Letter 50006: I treasure your letters as carefully as I treasure my own eyes.

Nebridius to Augustine -- greetings. 1. I treasure your letters as carefully as I treasure my own eyes. They are great -- not in length, but in the greatness of the subjects they discuss and the brilliance with which truth about those subjects is demonstrated. They bring to my ear the voice of Christ and the teaching of Plato and Plotinus. They will always be pleasant to listen to for their eloquence, easy to read for their brevity, and rewarding to understand for the wisdom they contain. So please continue to teach me everything that strikes your judgment as holy or good. As for this letter in particular, answer it when you are ready to take up a subtle problem about memory and the images produced by the imagination. My view is this: although such images can exist independently of memory, there is no exercise of memory that operates independently of such images. You will say: what about when memory recalls an act of understanding or of thought? My answer is that such acts can be recalled precisely because, in the original act of understanding or thinking, we gave rise to something conditioned by space or time -- something the imagination can reproduce. Either we connected words with our act of understanding (and words, being conditioned by time, fall within the domain of the senses and imagination), or even if we did not use words, the intellect experienced something in the act of thinking that was of a nature the imagination could later recall. I have stated these things, as usual, without much polishing and in a somewhat confused way. Please examine them, reject what is false, and let me know by letter what you hold to be the truth on this subject. 2. Here is another question for you: why do we not say that the imagination derives all its images from itself, rather than claiming it receives them from the senses? It is possible that the imagination relates to the senses the way the intellect does -- not depending on the senses for its actual objects, but only for the prompting that rouses it to perceive those objects. Perhaps the imagination, too, is indebted to the senses not for the images it works with, but only for the stimulus that activates it to contemplate images it already possesses within itself. This might explain how the imagination can perceive things the senses have never encountered -- which would show that it has all its images within itself, from itself. Tell me what you think about this too.

Letter 6 (A.D. 389) Please help support the mission of New Advent and get the full contents of this website as an instant download. Includes the Catholic Encyclopedia, Church Fathers, Summa, Bible and more — all for only $19.99... To Augustine Nebridius Sends Greeting. 1. Your letters I have great pleasure in keeping as carefully as my own eyes. For they are great, not indeed in length, but in the greatness of the subjects discussed in them, and in the great ability with which the truth in regard to these subjects is demonstrated. They shall bring to my ear the voice of Christ, and the teaching of Plato and of Plotinus. To me, therefore, they shall ever be pleasant to hear, because of their eloquent style; easy to read, because of their brevity; and profitable to understand, because of the wisdom which they contain. Be at pains, therefore, to teach me everything which, to your judgment, commends itself as holy or good. As to this letter in particular, answer it when you are ready to discuss a subtle problem in regard to memory, and the images presented by the imagination. My opinion is, that although there can be such images independently of memory, there is no exercise of memory independently of such images. You will say, What, then, takes place when memory is exercised in recalling an act of understanding or of thought? I answer this objection by saying, that such acts can be recalled by memory for this reason, that in the supposed act of understanding or of thought we gave birth to something conditioned by space or by time, which is of such a nature that it can be reproduced by the imagination: for either we connected the use of words with the exercise of the understanding and with the thoughts, and words are conditioned by time, and thus fall within the domain of the senses or of the imaginative faculty; or if we did not join words with the mental act, our intellect at all events experienced in the act of thinking something which was of such a nature as could produce in the mind that which, by the aid of the imaginative faculty, memory could recall. These things I have stated, as usual, without much consideration, and in a somewhat confused manner: do you examine them, and, rejecting what is false, acquaint me by letter with what you hold as the truth on this subject. 2. Listen also to this question: Why, I should like to know, do we not affirm that the phantasy [imaginative faculty] derives all its images from itself, rather than say that it receives these from the senses? For it is possible that, as the intellectual faculty of the soul is indebted to the senses, not for the objects upon which the intellect is exercised, but rather for the admonition arousing it to see these objects, in the same manner the imaginative faculty may be indebted to the senses, not for the images which are the objects upon which it is exercised, but rather for the admonition arousing it to contemplate these images. And perhaps it is in this way that we are to explain the fact that the imagination perceives some objects which the senses never perceived, whereby it is shown that it has all its images within itself, and from itself. You will answer me what you think of this question also.