Letter 71

You are continually referring special questions to me, forgetting that a vast stretch of sea sunders us. Since, however, the value of advice depends mostly on the time when it is given, it must necessarily result that by the time my opinion on certain matters reaches you, the opposite opinion is the better.  For advice conforms to circumstances; and our circumstances are carried along, or rather whirled along.  Accordingly, advice should be produced at short notice; and even this is too late; it should "grow while we work," as the saying is.  And I propose to show you how you may discover the method. As often as you wish to know what is to be avoided or what is to be sought, consider its relation to the Supreme Good, to the purpose of your whole life.  For whatever we do ought to be in harmony with this; no man can set in order the details unless he has already set before himself the chief purpose of his life. The artist may have his colours all prepared, but be cannot produce a likeness unless he has already made up his mind what he wishes to paint. The reason we make mistakes is because we all consider the parts of life, but never life as a whole. <Ep2-73> The archer must know what he is seeking to hit; then he must aim and control the weapon by his skill.  Our plans miscarry because they have no aim.  When a man does not know what harbour he is making for, no wind is the right wind.  Chance must necessarily have great influence over our lives, because we live by chance.  It is the case with certain men, however, that they do not know that they know certain things. Just as we often go searching for those who stand beside us, so we are apt to forget that the goal of the Supreme Good lies near us. To infer the nature of this Supreme Good, one does not need many words or any round-about discussion; it should be pointed out with the forefinger, so to speak, and not be dissipated into many parts.  For what good is there in breaking it up into tiny bits, when you can say: the Supreme Good is that which is honourable? Besides (and you may be still more surprised at this), that which is honourable is the only good; all other goods are alloyed and debased. If you once convince yourself of this, and if you come to love virtue devotedly (for mere loving is not enough), anything that has been touched by virtue will be fraught with blessing and prosperity for you, no matter how it shall be regarded by others.  Torture, if only, as you lie suffering, you are more calm in mind than your very torturer; illness, if only you curse not Fortune and yield not to the disease - in short, all those things which others regard as ills will become manageable and will end in good, if you succeed in rising above them. Let this once be clear, that there is nothing good except that which is honourable, and all hardships will have a just title to the name of "goods," when <Ep2-75> once virtue has made them honourable.  Many think that we Stoics are holding out expectations greater than our human lot admits of; and they have a right to think so.  For they have regard to the body only. But let them turn back to the soul, and they will soon measure man by the standard of God.  Rouse yourself, most excellent Lucilius, and leave off all this word-play of the philosophers, who reduce a most glorious subject to a matter of syllables, and lower and wear out the soul by teaching fragments; then you will become like the men who discovered these precepts, instead of those who by their teaching do their best to make philosopliy seem difficult rather than great.\a Socrates, who recalled the whole of philosophy to rules of conduct, and asserted that the highest wisdom consisted in distinguishing between good and evil, said:  "Follow these rules, if my words carry weight with you, in order that you may be happy; and let some men think you even a fool.  Allow any man who so desires to insult you and work you wrong; but if only virtue dwells with you, you will suffer nothing.  If you wish to be happy, if you would be in good faith a good man let one person or another despise you." No man can accomplish this unless he has come to regard all goods as equal, for the reason that no good exists without that which is honourable, and that which is honourable is in every case equal.  You may say:  "What then?  Is there no difference between Cato's being elected praetor and his failure at the polls?  Or whether Cato is conquered or conqueror in the battle-line of Pharsalia?  And when Cato could not be defeated, though his party met defeat, was not this goodness of his equal to that which would have been his if <Ep2-77> he had returned victorious to his native land and arranged a peace?" Of course it was; for it is by the same virtue that evil fortune is overcome and good fortune is controlled.  Virtue however, cannot be increased or decreased; its stature is uniform.  "But," you will object, "Gnaeus Pompey will lose his army; the patricians, those noblest patterns of the State's creation, and the front-rank men of Pompey's party, a senate under arms, will be routed in a single engagement; the ruins of that great oligarchy will be scattered all over the world; one division will fall in Egypt, another in Africa, and another in Spain! And the poor State will not be allowed even the privilege of being ruined once for all!" Yes, all this may happen; Juba's familiarity with every position in his own kingdom may be of no avail to him, of no avail the resolute bravery of his people when fighting for their king; even the men of Utica, crushed by their troubles, may waver in their allegiance; and the good fortune which ever attended men of the name of Scipio may desert Scipio in Africa.  But long ago destiny "saw to it that Cato should come to no harm." "    "He was conquered in spite of it all!" Well, you may include this among Cato's "failures "; Cato will bear with an equally stout heart anything that thwarts him of his victory, as he bore that which thwarted him of his praetorship.  The day whereon be failed of election, he spent in play; the night wherein he intended to die, he spent in reading. He regarded in the same light both the loss of his praetorship and the loss of his life; he had convinced himself that he ought to endure anything which might happen.  Why should he not suffer, bravely and calmly, a change in the govern- -------- c Plato's Phaedo. <Ep2-79> ment?  For what is free from the risk of change?  Neither earth, nor sky, nor the whole fabric of our universe, though it be controlled by the hand of God.  It will not always preserve its present order; it will be thrown from its course in days to come. All things move in accord with their appointed times; they are destined to be born, to grow, and to be destroyed. The stars which you see moving above us, and this seemingly immovable earth to which we cling and on which we are set, will be consumed and will cease to exist.  There is nothing that does not have its old age; the intervals are merely unequal at which Nature sends forth all these things towards the same goal.  Whatever is will cease to be, and yet it will not perish, but will be resolved into its elements. To our minds, this process means perishing, for we behold only that which is nearest; our sluggish mind, under allegiance to the body, does not penetrate to bournes beyond.  Were it not so, the mind would endure with greater courage its own ending and that of its possessions, if only it could hope that life and death, like the whole universe about us, go by turns, that whatever has been put together is broken up again, that whatever has been broken up is put together again, and that the eternal craftsmanship of God, who controls all things is working at this task. Therefore the wise man will say just what a Marcus Cato would say, after reviewing his past life:  "The whole race of man, both that which is and that which is to be, is condemned to die.  Of all the cities that at any time have held sway over the world, and of all that have been the splendid ornaments of empires not their own, men shall some day ask where they were, and they shall be swept away <Ep2-81> by destructions of various kinds; some shall be ruined by wars, others shall be wasted away by inactivity and by the kind of peace which ends in slotlh, or by that vice which is fraught with destruction even for mighty dynasties, - luxury.  All these fertile plains shall be buried out of sight by a sudden overflowing of the sea, or a slipplng of the soil, as it settles to lower levels, shall draw them suddenly into a yawning chasm.  Why then should I be angry or feel sorrow, if I precede the general destruction by a tiny interval of time?" Let great souls comply with God's wishes, and suffer unhesitatingly whatever fate the law of the universe ordains; for the soul at death is either sent forth into a better life, destined to dwell with deity amid greater radiance and calm, or else, at least, without suffering any harm to itself, it will be mingled with nature again, and will return to the universe. Therefore Cato's honourable death was no less a good than his honourable life, since virtue admits of no stretching. Socrates used to say that verity and virtue were the same.  Just as truth does not grow, so neither does virtue grow; for it has its due proportions and is complete.  You need not, therefore, wonder that goods are equal, both those which are to be deliberately chosen, and those which circumstances have imposed.  For if you once adopt the view that they are unequal, deeming, for instance, a brave endurance of torture as among the lesser goods, you will be including it among the evils also; you will pronounce Socrates unhappy in his prison, Cato unhappy when he reopens his wounds with more courage than he allowed in <Ep2-83> inflicting them, and Regulus the most ill-starred of all when he pays the penalty for keeping his word even with his enemies.  And yet no man, even the most effeminate person in the world, has ever dared to maintain such an opinion.  For though such persons deny that a man like Regulus is happy, yet for all that they also deny that he is wretched.  The carlier Academics do indeed admit that a man is happy even amid such tortures, but do not admit that he is completely or fully happy. With this view we cannot in any wise agree; for unless a man is happy, he has not attained the Supreme Good; and the good which is supreme admits of no higher degree, if only virtue exists within this man, and if adversity does not impair his virtue, and if, though the body be injured, the virtue abides unharmed. And it does abide.  For I understand virtue to be high_spirited and exalted, so that it is aroused by anything that molests it.  This spirit, which young men of noble breeding often assume, when they are so deeply stirred by the beauty of some honourable object that they despise all the gifts of chance, is assuredly infused in us and communicated to us by wisdom.  Wisdom will bring the conviction that there is but one good - that which is honourable; that this can neither be shortened nor extended, any more than a carpenter's rule, with which straight lines are tested, can be bent.  Any change in the rule means spoiling the straight line.  Applying, therefore, this same figure to virtue, we shall say: virtue also is straight, and admits of no bending.  What can be made more tense than a thing which is already rigid? Such is virtue, which passes judgment on everything, but nothing passes judgment on virtue.  And if this rule, virtue, cannot <Ep2-85> itself be made more straight, neither can the things created by virtue be in one case straighter and in another less straight.  For they must necessarily correspond to virtue; hence they are equal. "    "What," you say, "do you call reclining at a banquet and submitting to torture equally good?" Does this seem surprising to you?  You may be still more surprised at the following, - that reclining at a banquet is an evil, while reclining on the rack is a good, if the former act is done in a shameful, and the latter in an honourable manner. It is not the material that makes these actions good or bad; it is the virtue.  All acts in which virtue has disclosed itself are of the same measure and value.  At this moment the man who measures the souls of all men by his own is shaking his fist in my face because I hold that there is a parity between the goods involved in the case of one who passes sentence honourably, and of one who suffers sentence honourably; or because I hold that there is a parity between the goods of one who celebrates a triumph, and of one who, unconquered in spirit, is carried before the victor's chariot.  For such critics think that whatever they themselves cannot do, is not done; they pass judgment on virtue in the light of their own weaknesses.  Why do you marvel if it helps a man, and on occasion even pleases him, to be burned, wounded, slain, or bound in prison? To a luxurious man, a simple life is a penalty; to a lazy man, work is punishment; the dandy pities the diligent man; to the slothful, studies are torture.  Similarly, we regard those things with respect to which we are all infirm of disposition, as hard and beyond endurance, forgetting what a torment it is to many men to abstain from wine or to be routed from their beds at break of day.  These <Ep2-87> actions are not essentially difficult; it is we ourselves that are soft and flabby.  We must pass judgment concerning great matters with greatness of soul; otherwise, that which is really our fault will seem to be their fault.  So it is that certain objects which are perfectly straight, when sunk in water appear to the onlooker as bent or broken off. It matters not only what you see, but with what eyes you see it; our souls are too dull of vision to perceive the truth.  But give me an unspoiled and sturdy-minded young man; he will pronounce more fortunate one who sustains on unbending shoulders the whole weight of adversity, who stands out superior to Fortune. It is not a cause for wonder that one is not tossed about when the weather is calm; reserve your wonderment for cases where a man is lifted up when all others sink, and keeps his footing when all others are prostrate. What element of evil is there in torture and in the other things which we call hardships?  It seems to me that there is this evil, - that the mind sags, and bends, and collapses. But none of these things can happen to the sage; he stands erect under any load. Nothing can subdue him; nothing that must be endured annoys him. For he does not complain that he has been struck by that which can strike any man.  He knows his own strength; he knows that he was born to carry burdens. I do not withdraw the wise man from the category of man, nor do I deny to him the sense of pain as though he were a rock that has no feelings at all.  I remember that he is made up of two parts: the one part is irrational, - it is this that may be bitten, burned, or hurt; the other part is rational, -it is this which holds resolutely to opinions, is courageous, and unconquerable. In the <Ep2-89> latter is situated man's Supreme Good.  Before this is completely attained, the mind wavers in uncertainty; only when it is fully achieved is the mind fixed and steady.  And so when one has just begun, or is on one's way to the heights and is cultivating virtue, or even if one is drawing near the perfect good but has not yet put the finishing touch upon it, one will retrograde at times and there will be a certain slackening of mental effort. For such a man has not yet traversed the doubtful ground; he is still standing in slippery places.  But the happy man, whose virtue is complete, loves himself most of all when his bravery has been submitted to the severest test, and when he not only, endures but welcomes that which all other men regard with fear, if it is the price which he must pay for the performnance of a duty which honour imposes, and he greatly prefers to have men say of him:  "how much more noble!" rather than "how much more lucky!" And now I have reached the point to which your patient waiting summons me.  You must not think that our human virtue transcends nature; the wise man will tremble, will feel pain, will turn pale, For all these are sensations of the body.  Where, then, is the abode of utter distress, of that which is truly an evil? In the other part of us, no doubt, if it is the mind that these trials drag down, force to a confession of its servitude, and cause to regret its existence.  The wise man, indeed, overcomes Fortune by his virtue, but many who profess wisdom are sometimes frightened by the most unsubstantial threats.  And at this stage it is a mistake on our part to make the same demands upon the wise man and upon the learner. I still exhort myself to do <Ep2-91> that which I recommend; but my exhortations are not yet followed. And even if this were the case, I should not have these principles so ready for practice, or so well trained, that they would rush to my assistance in every crisis.  Just as wool takes up certain colours at once, while there are others which it will not absorb unless it is soaked and steeped in them many times; so other systems of doctrine can be immediately applied by men's minds after once being accepted, but this system of which I speak, unless it has gone deep and has sunk in for a long time, and has not merely coloured but thoroughly permeated the soul, does not fulfil any of its promises.  The matter can be imparted quickly and in very few words:  "Virtue is the only good; at any rate there is no good without virtue; and virtue itself is situated in our nobler part, that is, the rational part." And what will this virtue be?  A true and never-swerving judgment .  For therefrom will spring all mental impulses, and by its agency every external appearance that stirs our impulses will be clarified.  It will be in keeping with this judgment to judge all things that have been coloured by virtue as goods, and as equal goods. Bodily goods are, to be sure, good for the body; but they are not absolutely good.  There will indeed be some value in them; but they will possess no genuine merit, for they will differ greatly; some will be less, others greater.  And we are constrained to acknowledge that there are great differences among the very followers of wisdom.  One man has already made so much progress that he dares to raise his eyes and look Fortune in the face, but not persistently, for his eyes soon drop, dazzled by her overwhelming splendour; another has made <Ep2-93> so much progress that he is able to match glances with her, -that is, unless he has already reached the summit and is full of confideuce. That which is short of perfection must necessarily be unsteady, at one time progressing, at another slipping or growing faint; and it will surely slip back unless it keeps struggling ahead; for if a man slackens at all in zeal and faithful application, he must retrograde.  No one can resume his progress at the point where be left off.  Therefore let us press on and persevere.  There remains much more of the road than we have put behind us; but the greater part of progress is the desire to progress. I fully understand what this task is. It is a thing which I desire, and I desire it with all my heart. I see that you also have been aroused and are hastening with great zeal towards infinite beauty.  Let us, then, hasten; only on these terms will life be a boon to us; otherwise, there is delay, and indeed disgraceful delay, while we busy ourselves with revolting things.  Let us see to it that all time belongs to us.  This, however, cannot be unless first of all our own selves begin to belong to us.  And when will it be our privilege to despise both kinds of fortune?  When will it be our privilege, after all the passions have been subdued and brought under our own control, to utter the words "I have conquered!"?  Do you ask me whom I have conquered?  Neither the Persians, nor the far-off Medes, nor any warlike race that lies beyond the Dahae; not these, but greed, ambition, and the fear of death that has conquered the conquerors of the world.  Farewell. <Ep2-95>

[1] Subinde me de rebus singulis consulis, oblitus vasto nos mari dividi. Cum magna pars consilii sit in tempore, necesse est evenire ut de quibusdam rebus tunc ad te perferatur sententia mea cum iam contraria potior est. Consilia enim rebus aptantur; res nostrae feruntur, immo volvuntur; ergo consilium nasci sub diem debet. Et hoc quoque nimis tardum est: sub manu, quod aiunt, nascatur. Quemadmodum autem inveniatur ostendam. [2] Quotiens quid fugiendum sit aut quid petendum voles scire, ad summum bonum, propositum totius vitae tuae, respice. Illi enim consentire debet quidquid agimus: non disponet singula, nisi cui iam vitae suae summa proposita est. Nemo, quamvis paratos habeat colores, similitudinem reddet, nisi iam constat quid velit pingere. Ideo peccamus quia de partibus vitae omnes deliberamus, de tota nemo deliberat. [3] Scire debet quid petat ille qui sagittam vult mittere, et tunc derigere ac moderari manu telum: errant consilia nostra, quia non habent quo derigantur; ignoranti quem portum petat nullus suus ventus est. Necesse est multum in vita nostra casus possit, quia vivimus casu. [4] Quibusdam autem evenit ut quaedam scire se nesciant; quemadmodum quaerimus saepe eos cum quibus stamus, ita plerumque finem summi boni ignoramus appositum. Nec multis verbis nec circumitu longo quod sit summum bonum colliges: digito, ut ita dicam, demonstrandum est nec in multa spargendum. Quid enim ad rem pertinet in particulas illud diducere? cum possis dicere 'summum bonum est quod honestum est' et, quod magis admireris, 'unum bonum est quod honestum est, cetera falsa et adulterina bona sunt'. [5] Hoc si persuaseris tibi et virtutem adamaveris - amare enim parum est -, quidquid illa contigerit, id tibi, qualecumque aliis videbitur, faustum felixque erit. Et torqueri, si modo iacueris ipso torquente securior, et aegrotare, si non male dixeris fortunae, si non cesseris morbo, omnia denique quae ceteris videntur mala et mansuescent et in bonum abibunt, si super illa eminueris. Hoc liqueat, nihil esse bonum nisi honestum: et omnia incommoda suo iure bona vocabuntur quae modo virtus honestaverit. [6] Multis videmur maiora promittere quam recipit humana condicio, non immerito; ad corpus enim respiciunt. Revertantur ad animum: iam hominem deo metientur. Erige te, Lucili virorum optime, et relinque istum ludum litterarium philosophorum qui rem magnificentissimam ad syllabas vocant, qui animum minuta docendo demittunt et conterunt: fies similis illis qui invenerunt ista, non qui docent et id agunt ut philosophia potius difficilis quam magna videatur. [7] Socrates, qui totam philosophiam revocavit ad mores et hanc summam dixit esse sapientiam, bona malaque distinguere, 'sequere' inquit 'illos, si quid apud te habeo auctoritatis, ut sis beatus, et te alicui stultum videri sine. Quisquis volet tibi contumeliam faciat et iniuriam, tu tamen nihil patieris, si modo tecum erit virtus. Si vis inquit 'beatus esse, si fide bona vir bonus, sine contemnat te aliquis.' Hoc nemo praestabit nisi qui omnia prior ipse contempserit, nisi qui omnia bona exaequaverit, quia nec bonum sine honesto est et honestum in omnibus par est. [8] 'Quid ergo? nihil interest inter praeturam Catonis et repulsam? nihil interest utrum Pharsalica acie Cato vincatur an vincat? hoc eius bonum, quo victis partibus non potest vinci, par erat illi bono quo victor rediret in patriam et componeret pacem?' Quidni par sit? eadem enim virtute et mala fortuna vincitur et ordinatur bona; virtus autem non potest maior aut minor fieri: unius staturae est. [9] 'Sed Cn. Pompeius amittet exercitum, sed illud pulcherrimum rei publicae praetextum, optimates, et prima acies Pompeianarum partium, senatus ferens arma, uno proelio profligabuntur et tam magni ruina imperii in totum dissiliet orbem: aliqua pars eius in Aegypto, aliqua in Africa, aliqua in Hispania cadet. Ne hoc quidem miserae rei publicae continget, semel ruere.' [10] Omnia licet fiant: Iubam in regno suo non locorum notitia adiuvet, non popularium pro rege suo virtus obstinatissima, Uticensium quoque fides malis fracta deficiat et Scipionem in Africa nominis sui fortuna destituat: olim provisum est ne quid Cato detrimenti caperet. [11] 'Victus est tamen.' Et hoc numera inter repulsas Catonis: tam magno animo feret aliquid sibi ad victoriam quam ad praeturam obstitisse. Quo die repulsus est lusit, qua nocte periturus fuit legit; eodem loco habuit praetura et vita excidere; omnia quae acciderent ferenda esse persuaserat sibi. [12] Quidni ille mutationem rei publicae forti et aequo pateretur animo? quid enim mutationis periculo exceptum? non terra, non caelum, non totus hic rerum omnium contextus, quamvis deo agente ducatur; non semper tenebit hunc ordinem, sed illum ex hoc cursu aliquis dies deiciet. [13] Certis eunt cuncta temporibus: nasci debent, crescere, exstingui. Quaecumque supra nos vides currere et haec quibus innixi atque impositi sumus veluti solidissimis carpentur ac desinent; nulli non senectus sua est. Inaequalibus ista spatiis eodem natura dimittit: quidquid est non erit, nec peribit sed resolvetur. [14] Nobis solvi perire est; proxima enim intuemur, ad ulteriora non prospicit mens hebes et quae se corpori addixerit; alioqui fortius finem sui suorumque pateretur, si speraret, <ut> omnia illa, sic vitam mortemque per vices ire et composita dissolvi, dissoluta componi, in hoc opere aeternam artem cuncta temperantis dei verti. [15] Itaque ut M. Cato, cum aevum animo percucurrerit, dicet, 'omne humanum genus, quodque est quodque erit, morte damnatum est; omnes quae usquam rerum potiuntur urbes quaeque alienorum imperiorum magna sunt decora, ubi fuerint aliquando quaeretur et vario exitii genere tollentur: alias destruent bella, alias desidia paxque ad inertiam versa consumet et magnis opibus exitiosa res, luxus. Omnes hos fertiles campos repentini maris inundatio abscondet aut in subitam cavernam considentis soli lapsus abducet. Quid est ergo quare indigner aut doleam, si exiguo momento publica fata praecedo?' [16] Magnus animus deo pareat et quidquid lex universi iubet sine cunctatione patiatur: aut in meliorem emittitur vitam lucidius tranquilliusque inter divina mansurus aut certe sine ullo futurus incommodo, si naturae remiscebitur et revertetur in totum. Non est ergo M. Catonis maius bonum honesta vita quam mors honesta, quoniam non intenditur virtus. Idem esse dicebat Socrates veritatem et virtutem. Quomodo illa non crescit, sic ne virtus quidem: habet numeros suos, plena est. [17] Non est itaque quod mireris paria esse bona, et quae ex proposito sumenda sunt et quae si ita res tulit. Nam si hanc inaequalitatem receperis ut fortiter torqueri in minoribus bonis numeres, numerabis etiam in malis, et infelicem Socraten dices in carcere, infelicem Catonem vulnera sua animosius quam fecerat retractantem, calamitosissimum omnium Regulum fidei poenas etiam hostibus servatae pendentem. Atqui nemo hoc dicere, ne ex mollissimis quidem, ausus est; negant enim illum esse beatum, sed tamen negant miserum. [18] Academici veteres beatum quidem esse etiam inter hos cruciatus fatentur, sed non ad perfectum nec ad plenum, quod nullo modo potest recipi: nisi beatus est, in summo bono non est. Quod summum bonum est supra se gradum non habet, si modo illi virtus inest, si illam adversa non minuunt, si manet etiam comminuto corpore incolumis: manet autem. Virtutem enim intellego animosam et excelsam, quam incitat quidquid infestat. [19] Hunc animum, quem saepe induunt generosae indolis iuvenes quos alicuius honestae rei pulchritudo percussit, ut omnia fortuita contemnant, profecto sapientia [non] infundet et tradet; persuadebit unum bonum esse quod honestum, hoc nec remitti nec intendi posse, non magis quam regulam qua rectum probari solet flectes. Quidquid ex illa mutaveris iniuria est recti. [20] Idem ergo de virtute dicemus: et haec recta est, flexuram non recipit; [rigidari quidem amplius intendi potest]. Haec de omnibus rebus iudicat, de hac nulla. Si rectior ipsa non potest fieri, ne quae ab illa quidem fiunt alia aliis rectiora sunt; huic enim necesse est respondeant; ita paria sunt. [21] 'Quid ergo?' inquis 'iacere in convivio et torqueri paria sunt?' Hoc mirum videtur tibi? illud licet magis admireris: iacere in convivio malum est, iacere in eculeo bonum est, si illud turpiter, hoc honeste fit. Bona ista aut mala non efficit materia sed virtus; haec ubicumque apparuit, omnia eiusdem mensurae ac pretii sunt. [22] In oculos nunc mihi manus intentat ille qui omnium animum aestimat ex suo, quod dicam paria bona esse honeste iudicantis <et honeste periclitantis,> quod dicam paria bona esse eius qui triumphat et eius qui ante currum vehitur invictus animo. Non putant enim fieri quidquid facere non possunt; ex infirmitate sua ferunt de virtute sententiam. [23] Quid miraris si uri, vulnerari, occidi, alligari iuvat, aliquando etiam libet? Luxurioso frugalitas poena est, pigro supplicii loco labor est, delicatus miseretur industrii, desidioso studere torqueri est: eodem modo haec ad quae omnes imbecilli sumus dura atque intoleranda credimus, obliti quam multis tormentum sit vino carere aut prima luce excitari. Non ista difficilia sunt natura, sed nos fluvidi et enerves. [24] Magno animo de rebus magnis iudicandum est; alioqui videbitur illarum vitium esse quod nostrum est. Sic quaedam rectissima, cum in aquam demissa sunt, speciem curvi praefractique visentibus reddunt. Non tantum quid videas, sed quemadmodum, refert: animus noster ad vera perspicienda caligat. [25] Da mihi adulescentem incorruptum et ingenio vegetum: dicet fortunatiorem sibi videri qui omnia rerum adversarum onera rigida cervice sustollat, qui supra fortunam exstet. Non est mirum in tranquillitate non concuti: illud mirare, ibi extolli aliquem ubi omnes deprimuntur, ibi stare ubi omnes iacent. [26] Quid est in tormentis, quid est in aliis quae adversa appellamus mali? hoc, ut opinor, succidere mentem et incurvari et succumbere. Quorum nihil sapienti viro potest evenire: stat rectus sub quolibet pondere. Nulla illum res minorem facit; nihil illi eorum quae ferenda sunt displicet. Nam quidquid cadere in hominem potest in se cecidisse non queritur. Vires suas novit; scit se esse oneri ferendo. [27] Non educo sapientem ex hominum numero nec dolores ab illo sicut ab aliqua rupe nullum sensum admittente summoveo. Memini ex duabus illum partibus esse compositum: altera est irrationalis, haec mordetur, uritur, dolet; altera rationalis, haec inconcussas opiniones habet, intrepida est et indomita. In hac positum est summum illud hominis bonum. Antequam impleatur, incerta mentis volutatio est; cum vero perfectum est, immota illi stabilitas est. [28] Itaque inchoatus et ad summa procedens cultorque virtutis, etiam si appropinquat perfecto bono sed ei nondum summam manum imposuit, ibit interim cessim et remittet aliquid ex intentione mentis; nondum enim incerta transgressus est, etiam nunc versatur in lubrico. Beatus vero et virtutis exactae tunc se maxime amat cum fortissime expertus est, et metuenda ceteris, si alicuius honesti officii pretia sunt, non tantum fert sed amplexatur multoque audire mavult 'tanto melior' quam 'tanto felicior'. [29] Venio nunc illo quo me vocat exspectatio tua. Ne extra rerum naturam vagari virtus nostra videatur, et tremet sapiens et dolebit et expallescet; hi enim omnes corporis sensus sunt. Ubi ergo calamitas, ubi illud malum verum est? illic scilicet, si ista animum detrahunt, si ad confessionem servitutis adducunt, si illi paenitentiam sui faciunt. [30] Sapiens quidem vincit virtute fortunam, at multi professi sapientiam levissimis nonnumquam minis exterriti sunt. Hoc loco nostrum vitium est, qui idem a sapiente exigimus et a proficiente. Suadeo adhuc mihi ista quae laudo, nondum persuadeo; etiam si persuasissem, nondum tam parata haberem aut tam exercitata ut ad omnes casus procurrerent. [31] Quemadmodum lana quosdam colores semel ducit, quosdam nisi saepius macerata et recocta non perbibit, sic alias disciplinas ingenia, cum accepere, protinus praestant: haec, nisi alte descendit et diu sedit et animum non coloravit sed infecit, nihil ex iis quae promiserat praestat. [32] Cito hoc potest tradi et paucissimis verbis: unum bonum esse virtutem, nullum certe sine virtute, et ipsam virtutem in parte nostri meliore, id est rationali, positam. Quid erit haec virtus? iudicium verum et immotum; ab hoc enim impetus venient mentis, ab hoc omnis species quae impetum movet redigetur ad liquidum. [33] Huic iudicio consentaneum erit omnia quae virtute contacta sunt et bona iudicare et inter se paria. Corporum autem bona corporibus quidem bona sunt, sed in totum non sunt bona; his pretium quidem erit aliquod, ceterum dignitas non erit; magnis inter se intervallis distabunt: alia minora, alia maiora erunt. [34] Et in ipsis sapientiam sectantibus magna discrimina esse fateamur necesse est: alius iam in tantum profecit ut contra fortunam audeat attollere oculos, sed non pertinaciter - cadunt enim nimio splendore praestricti -, alius in tantum ut possit cum illa conferre vultum, nisi iam pervenit ad summum et fiduciae plenus est. [35] Imperfecta necesse est labent et modo prodeant, modo sublabantur aut succidant. Sublabentur autem, nisi ire et niti perseveraverint; si quicquam ex studio et fideli intentione laxaverint, retro eundum est. Nemo profectum ibi invenit ubi reliquerat. [36] Instemus itaque et perseveremus; plus quam profligavimus restat, sed magna pars est profectus velle proficere. Huius rei conscius mihi sum: volo et mente tota volo. Te quoque instinctum esse et magno ad pulcherrima properare impetu video. Properemus: ita demum vita beneficium erit; alioquin mora est, et quidem turpis inter foeda versantibus. Id agamus ut nostrum omne tempus sit; non erit autem, nisi prius nos nostri esse coeperimus. [37] Quando continget contemnere utramque fortunam, quando continget omnibus oppressis affectibus et sub arbitrium suum adductis hanc vocem emittere 'vici'? Quem vicerim quaeris? Non Persas nec extrema Medorum nec si quid ultra Dahas bellicosum iacet, sed avaritiam, sed ambitionem, sed metum mortis, qui victores gentium vicit. Vale.