Letter 65

I shared my time yesterday with ill health; it claimed for itself all the period before noon; in the afternoon, however, it yielded to me.  And so I first tested my spirit by reading; then, when reading was found to be possible, I dared to make more demands upon the spirit, or perhaps I should say, to make more concessions to it. I wrote a little, and indeed with more concentration than usual, for I am struggling with a difficult subject and do not wish to be downed. In the midst of this, some friends visited me, with the purpose of employing force and of restraining me, as if I were a sick man indulging in some excess.  So conversation was substituted for writing; and from this conversation I shall communicate to you the topic which is still the subject of debate; for we have appointed you referee. You have more of a task on your hands than you suppose, for the argument is threefold. Our Stoic philosophers, as you know, declare that there are two things in the universe which are the source of everything, - namely, cause and matter. Matter lies sluggish, a substance ready for any use, but sure to remain unemployed if no one sets it in motion. Cause, however, by which we mean reason, moulds matter and turns it in whatever direction it will, producing thereby various concrete results. Accordingly, there must be, in the case of each thing, that from which it is made, and, next, an agent by which it is made.  The former is its material, the latter its cause. All art is but imitation of nature; therefore, let me apply these statements of general principles to <Ep1-445> the things which have to be made by man.  A statue, for example, has afforded matter which was to undergo treatment at the hands of the artist, and has had an artist who was to give form to the matter. Hence, in the case of the statue, the material was bronze, the cause was the workman. And so it goes with all things, - they consist of that which is made and of the maker.  The Stoics believe in one cause only - the maker; but Aristotle thinks that the word "cause" can be used in three ways: "The first cause," he says, "is the actual matter, without which nothing can be created.  The second is the workman.  The third is the form, which is impressed upon every work, - a statue, for example." This last is what Aristotle calls the idos. "There is, too," says he, "a fourth, - the purpose of the work as a whole." Now I shall show you what this last means.  Bronze is the "first cause" of the statue, for it could never have been made unless there had been something from which it could be cast and moulded.  The "second cause " is the artist; for without the skilled hands of a workman that bronze could not have been shaped to the outlines of the statue.  The "third cause" is the form, inasmuch as our statue could never be called The Lance-Bearer or The Boy Binding his Hair had not this special shape been stamped upon it. The "fourth cause" is the purpose of the work.  For if this purpose had not existed, the statue would not have been made.  Now what is this purpose?  It is that which attracted the artist which he followed when he made the statue.  It may have been money, if he has made it for sale; or renown, if he has worked for reputation; or religion, if he has wrought it as a gift for a temple.  Therefore this also is a cause contributing towards the making of the statue; <Ep1-447> or do you think that we should avoid including, among the causes of a thing which has been made, that element without which the thing in question would not have been made? To these four Plato adds a fifth cause, - the pattern which he himself calls the "idea"; for it is this that the artist gazed upon when he created the work which he had decided to carry out.  Now it makes no difference whether he has this pattern outside himself, that he may direct his glance to it, or within himself, conceived and placed there by himself.  God has within himself these patterns of all things, and his mind comprehends the harmonies and the measures of the whole totality of things which are to be carried out; he is filled with these shapes which Plato calls the "ideas," - imperishable, unchangeable, not subject to decay. And therefore, though men die, humanity itself, or the idea of man, according to which man is moulded, lasts on, and though men toil and perish, it suffers no change.  Accordingly, there are five causes, as Plato says: the material, the agent, the make-up, the model, and the end in view.  Last comes the result of all these. Just as in the case of the statue, - to go back to the figure with which we began, - the material is the bronze, the agent is the artist, the make-up is the form which is adapted to the material, the model is the pattern imitated by the agent, the end in view is the purpose in the maker's mind, and, finally, the result of all these is the statue itself.  The universe also, in Plato's opinion, possesses all these elements.  The agent is God; the source, matter; the form, the shape and the arrangement of the visible world.  The pattern is doubtless the model according to which God has made this great and most beautiful <Ep1-449> creation.  The purpose is his object in so doing.  Do you ask what God's purpose is?  It is goodness.  Plato, at any rate, says: "What was God's reason for creating the world?  God is good, and no good person is grudging of anything that is good.  Therefore, God made it the best world possible." Hand down your opinion, then, O judge; state who seems to you to say what is truest, and not who says what is absolutely true.  For to do that is as far beyond our ken as truth itself. This throng of causes, defined by Aristotle and by Plato, embraces either too much or too little. For if they regard as "causes" of an object that is to be made everything without which the object cannot be made, they have named too few.  Time must be included among the causes; for nothing can be made without time.  They must also include place; for if there be no place where a thing can be made, it will not be made.  And motion too; nothing is either made or destroyed without motion. There is no art without motion, no change of any kind. Now, however, I am searching for the first, the general cause; this must be simple, inasmuch as matter, too, is simple.  Do we ask what cause is?  It is surely Creative Reason, - in other words, God. For those clements to which you referred are not a great series of independent causes; they all hinge on one alone, and that will be the creative cause. Do you maintain that form is a cause? This is only what the artist stamps upon his work; it is part of a cause, but not the cause.  Neither is the pattern a cause, but an indispensable tool of the cause.  His pattern is as <Ep1-451> indispensable to the artist as the chisel or the file; without these, art can make no progress.  But for all that, these things are neither parts of the art, nor causes of it. "Then," perhaps you will say, "the purpose of the artist, that which leads him to undertake to create something, is the cause." It may be a cause; it is not, however, the efficient cause, but only an accessory cause.  But there are countless accessory causes; what we are discussing is the general cause.  Now the statement of Plato and Aristotle is not in accord with their usual penetration, when they maintain that the whole universe, the perfectly wrought work, is a cause. For there is a great difference between a work and the cause of a work. Either give your opinion, or, as is easier in cases of this kind, declare that the matter is not clear and call for another hearing. But you will reply: "What pleasure do you get from wasting your time on these problems, which relieve you of none of your emotions, rout none of your desires?" So far as I am concerned, I treat and discuss them as matters which contribute greatly toward calming the spirit, and I search myself first, and then the world about me.  And not even now am I, as you think, wasting my time.  For all these questions, provided that they be not chopped up and torn apart into such unprofitable refinements, elevate and lighten the soul, which is weighted down by a heavy burden and desires to be freed and to return to the elements of which it was once a part.  For this body of ours is a weight upon the soul and its penance; as the load presses down the soul is crushed and is in bondage, unless philosophy has come to its assistance and has bid it take fresh courage by contemplating the <Ep1-453> universe, and has turned it from things earthly to things divine. There it has its liberty, there it can roam abroad; meantime it escapes the custody in which it is bound, and renews its life in heaven. Just as skilled workmen, who have been engaged upon some delicate piece of work which wearies their eyes with straining, if the light which they have is niggardly or uncertain, go forth into the open air and in some park devoted to the people's recreation delight their eyes in the generous light of day; so the soul, imprisoned as it has been in this gloomy and darkened house, seeks the open sky whenever it can, and in the contemplation of the universe finds rest.  The wise man, the seeker after wisdom, is bound closely, indeed, to his body, but he is an absentee so far as his better self is concerned, and he concentrates his thoughts upon lofty things.  Bound, so to speak, to his oath of allegiance, he regards the period of life as his term of service.  He is so trained that he neither loves nor hates life; he endures a mortal lot, although he knows that an ampler lot is in store for him. Do you forbid me to contemplate the universe?  Do you compel me to withdraw from the whole and restrict me to a part?  May I not ask what are the beginnings of all things, who moulded the universe, who took the confused and conglomerate mass of sluggish matter, and separated it into its parts?  May I not inquire who is the Master-Builder of this universe, how the mighty bulk was brought under the control of law and order, who gathered together the scattered atoms, who separated the disordered elements and assigned an outward form to elements that lay in one vast shapelessness?  Or whence came all the expanse of light?  And whethber is it fire, or <Ep1-455> even brighter than fire? Am I not to ask these questions?  Must I be ignorant of the heights whence I have descended?  Whether I am to see this world but once, or to be born many times?  What is my destination afterwards? What abode awaits my soul on its release from the laws of slavery among men?  Do you forbid me to have a share in heaven? In other words, do you bid me live with my head bowed down?  No, I am above such an existence; I was born to a greater destiny than to be a mere cbattel of my body. and I regard this body as nothing but a chain which manacles my freedom . Therefore, I offer it as a sort of buffer to fortune , and shall allow no wound to penetrate through to my soul. For my body is the only part of me which can suffer injury.  In this dwelling, which is exposed to peril, my soul lives free.  Never shall this flesh drive me to feel fear or to assume any pretence that is unworthy of a good man.  Never shall I lie in order to honour this petty body.  When it seems proper, I shall sever my connexion with it.  And at present, while we are bound together, our alliance shall nevertheless not be one of equality; the soul shall bring all quarrels before its own tribunal.  To despise our bodies is sure freedom To return to our subject; this freedom will be greatly helped by the contemplation of which we were just speaking.  All things are made up of matter and of God.  God controls matter, which encompasses him and follows him as its guide and leader.  And that which creates, in other words, God, is more powerful and precious than matter, which is acted upon by God.  God's place in the <Ep1-457> universe corresponds to the soul's relation to man.  World-matter corresponds to our mortal body; therefore let the lower serve the higher. Let us be brave in the face of hazards.  Let us not fear wrongs, or wounds, or bonds, or poverty.  And what is death ?  It is either the end, or a process of change. I have no fear of ceasing to exist; it is the same as not having begun. Nor do I shrink from changing into another state, because I shall, under no conditions, be as cramped as I am now.  Farewell. <Ep1-459> 

[1] Hesternum diem divisi cum mala valetudine: antemeridianum illa sibi vindicavit, postmeridiano mihi cessit. Itaque lectione primum temptavi animum; deinde, cum hanc recepisset, plus illi imperare ausus sum, immo permittere: aliquid scripsi et quidem intentius quam soleo, dum cum materia difficili contendo et vinci nolo, donec intervenerunt amici qui mihi vim afferrent et tamquam aegrum intemperantem coercerent. [2] In locum stili sermo successit, ex quo eam partem ad te perferam quae in lite est. Te arbitrum addiximus. Plus negotii habes quam existimas: triplex causa est. Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri duo esse in rerum natura ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. Materia iacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat; causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult versat, ex illa varia opera producit. Esse ergo debet unde fiat aliquid, deinde a quo fiat: hoc causa est, illud materia. [3] Omnis ars naturae imitatio est; itaque quod de universo dicebam ad haec transfer quae ab homine facienda sunt. Statua et materiam habuit quae pateretur artificem, et artificem qui materiae daret faciem; ergo in statua materia aes fuit, causa opifex. Eadem condicio rerum omnium est: ex eo constant quod fit, et ex eo quod facit. [4] Stoicis placet unam causam esse, id quod facit. Aristoteles putat causam tribus modis dici: 'prima' inquit 'causa est ipsa materia, sine qua nihil potest effici; secunda opifex; tertia est forma, quae unicuique operi imponitur tamquam statuae'. Nam hanc Aristoteles 'idos' vocat. 'Quarta quoque' inquit 'his accedit, propositum totius operis.' [5] Quid sit hoc aperiam. Aes prima statuae causa est; numquam enim facta esset, nisi fuisset id ex quo funderetur ducereturve. Secunda causa artifex est; non potuisset enim aes illud in habitum statuae figurari, nisi accessissent peritae manus. Tertia causa est forma; neque enim statua ista 'doryphoros' aut 'diadumenos' vocaretur, nisi haec illi esset impressa facies. Quarta causa est faciendi propositum; nam nisi hoc fuisset, facta non esset. [6] Quid est propositum? quod invitavit artificem, quod ille secutus fecit: vel pecunia est haec, si venditurus fabricavit, vel gloria, si laboravit in nomen, vel religio, si donum templo paravit. Ergo et haec causa est propter quam fit: an non putas inter causas facti operis esse numerandum quo remoto factum non esset? [7] His quintam Plato adicit exemplar, quam ipse 'idean' vocat; hoc est enim ad quod respiciens artifex id quod destinabat effecit. Nihil autem ad rem pertinet utrum foris habeat exemplar ad quod referat oculos an intus, quod ibi ipse concepit et posuit. Haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intra se habet numerosque universorum quae agenda sunt et modos mente complexus est; plenus his figuris est quas Plato 'ideas' appellat, immortales, immutabiles, infatigabiles. Itaque homines quidem pereunt, ipsa autem humanitas, ad quam homo effingitur, permanet, et hominibus laborantibus, intereuntibus, illa nihil patitur. [8] Quinque ergo causae sunt, ut Plato dicit: id ex quo, id a quo, id in quo, id ad quod, id propter quod; novissime id quod ex his est. Tamquam in statua - quia de hac loqui coepimus - id ex quo aes est, id a quo artifex est, id in quo forma est quae aptatur illi, id ad quod exemplar est quod imitatur is qui facit, id propter quod facientis propositum est, id quod ex istis est ipsa statua <est>. [9] Haec omnia mundus quoque, ut ait Plato, habet: facientem, hic deus est; ex quo fit, haec materia est; formam, haec est habitus et ordo mundi quem videmus; exemplar, scilicet ad quod deus hanc magnitudinem operis pulcherrimi fecit; propositum, propter quod fecit. [10] Quaeris quod sit propositum deo? bonitas. Ita certe Plato ait: 'quae deo faciendi mundum fuit causa? bonus est; bono nulla cuiusquam boni invidia est; fecit itaque quam optimum potuit'. Fer ergo iudex sententiam et pronuntia quis tibi videatur verisimillimum dicere, non quis verissimum dicat; id enim tam supra nos est quam ipsa veritas. [11] Haec quae ab Aristotele et Platone ponitur turba causarum aut nimium multa aut nimium pauca comprendit. Nam si quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id causam iudicant esse faciendi, pauca dixerunt. Ponant inter causas tempus: nihil sine tempore potest fieri. Ponant locum: si non fuerit ubi fiat aliquid, ne fiet quidem. Ponant motum: nihil sine hoc nec fit nec perit; nulla sine motu ars, nulla mutatio est. [12] Sed nos nunc primam et generalem quaerimus causam. Haec simplex esse debet; nam et materia simplex est. Quaerimus quid sit causa? ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus; ista enim quaecumque rettulistis non sunt multae et singulae causae, sed ex una pendent, ex ea quae facit. [13] Formam dicis causam esse? hanc imponit artifex operi: pars causae est, non causa. Exemplar quoque non est causa, sed instrumentum causae necessarium. Sic necessarium est exemplar artifici quomodo scalprum, quomodo lima: sine his procedere ars non potest, non tamen hae partes artis aut causae sunt. [14] 'Propositum' inquit 'artificis, propter quod ad faciendum aliquid accedit, causa est.' Ut sit causa, non est efficiens causa, sed superveniens. Hae autem innumerabiles sunt: nos de causa generali quaerimus. Illud vero non pro solita ipsis subtilitate dixerunt, totum mundum et consummatum opus causam esse; multum enim interest inter opus et causam operis. [15] Aut fer sententiam aut, quod facilius in eiusmodi rebus est, nega tibi liquere et nos reverti iube. 'Quid te' inquis 'delectat tempus inter ista conterere, quae tibi nullum affectum eripiunt, nullam cupiditatem abigunt?' Ego quidem [peiora] illa ago ac tracto quibus pacatur animus, et me prius scrutor, deinde hunc mundum. [16] Ne nunc quidem tempus, ut existimas, perdo; ista enim omnia, si non concidantur nec in hanc subtilitatem inutilem distrahantur, attollunt et levant animum, qui gravi sarcina pressus explicari cupit et reverti ad illa quorum fuit. Nam corpus hoc animi pondus ac poena est; premente illo urguetur, in vinclis est, nisi accessit philosophia et illum respirare rerum naturae spectaculo iussit et a terrenis ad divina dimisit. Haec libertas eius est, haec evagatio; subducit interim se custodiae in qua tenetur et caelo reficitur. [17] Quemadmodum artifices [ex] alicuius rei subtilioris quae intentione oculos defetigat, si malignum habent et precarium lumen, in publicum prodeunt et in aliqua regione ad populi otium dedicata oculos libera luce delectant, sic animus in hoc tristi et obscuro domicilio clusus, quotiens potest, apertum petit et in rerum naturae contemplatione requiescit. [18] Sapiens assectatorque sapientiae adhaeret quidem in corpore suo, sed optima sui parte abest et cogitationes suas ad sublimia intendit. Velut sacramento rogatus hoc quod vivit stipendium putat; et ita formatus est ut illi nec amor vitae nec odium sit, patiturque mortalia quamvis sciat ampliora superesse. [19] Interdicis mihi inspectione rerum naturae, a toto abductum redigis in partem? Ego non quaeram quae sint initia universorum? quis rerum formator? quis omnia in uno mersa et materia inerti convoluta discreverit? Non quaeram quis sit istius artifex mundi? qua ratione tanta magnitudo in legem et ordinem venerit? quis sparsa collegerit, confusa distinxerit, in una deformitate iacentibus faciem diviserit? unde lux tanta fundatur? ignis sit, an aliquid igne lucidius? [20] Ego ista non quaeram? ego nesciam unde descenderim? semel haec mihi videnda sint, an saepe nascendum? quo hinc iturus sim? quae sedes exspectet animam solutam legibus servitutis humanae? Vetas me caelo interesse, id est iubes me vivere capite demisso? [21] Maior sum et ad maiora genitus quam ut mancipium sim mei corporis, quod equidem non aliter aspicio quam vinclum aliquod libertati meae circumdatum; hoc itaque oppono fortunae, in quo resistat, nec per illud ad me ullum transire vulnus sino. Quidquid in me potest iniuriam pati hoc est in hoc obnoxio domicilio animus liber habitat. [22] Numquam me caro ista compellet ad metum, numquam ad indignam bono simulationem; numquam in honorem huius corpusculi mentiar. Cum visum erit, distraham cum illo societatem; et nunc tamen, dum haeremus, non erimus aequis partibus socii: animus ad se omne ius ducet. Contemptus corporis sui certa libertas est. [23] Ut ad propositum revertar, huic libertati multum conferet et illa de qua modo loquebamur inspectio; nempe universa ex materia et ex deo constant. Deus ista temperat quae circumfusa rectorem sequuntur et ducem. Potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus, quam materia patiens dei. [24] Quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est. Serviant ergo deteriora melioribus; fortes simus adversus fortuita; non contremescamus iniurias, non vulnera, non vincula, non egestatem. Mors quid est? aut finis aut transitus. Nec desinere timeo - idem est enim quod non coepisse -, nec transire, quia nusquam tam anguste ero. Vale.