illi opus est alieno consilio quomodomedico, quomodo gubernatori, quomodo advocato et litis ordinatori. Proderitergo sapiens aliquando sapienti; suadebit enim. Sed in illis quoque magnisac divinis, ut diximus, communiter honesta tractando et animos cogitationesquemiscendo utilis erit. [15] Praeterea secundum naturam est et amicos conplectiet amicorum auctu ut suo proprioque laetari; nam nisi hoc fecerimus, nevirtus quidem nobis permanebit, quae exercendo sensu valet. Virtus autemsuadet praesentia bene conlocare, in futurum consulere, deliberare et intendereanimum: facilius intendet explicabitque qui aliquem sibi adsumpserit. Quaeretitaque aut perfectum virum aut proficientem vicinumque perfecto. Proderitautem ille perfectus, si consilium communi prudentia iuverit. [16] Aiunthomines plus in alieno negotio videre +initio+. Hoc illis evenit quos amorsui excaecat quibusque dispectum utilitatis timor in periculis excutit:incipiet sapere securior et extra metum positus. Sed nihilominus quaedamsunt quae etiam sapientes in alio quam in se diligentius vident. Praetereaillud dulcissimum et honestissimum 'idem velle atque idem nolle' sapienssapienti praestabit; egregium opus pari iugo ducet.
[17] Persolvi quod exegeras, quamquam in ordine rerum erat quas moralisphilosophiae voluminibus conplectimur. Cogita quod soleo frequenter tibidicere, in istis nos nihil aliud quam acumen exercere. Totiens enim illorevertor: quid ista me res iuvat? fortiorem fac me, iustiorem, temperantiorem. Nondum exerceri vacat: adhuc medico mihi opus est. [18] Quid me poscis scientiam inutilem? Magna promisisti: exhibe fidem. Dicebas intrepidumfore etiam si circa me gladii micarent, etiam si mucro tangeret iugulum;dicebas securum fore etiam si circa me flagrarent incendia, etiam si subitus turbo toto navem meam mari raperet: hanc mihi praesta curam, ut voluptatem, ut gloriam contemnam. Postea docebis inplicta solvere, ambigua distinguere, obscura perspicere: nunc doce quod necesse est. Vale.
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