Letter 73
It seems to me erroneous to believe that those who have loyally dedicated
themselves to philosophy are stubborn and rebellious, scorners of magistrates
or kings or of those who control the administration of public affairs.
For, on the contrary, no class of man is so popular with the philosopher
as the ruler is; and rightly so, because rulers bestow upon no men a greater
privilege than upon those who are allowed to enjoy peace and leisure.
Hence, those who are greatly profited, as regards their purpose of right
living, by the security of the State, must needs cherish as a father the
author of this good; much more so, at any rate, than those restless persons
who are always in the public eye, who owe much to the ruler, but also expect
much from him, and are never so generously loaded with favours that their
cravings, which grow by being supplied, are thoroughly satisfied.
And yet he whose thoughts are of benefits to come has forgotten the benefits
received; and there is no greater evil in covetousness than its ingratittide.
Besides, no man in public life thinks of the many whom be has outstripped;
he thinks rather of those by whom he is outstripped. And these men
find it less pleasing to see many behind them than annoying to see anyone
ahead of them. That is the trouble with every sort of ambition; it does
not look back. Nor is it ambition alone that is fickle, but also
every sort of craving, because it always begins where it ought to end.
But that other man, upright and pure,
who has left the senate and the bar and all affairs of state, that
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he may retire to nobler affairs, cherishes those who have made it
possible for him to do this in security; he is the only person who returns
spontaneous thanks to them, the only person who owes them a great debt
without their knowledge. Just as a man honours and reveres his teachers,
by whose aid he has found release from his early wanderings, so the sage
honours these men, also, under whose guardianship he can put his good theories
into practice. But you answer: "Other men too are protected
by a king's personal power." Perfectly true. But just as, out of
a number of persons who have profited by the same stretch of calm weather,
a man deems that his debt to Neptune is greater if his cargo during that
voyage has been more extensive and valuable, and just as the vow is paid
with more of a will by the merchant than by the passenger, and just as,
from among the merchants themselves, heartier thanks are uttered by the
dealer in spices, purple fabrics, and objects worth their weight in gold,
than by him who has gathered cheap merchandise that will be nothing but
ballast for his ship; similarly, the benefits of this peace, which extends
to all, are more deeply appreciated by those who make good use of it.
For there are many of our toga-clad
citizens to whom peace brings more trouble than war. Or do those,
think you, owe as much as we do for the peace they enjoy, who spend it
in drunkenness, or in lust, or in other vices which it were worth even
a war to interrupt? No, not unless you think that the wise man is so unfair
as to believe that as an individual he owes nothing in return for the advantages
which be enjoys with all the rest. I owe a great debt to the sun
and to the moon; and yet they do not rise for me alone. I am personally
beholden to the seasons
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and to the god who controls them, although in no respect have they been
apportioned for my benefit. The foolish greed of mortals makes a
distinction between possession and ownership, and believes that it has
ownership in nothing in which the general public has a share. But
our philosopher considers nothing more truly his own than that which he
shares in partnership with all mankind. For these things would not
be common property, as indeed they are, unless every individual had his
quota; even a joint interest based upon the slightest share makes one a
partner. Again, the great and true goods are not divided in such
a manner that each has but a slight interest; they belong in their entirety
to each individual. At a distribution of grain men receive only the
amount that has been promised to each person; the banquet and the meat-dole,
or all else that a man can carry away with him, are divided into parts.
These goods, however, are indivisible, - l mean peace and liberty, - and
they belong in their entirety to all men just as much as they belong to
each individual.
Therefore the philosopher thinks of
the person who makes it possible for him to use and enjoy these things,
of the person who exempts him when the state's dire need summons to arms,
to sentry duty, to the defence of the walls, and to the manifold exactions
of war; and he gives thanks to the helmsman of his state. This is
what philosophy teaches most of all, - honourably to avow the debt of
benefits received, and honourably to pay them; sometimes, however,
the acknowledgment itself constitutes payment. Our philosopher will
therefore acknowledge that he owes a large debt to the ruler who makes
it possible, by his management and foresight,
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for him to enjoy rich leisure, control of his own time, and a tranquillity
uninterrupted by public employments. Shepherd! a god this leisure
gave to me, For he shall be my god eternally. And if even such leisure
as that of our poet owes a great debt to its author, though its greatest
boon is this: As thou canst see,
He let me turn my cattle out to feed,
And play what fancy pleased on rustic reed;
how highly are we to value this leisure of the philosopher, which is spent
among the gods, and makes us gods? Yes, this is what I mean, Lucilius;
and I invite you to heaven by a short cut.
Sextius used to say that Jupiter had
no more power than the good man. Of course, Jupiter has more gifts
which he can offer to mankind; but when you are choosing between two good
men, the richer is not necessarily the better, any more than, in the case
of two pilots of equal skill in managing the tiller, you would call him
the better whose ship is larger and more imposing. In what respect
is Jupiter superior to our good man? His goodness lasts longer; but
the wise man does not set a lower value upon himself, just because his
virtues are limited by a briefer span. Or take two wise men; he who
has died at a greater age is not happier than he whose virtue has been
limited to fewer years: similarlly, a god has no advantage over a wise
man in point of happiness, even though he has such an advantage in point
of years. That virtue is not greater which lasts longer. Jupiter
possesses all things, but he has surely given over the possession of
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Latin / Greek Original
[1] Errare mihi videntur qui existimant philosophiae fideliter deditos contumaces esse ac refractarios, contemptores magistratuum aut regum eorumve per quos publica administrantur. Ex contrario enim nulli adversus illos gratiores sunt, nec immerito; nullis enim plus praestant quam quibus frui tranquillo otio licet. [2] Itaque ii quibus multum ad propositum bene vivendi confert securitas publica necesse est auctorem huius boni ut parentem colant, multo quidem magis quam illi inquieti et in medio positi, qui multa principibus debent sed multa et imputant, quibus numquam tam plene occurrere ulla liberalitas potest ut cupiditates illorum, quae crescunt dum implentur, exsatiet. Quisquis autem de accipiendo cogitat oblitus accepti est, nec ullum habet malum cupiditas maius quam quod ingrata est. [3] Adice nunc quod nemo eorum qui in re publica versantur quot vincat, sed a quibus vincatur, aspicit; et illis non tam iucundum est multos post se videre quam grave aliquem ante se. Habet hoc vitium omnis ambitio: non respicit. Nec ambitio tantum instabilis est, verum cupiditas omnis, quia incipit semper a fine. [4] At ille vir sincerus ac purus, qui reliquit et curiam et forum et omnem administrationem rei publicae ut ad ampliora secederet, diligit eos per quos hoc ei facere tuto licet solusque illis gratuitum testimonium reddit et magnam rem nescientibus debet. Quemadmodum praeceptores suos veneratur ac suspicit quorum beneficio illis inviis exit, sic et hos sub quorum tutela positus exercet artes bonas.
[5] 'Verum alios quoque rex viribus suis protegit.' Quis negat? Sed quemadmodum Neptuno plus debere se iudicat ex iis qui eadem tranquillitate usi sunt qui plura et pretiosiora illo mari vexit, animosius a mercatore quam a vectore solvitur votum et ex ipsis mercatoribus effusius ratus est qui odores ac purpuras et auro pensanda portabat quam qui vilissima quaeque et saburrae loco futura congesserat, sic huius pacis beneficium ad omnis pertinentis altius ad eos pervenit qui illa bene utuntur. [6] Multi enim sunt ex his togatis quibus pax operosior bello est: an idem existimas pro pace debere eos qui illam ebrietati aut libidini impendunt aut aliis vitiis quae vel bello rumpenda sunt? Nisi forte tam iniquum putas esse sapientem ut nihil viritim se debere pro communibus bonis iudicet. Soli lunaeque plurimum debeo, et non uni mihi oriuntur; anno temperantique annum deo privatim obligatus sum, quamvis nihil in meum honorem *** discripta sint. [7] Stulta avaritia mortalium possessionem proprietatemque discernit nec quicquam suum credit esse quod publicum est; at ille sapiens nihil magis suum iudicat quam cuius illi cum humano genere consortium est. Nec enim essent ista communia, nisi pars illorum pertineret ad singulos; socium efficit etiam quod ex minima portione commune est.
[8] Adice nunc quod magna et vera bona non sic dividuntur ut exiguum in singulos cadat: ad unumquemque tota perveniunt. E congiario tantum ferunt homines quantum in capita promissum est; epulum et visceratio et quidquid aliud manu capitur discedit in partes: at haec individua bona, pax et libertas, ea tam omnium tota quam singulorum sunt. [9] Cogitat itaque per quem sibi horum usus fructusque contingat, per quem non ad arma illum nec ad servandas vigilias nec ad tuenda moenia et multiplex belli tributum publica necessitas vocet, agitque gubernatori suo gratias. Hoc docet philosophia praecipue, bene debere beneficia, bene solvere; interdum autem solutio est ipsa confessio. [10] Confitebitur ergo multum se debere ei cuius administratione ac providentia contingit illi pingue otium et arbitrium sui temporis et imperturbata publicis occupationibus quies.
[11] Si illa quoque otia multum auctori suo debent quorum munus hoc maximum est,
quanti aestimamus hoc otium quod inter deos agitur, quod deos facit?
[12] Ita dico, Lucili, et te in caelum compendiario voco. Solebat Sextius dicere Iovem plus non posse quam bonum virum. Plura Iuppiter habet quae praestet hominibus, sed inter duos bonos non est melior qui locupletior, non magis quam inter duos quibus par scientia regendi gubernaculum est meliorem dixeris cui maius speciosiusque navigium est. [13] Iuppiter quo antecedit virum bonum? diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se minoris aestimat quod virtutes eius spatio breviore cluduntur. Quemadmodum ex duobus sapientibus qui senior decessit non est beatior eo cuius intra pauciores annos terminata virtus est, sic deus non vincit sapientem felicitate, etiam si vincit aetate; non est virtus maior quae longior. [14] Iuppiter omnia habet, sed nempe aliis tradidit habenda: ad ipsum hic unus usus pertinet, quod utendi omnibus causa est: sapiens tam aequo animo omnia apud alios videt contemnitque quam Iuppiter et hoc se magis suspicit quod Iuppiter uti illis non potest, sapiens non vult. [15] Credamus itaque Sextio monstranti pulcherrimum iter et clamanti 'hac
hac secundum frugalitatem, hac secundum temperantiam, hac secundum fortitudinem'. Non sunt dii fastidiosi, non invidi: admittunt et ascendentibus manum porrigunt. [16] Miraris hominem ad deos ire? Deus ad homines venit, immo quod est propius, in homines venit: nulla sine deo mens bona est. Semina in corporibus humanis divina dispersa sunt, quae si bonus cultor excipit, similia origini prodeunt et paria iis ex quibus orta sunt surgunt: si malus, non aliter quam humus sterilis ac palustris necat ac deinde creat purgamenta pro frugibus. Vale.