Letter 118
Y ou have been demanding more frequent letters
from me. But if we compare the accounts, you will not be on the credit
side. We had indeed made the agreement that your part came first, that
you should write the first letters, and that I should answer. However,
I shall not be disagreeable; I know that it is safe to trust you, so I
shall pay in advance, and yet not do as the eloquent Cicero bids Atticus
do: "Even if you have nothing to say, write whatever en-ters your head."
For there will always be something for me to write about, even omitting
all the kinds of news with which Cicero fills his correspondence: what
candidate is in difficulties, who is striving on borrowed resources and
who on his own; who is a candidate for the consulship relying on Caesar,
or on Pompey, or on his own strong-box; what a merciless usurer is Caecilius,
out of whom his friends cannot screw a penny for less than one per cent
each month. But it is preferable to deal with one's own ills, rather
than with another's - to sift oneself and see for how many vain things
one is a candidate, and cast a vote for none of them. This, my dear
Lucilius, is a noble thing, this brings peace and freedom - to canvass
for nothing, and to pass by all the elections of Fortune. How can
you call it enjoyable, when the tribes are called together and the candidates
are making offerings in their favorite temples -some of them promising
money gifts and others doing business by means of an agent, or wearing
down their hands with the kisses of those to whom they will refuse the
least finger-touch after being elected
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- when all are excitedly awaiting the announcement of the herald, do
you call it enjoyable, I say, to stand idle and look on at this Vanity
Fair without either buying or selling? How much greater joy does
one feel who looks without concern, not merely upon the election of a praetor
or of a consul, but upon that great struggle in which some are seeking
yearly honours, and others permanent power, and others the triumph and
the prosperous outcome of war, and others riches, or marriage and offspring,
or the welfare of themselves and their relatives! What a great- souled
action it is to be the only person who is canvassing for nothing, offering
prayers to no man, and saying: "Fortune, I have nothing to do with you.
I am not at your service. I know that men like Cato are spurned by
you, and men like Vatinius made by you. I ask no favours." This is the
way to reduce Fortune to the ranks.
T hese, then, are the things about which we
may write in turn, and this is the ever fresh material which we may dig
out as we scan the restless multitudes of men, who, in order to attain
something ruinous, struggle on through evil to evil, and seek that which
they must presently shun or even find surfeiting. For who was ever
satisfied, after attainment, with that which loomed up large as he prayed
for it? Happiness is not, as men think, a greedy thing; it is a lowly thing;
for that reason it never gluts a man's desire. You deem lofty the
objects you seek, because you are on a low level and hence far away from
them; but they are mean in the sight of him who has reached them.
And I am very much mistaken if he does not desire to climb still higher;
that which you regard as the top is merely a rung on the ladder.
Now all men suffer
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from ignorance of the truth; deceived by common report, they make for
these ends as if they were good, and then, after having won their wish,
and suffered much, they find them evil, or empty, or less important than
they had expected. Most men admire that which deceives them at a
distance, and by the crowd good things are supposed to be big things.
N ow, lest this happen also in our own case,
let us ask what is the Good. It has been explained in various ways;
different men have described it in different ways. Some define it
in this way. "That which attracts and calls the spirit to itself is a Good."
But the objection at once comes up - what if it does attract, but straight
to ruin? You know how seductive many evils are. That which
is true differs from that which looks like the truth; hence the Good is
connected with the true, for it is not good unless it is also true.
But that which attracts and allures, is only like the truth; it steals
your attention, demands your interest, and draws you to itself. Therefore,
some have given this definition: "That is good which inspires desire for
itself, or rouses towards itself the impulse of a struggling soul." There
is the same objection to this idea; for many things rouse the soul's impulses,
and yet the search for them is harmful to the seeker. The following
definition is better: "That is good which rouses the soul's impulse towards
itself in accordance with nature, and is worth seeking only when it begins
to be thoroughly worth seeking." It is by this time an honourable thing;
for that is a thing completely worth seeking. The present topic suggests
that I state the difference between the Good and the honourable. Now
they have a certain quality which blends with
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both and is inseparable from either: nothing can be good unless it contains
an element of the honourable ,
and the honourable is necessarily good. What, then, is the difference
between these two qualities? The honourable is the perfect Good,
and the happy life is fulfilled thereby; through its influence other things
also are rendered good. I mean something like this: there are certain
things which are neither good nor bad - as military or diplomatic service,
or the pronouncing of legal decisions. When such pursuits have been
honourably conducted, they begin to be good, and they change over from
the indifferent" class into the Good. The Good results from partnership
with the honourable, but the honourable is good in itself. The Good
springs from the honourable, but the latter from itself. What is
good might have been bad; what is honourable could never have been anything
but good.
S ome have defined as follows: "That is good
which is according to nature." Now attend to my own statement: that which
is good is according to nature, but that which is according to nature does
not also become immediately good; for many things harmonize with nature,
but are so petty that it is not suitable to call them good. For they
are unimportant and deserve to be despised. But there is no such
thing as a very small and despicable good, for, as long as it is scanty,
it is not good, and when it begins to be good, it ceases to be scanty.
How, then, can the Good be recognized? Only if it is completely according
to nature.
P eople say: "You admit that that which is
good is according to nature; for this is its peculiar quality. You
admit, too, that there are other things according to nature, which, however,
are not good. How then
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can the former be good, and the latter not? How can there be an
alteration in the peculiar quality of a thing, when each has, in common
with the other, the special attribute of being in accord with nature? "Surely
because of its magnitude. It is no new idea that certain objects
change as they grow. A person, once a child, becomes a youth; his peculiar
quality is transformed; for the child could not reason, but the youth possesses
reason. Certain things not only grow in size as they develop, but
grow into something else. Some reply: "But that which becomes greater does
not necessarily become different. It matters not at all whether you
pour wine into a flask or into a vat; the wine keeps its peculiar quality
in both vessels. Small and large quantities of honey are not distinct
in taste." But these are different cases which you mention; for wine and
honey have a uniform quality; no matter how much the quantity is enlarged,
the quality is the same. For some things endure according to their
kind and their peculiar qualities, even when they are enlarged. There
are others, however, which, after many increments, are altered by the last
addition; there is stamped upon them a new character, different from that
of yore. One stone makes an archway - the stone which wedges the
leaning sides and holds the arch together by its position in the middle.
And why does the last addition, although very slight, make a great deal
of difference? Because it does not increase; it fills up. Some
things, through development, put off their former shape and are altered
into a new figure. When the mind has for a long time developed some idea,
and in the attempt to grasp its magnitude has become weary, that thing
begins to be called "infinite." And
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Latin / Greek Original
(1) Exigis a me frequentiores epistulas. Rationes conferamus: soluendonon eris. Conuenerat quidem ut tua priora essent: tu scriberes, ego rescriberem. Sed non ero difficilis: bene credi tibi scio. Itaque in anticessum dabonec faciam quod Cicero, uir disertissimus, facere Atticum iubet, ut etiam'si rem nullam habebit, quod in buccam uenerit scribat'. (2) Numquam potestdeesse quod scribam, ut omnia illa quae Ciceronis implent epistulas transeam:quis candidatus laboret; quis alienis, quis suis uiribus pugnet; quis consulatumfiducia Caesaris, quis Pompei, quis arcae petat; quam durus sit feneratorCaecilius, a quo minoris centesimis propinqui nummum mouere non possint. Sua satius est mala quam aliena tractare, se excutere et uidere quam multarumrerum candidatus sit, et non suffragari. (3) Hoc est, mi Lucili, egregium,hoc securum ac liberum, nihil petere et tota fortunae comitia transire. Quam putas esse iucundum tribubus uocatis, cum candidati in templis suispendeant et alius nummos pronuntiet, alius per sequestrem agat, alius eorummanus osculis conterat quibus designatus contingendam manum negaturus est,omnes attoniti uocem praeconis expectent, stare otiosum et spectare illasnundinas nec ementem quicquam nec uendentem? (4) Quanto hic maiore gaudiofruitur qui non praetoria aut consularia comitia securus intuetur, sedmagna illa in quibus alii honores anniuersarios petunt, alii perpetuaspotestates, alii bellorum euentus prosperos triumphosque, alii diuitias,alii matrimonia ac liberos, alii salutem suam suorumque! Quanti animi resest solum nihil petere, nulli supplicare, et dicere, 'nihil mihi tecum,fortuna; non facio mei tibi copiam. Scio apud te Catones repelli, Vatiniosfieri. Nihil rogo. ' Hoc est priuatam facere fortunam. (5) Licet ergo haec in uicem scribere et hanc semper integram egereremateriam circumspicientibus tot milia hominum inquieta, qui ut aliquidpestiferi consequantur per mala nituntur in malum petuntque mox fugiendaaut etiam fastidienda. (6) Cui enim adsecuto satis fuit quod optanti nimiumuidebatur? Non est, ut existimant homines, auida felicitas sed pusilla;itaque neminem satiat. Tu ista credis excelsa quia longe ab illis iaces;ei uero qui ad illa peruenit humilia sunt. Mentior nisi adhuc quaerit escendere:istud quod tu summum putas gradus est. (7) Omnes autem male habet ignorantiaueri. Tamquam ad bona feruntur decepti rumoribus, deinde mala esse autinania aut minora quam sperauerint adepti ac multa passi uident; maiorquepars miratur ex interuallo fallentia, et uulgo bona pro magnis sunt.
(8) Hoc ne nobis quoque eueniat, quaeramus quid sit bonum. Varia eiusinterpretatio fuit, alius illud aliter expressit. Quidam ita finiunt: 'bonumest quod inuitat animos, quod ad se uocat'. Huic statim opponitur: quidsi inuitat quidem sed in perniciem? scis quam multa mala blanda sint. Verumet ueri simile inter se differunt. Ita quod bonum est uero iungitur; nonest enim bonum nisi uerum est. At quod inuitat ad se et adlicefacit uerisimile est: subrepit, sollicitat, adtrahit. (9) Quidam ita finierunt: 'bonumest quod adpetitionem sui mouet, uel quod impetum animi tendentis ad semouet. ' Et huic idem opponitur; multa enim impetum animi mouent quae petanturpetentium malo. Melius illi qui ita finierunt: 'bonum est quod ad se impetumanimi secundum naturam mouet et ita demum petendum est cum coepit esseexpetendum'. Iam et honestum est; hoc enim est perfecte petendum. (10) Locus ipse me admonet ut quid intersit inter bonum honestumque dicam. Aliquidinter se mixtum habent et inseparabile: nec potest bonum esse nisi cuialiquid honesti inest, et honestum utique bonum est. Quid ergo inter duointerest? Honestum est perfectum bonum, quo beata uita completur, cuiuscontactu alia quoque bona fiunt. (11) Quod dico talest: sunt quaedam nequebona neque mala, tamquam militia, legatio, iurisdictio. Haec cum honesteadministrata sunt, bona esse incipiunt et ex dubio in bonum transeunt. Bonum societate honesti fit, honestum per se bonum est;bonum ex honestofluit, honestum ex se est. Quod bonum est malum esse potuit; quod honestumest nisi bonum esse non potuit.
(12) Hanc quidam finitionem reddiderunt: 'bonum est quod secundum naturamest'. Adtende quid dicam: quod bonum, est secundum naturam: non protinusquod secundum naturam est etiam bonum est. Multa naturae quidem consentiunt,sed tam pusilla sunt ut non conueniat illis boni nomen; leuia enim sunt,contemnenda. Nullum est minimum contemnendum bonum; nam quamdiu exiguumest bonum non est: cum bonum esse coepit, non est exiguum. Unde adcognoscitur bonum? si perfecte secundum naturam est. (13) 'Fateris' inquis 'quod bonumest secundum naturam esse; haec eius proprietas est. Fateris et alia secundum naturam quidem esse sed bona non esse. Quomodo ergo illud bonum est cumhaec non sint? quomodo ad aliam proprietatem peruenit cum utrique praecipuum illud commune sit, secundum naturam esse? '
(14) Ipsa scilicet magnitudine. Nec hoc nouum est, quaedam crescendo mutari. Infans fuit; factus est pubes:alia eius proprietas fit; ille enim inrationalis est, hic rationalis. Quaedamincremento non tantum in maius exeunt sed in aliud. (15) 'Non fit' inquit'aliud quod maius fit. Utrum lagonam an dolium impleas uino, nihil refert:in utroque proprietas uini est. Et exiguum mellis pondus et magnum saporenon differt. ' Diuersa ponis exempla; in istis enim eadem qualitas est;quamuis augeantur, manet. (16) Quaedam amplificata in suo genere et insua proprietate perdurant; quaedam post multa incrementa ultima demum uertitadiectio et nouam illis aliamque quam in qua fuerunt condicionem inprimit. Unus lapis facit fornicem, ille qui latera inclinata cuneauit et interuentusuo uinxit. Summa adiectio quare plurimum facit uel exigua? quia non augetsed implet. (17) Quaedam processu priorem exuunt formam et in nouam transeunt. Ubi aliquid animus diu protulit et magnitudinem eius sequendo lassatusest, infinitum coepit uocari; quod longe aliud factum est quam fuit cummagnum uideretur sed finitum. Eodem modo aliquid difficulter secari cogitauimus:nouissime crescente hac difficultate insecabile inuentum est. Sic ab eoquod uix et aegre mouebatur processimus ad inmobile. Eadem ratione aliquidsecundum naturam fuit: hoc in aliam proprietatem magnitudo sua transtulitet bonum fecit. Vale.