Letter 102

J ust as a man is annoying when he rouses a dreamer of pleasant dreams (for he is spoiling a pleasure which may be unreal but nevertheless has the appearance of reality), even so your letter has done me an injury.  For it brought me back abruptly, absorbed as I was in agreeable meditation and ready to proceed still further if it had been permitted me. I was taking pleasure in investigating the immortality of souls, nay, in believing that doctrine.  For I was lending a ready car to the opinions of the great authors, who not only approve but promise this most pleasing condition.  I was giving myself over to such a noble hope; for I was already weary of myself, beginning already to despise the fragments of my shattered existence, and feeling that I was destined to pass over into that infinity of time and the heritage of eternity, when I was suddenly awakened by the receipt of your letter, and lost my lovely dream. But, if I can once dispose of you, I shall reseek and rescue it. T here was a remark, at the beginning of your letter, that I had not explained the whole problem wherein I was endeavouring to prove one of the beliefs of our school, that the renown which falls to one's lot after death is a good; for I had not solved the problem with which we are usually confronted: "No good can consist of things that are distinct and separate; yet renown consists of such things." What you are asking about, my dear Lucilius, belongs to another topic of the same subject, and that <Ep3-169> is why I had postponed the arguments, not only on this one topic, but on other topics which also covered the same ground.  For, as you know, certain logical questions are mingled with ethical ones.  Accordingly, I handled the essential part of my subject which has to do with conduct - as to whether it is foolish and useless to be concerned with what lies beyond our last day, or whether our goods die with us and there is nothing left of him who is no more, or whether any profit can be attained or attempted beforehand out of that which, when it comes, we shall not be capable of feeling. A ll these things have a view to conduct, and therefore they have been inserted under the proper topic.  But the remarks of dialecticians in opposition to this idea had to be sifted out, and were accordingly laid aside.  Now that you demand an answer to them all, I shall examine all their statements, and then refute them singly.  Unless, however, I make a preliminary remark, it will be impossible to understand my rebuttals. And what is that preliminary remark? Simply this: there are certain continuous bodies, such as a man; there are certain composite bodies, - as ships, houses, and everything which is the result of joining separate parts into one sum total: there are certain others made up of things that are distinct, each member remaining separate - like an army, a populace, or a senate. For the persons who go to make up such bodies are united by virtue of law or function; but by their nature they are distinct and individual.  Well, what further prefatory remarks do I still wish to make?  Simply this: we believe that nothing is a good, if it be composed of things that are distinct. For a single good should be checked and controlled by a single soul; and the <Ep3-171> essential quality of each single good should be single.  This can be proved of itself whenever you desire; in the meanwhile, however, it had to be laid aside, because our own weapons are being hurled at us. O pponents speak thus: "You say, do you, that no good can be made up of things that are distinct?  Yet this renown , of which you speak, is simply the favourable opinion of good men. For just as reputation does not consist of one person's remarks, and as ill repute does not consist of one person's disapproval, so renown does not mean that we have merely pleased one good person.  In order to constitute renown, the agreement of many distinguished and praiseworthy men is necessary. But this results from the decision of a number - in other words, of persons who are distinct.  Therefore, it is not a good. You say, again, that renown is the praise rendered to a good man by good men.  Praise means speech: now speech is utterance with a particular meaning; and utterance, even from the lips of good men, is not a good in itself.  For any act of a good man is not necessarily a good; he shouts his applause and hisses his disapproval, but one does not call the shouting or the hissing good -although his entire conduct may be admired and praised - any more than one would applaud a sneeze or a cough.  Therefore, renown is not a good.  Finally, tell us whether the good belongs to him who praises, or to him who is praised: if you say that the good belongs to him who is praised, you are on as foolish a quest as if you were to maintain that my neighbour's good health is my own.  But to praise worthy men is an honourable action; thus the good is exclusively that of the man who does the praising, of the man who performs the action, and not of us, who are <Ep3-173> being praised.  And yet this was the question under discussion." I shall now answer the separate objections hurriedly.  The first question still is, whether any good can consist of things that are distinct - and there are votes cast on both sides.  Again, does renown need many votes?  Renown can be satisfied with the decision of one good man: it is one good man who decides that we are good.  Then the retort is: "What!  Would you define reputation as the esteem of one individual, and ill-repute as the rancorous chatter of one man?  Glory  , too, we take to be more widespread, for it demands the agreement of many men." But the position of the "many" is different from that of "the one." And why?  Because, if the good man thinks well of me, it practically amounts to my being thought well of by all good men; for they will all think the same, if they know me.  Their judgment is alike and identical; the effect of truth on it is equal.  They cannot disagree, which means that they would all hold the same view, being unable to hold different views. "One man's opinion," you say, "is not enough to create glory or reputation." In the former case, one judgment is a universal judgment, because all, if they were asked, would hold one opinion; in the other case, however, men of dissimilar character give divergent judgments.  You will find perplexing emotions - everything doubtful, inconstant, untrustworthy.  And can you suppose that all men are able to hold one opinion? Even an individual does not hold to a single opinion. With the good man it is truth that causes belief, and truth has but one function and one likeness; while among the second class of which I spoke, the ideas with which they <Ep3-175> agree are unsound.  Moreover, those who are false are never steadfast: they are irregular and discordant. "But praise," says the objector, "is nothing but an utterance, and an utterance is not a good." When they say that renown is praise bestowed on the good by the good, what they refer to is not an utterance but a judgment.  For a good man may remain silent; but if he decides that a certain person is worthy, of praise, that person is the object of praise.  Besides, praise is one thing, and the giving of praise another; the latter demands utterance also. Hence no one speaks of "a funeral praise," but says "praise- giving" - for its function depends upon speech.  And when we say that a man is worthy of praise, we assure human kindness to him, not in words, but in judgment.  So the good opinion, even of one who in silence feels inward approval of a good man, is praise. A gain, as I have said, praise is a matter of the mind rather than of the speech; for speech brings out the praise that the mind has conceived, and publishes it forth to the attention of the many.  To judge a man worthy of praise, is to praise him. And when our tragic poet sings to us that it is wonderful "to be praised by a well-praised hero," he means, "by one who is worthy of praise." Again, when an equally venerable bard says: "Praise nurtureth the arts," he does not mean the giving of praise, for that spoils the arts.  Nothing has corrupted oratory and all other studies that depend on hearing so much as popular approval. Reputation necessarily demands words, but renown can be content with men's judgments, and suffice without the spoken <Ep3-177> word.  It is satisfied not only amid silent approval, but even in the face of open protest.  There is, in my opinion, this difference between renown and glory - the latter depends upon the judgments of the many; but renown on the judgments of good men. The retort comes: "But whose good is this renown, this praise rendered to a good man by good men?  Is it of the one praised, or of the one who praises.?" Of both, I say.  It is my own good, in that I am praised, because I am naturally born to love all men, and I rejoice in having done good deeds and congratulate myself on having found men who express their ideas of my virtues with gratitude; that they are grateful, is a good to the many, but it is a good to me also. For my spirit is so ordered that I can regard the good of other men as my own - in any case those of whose good I am myself the cause.  This good is also the good of those who render the praise, for it is applied by means of virtue; and every act of virtue is a good.  My friends could not have found this blessing if I had not been a man of the right stamp.  It is therefore a good belonging to both sides - this being praised when one deserves it - just as truly as a good decision is the good of him who makes the decision and also of him in whose favour the decision was given.  Do you doubt that justice is a blessing to its possessor, as well as to the man to whom the just due was paid?  To praise the deserving is justice; therefore, the good belongs to both sides.  This will be a sufficient answer to such dealers in subtleties.  But it should not be our purpose to discuss things cleverly and to drag Philosophy down from her majesty to such petty quibbles.  How much better it is to follow the open and direct road, rather than to map out for yourself a circuitous route <Ep3-179> which you must retrace with infinite trouble!  For such argumentation is nothing else than the sport of men who are skilfully juggling with each other.  Tell me rather how closely in accord with nature it is to let one's mind reach out into the boundless universe!  The human soul is a great and noble thing; it permits of no limits except those which can be shared even by the gods.  First of all, it does not consent to a lowly birthplace, like Ephesus or Alexandria, or any land that is even more thickly populated than these, and more richly spread with dwellings. The soul's homeland is the whole space that encircles the, height and breadth of the firmament, the whole rounded dome within which lie land and sea, within which the upper air that sunders the human from the divine also unites them, and where all the sentinel stars are taking their turn on duty.  Again, the soul will not put up with a narrow span of existence. "All the years," says the soul, "are mine; no epoch is closed to great minds; all Time is open for the progress of thought.  When the day comes to separate the heavenly from its earthly blend, I shall leave the body here where I found it, and shall of my own volition betake myself to the gods.  I am not apart from them now, but am merely detained in a heavy and carthly prison." These delays of mortal existence are a prelude to the longer and better life.  As the mother's womb holds us for ten months, making us ready, not for the womb itself, but for the existence into which we seem to be sent forth when at last we are fitted to draw breath and live in the open; just so, throughout the years extending between infancy and old age, we are making ourselves ready for another birth.  A different beginning, a different condition, await us. <Ep3-181> We cannot yet, except at rare intervals, endure the light of heaven; therefore, look forward without fearing to that appointed hour, - the last hour of the body but not of the soul.  Survey everything that lies about you, as if it were luggage in a guestchamber: you must travel on. Nature strips you as bare at your departure as at your entrance. You may take away no more than you brought in; what is more, you must throw away the major portion of that which you brought with you into life: you will be stripped of the very skin which covers you - that which has been your last protection; you will be stripped of the flesh, and lose the blood which is suffuses and circulated through your body; you will be stripped of bones and sinews, the framework of these transitory and feeble parts. T hat day, which you fear as being the end of all things, is the birthday of your eternity.  Lay aside your burden - why delay? - just as if you had not previously left the body which was your hiding-place!  You cling to your burden, you struggle; at birth also great effort was necessary on your your mother's part to set you free. You weep and wail; and yet this very weeping happens at birth also; but then it was to be excused -. for you came into the world wholly ignorant and inexperienced. When you left the warm and cherishing protection of your mother's womb, a freer air breathed into your face; then you winced at the touch of a rough hand, and you looked in amaze at unfamiliar objects, still delicate and ignorant of all things.  But now it is no new thing for you to be sundered from that of which you have previously been a part; let go your already useless limbs with resignation and dispense with that body in which you have dwelt for <Ep3-183> so long.  It will be torn asunder, buried out of sight, and wasted away. Why be downcast?  This is what ordinarily happens: when we are born, the afterbirth always perishes.  Why love such a thing as if it were your own possession?  It was merely your covering.  The day will come which will tear you forth and lead you away from the company of the foul and noisome womb. Withdraw from it now too as much as you can, and withdraw from pleasure, except such as may be bound up with essential and important things; estrange yourself from it even now, and ponder on something nobler and loftier. Some day the secrets of nature shall be disclosed to you, the haze will be shaken from your eyes, and the bright light will stream in upon you from all sides. P icture to yourself how great is the glow when all the stars mingle their fires; no shadows will disturb the clear sky.  The whole expanse of heaven will shine evenly; for day and night are interchanged only in the lowest atmosphere.  Then you will say that you have lived in darkness, after you have seen, in your perfect state, the perfect light - that light which now you behold darkly with vision that is cramped to the last degree.  And yet, far off as it is, you already look upon it in wonder; what do you think the heavenly light will be when you have seen it in its proper sphere?  Such thoughts permit nothing mean to settle in the soul, nothing low, nothing cruel.  They maintain that the gods are witnesses of evervthing.  They order us to meet the gods' approval, to prepare ourselves to join them at some future time, and to plan for immortality.  He that has grasped this idea shrinks from no attacking army, is not terrified by the trumpet-blast, and is intimidated by no threats. <Ep3-185>

[1] Quomodo molestus est iucundum somnium videnti qui excitat (aufertenim voluptatem etiam si falsam, effectum tamen verae habentem) sic epistulatua mihi fecit iniuriam; revocavit enim me cogitationi aptae traditum etiturum, si licuisset, ulterius. [2] Iuvabat de aeternitate animarum quaerere, immo mehercules credere; praebebam enim me facilem opinionibus magnorum virorum rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium. Dabam me spei tantae, iam eram fastidio mihi, iam reliquias aetatis infractae contemnebamin immensum illud tempus et in possessionem omnis aevi transiturus, cumsubito experrectus sum epistula tua accepta et tam bellum somnium perdidi. Quod repetam, si te dimisero, et redimam. [3] Negas me epistula prima totam quaestionem explicuisse in qua probare conabar id quod nostris placet, claritatem quae post mortem contingit bonum esse. Id enim me non solvisse quod opponitur nobis: 'nullum' inquiunt 'bonum ex distantibus; hoc autem ex distantibus constat'. [4] Quod interrogas, mi Lucili, eiusdem quaestionis est loci alterius, et ideo non id tantum sed alia quoque eodem pertinentia distuleram; quaedam enim, ut scis, moralibus rationalia inmixta sunt. Itaque illam partem rectam et ad mores pertinentem tractavi, numquid stultum sit ac supervacuum ultra extremum diem curastrans mittere, an cadant bona nostra nobiscum nihilque sit eius qui nullusest, an ex eo quod, cum erit, sensuri non sumus, antequam sit aliquis fructus percipi aut peti possit. [5] Haec omnia ad mores spectant; itaque suo locoposita sunt. At quae a dialecticis contra hanc opinionem dicuntur segreganda fuerunt et ideo seposita sunt. Nunc, quia omnia exigis, omnia quae dicunt persequar, deinde singulis occurram. [6] Nisi aliquid praedixero, intellegi non poterunt quae refellentur. Quid est quod praedicere velim? quaedam continua corpora esse, ut hominem; quaedam esse composita, ut navem, domum, omnia denique quorum diversae partes iunctura in unum coactae sunt; quaedam ex distantibus, quorum adhuc membra separata sunt, tamquam exercitus, populus, senatus. Illi enim perquos ista corpora efficiuntur iure aut officio cohaerent, natura diductiet singuli sunt. Quid est quod etiam nunc praedicere velim? [7] nullum bonum putamus esse quod ex distantibus constat; uno enim spiritu unum bonum contineri ac regi debet, unum esse unius boni principale. Hoc si quando desideraverisper se probatur: interim ponendum fuit, quia in <nos> nostra tela mittuntur. [8] 'Dicitis' inquit 'nullum bonum ex distantibus esse; claritas aut emista bonorum virorum secunda opinio est. Nam quomodo fama non est unius sermo nec infamia unius mala existimatio, sic nec claritas uni bono placuisse;consentire in hoc plures insignes et spectabiles viri debent, ut claritassit. Haec autem ex iudiciis plurium efficitur, id est distantium; ergonon est bonum. [9] 'Claritas' inquit 'laus est a bonis bono reddita; laus oratio, vox est aliquid significans; vox est autem, licet virorum sit <bonorum, non> bonum. Nec enim quidquid vir bonus facit bonum est; nam et plauditet sibilat, sed nec plausum quisquam nec sibilum, licet omnia eius admiretur et laudet, bonum dicit, non magis quam sternumentum aut tussim. Ergo claritas bonum non est. [10] 'Ad summam dicite nobis utrum laudantis an laudati bonum sit: si laudati bonum esse dicitis, tam ridiculam rem facitis quam si adfirmetis meum esse quod alius bene valeat. Sed laudare dignos honesta actio est; ita laudantis bonum est cuius actio est, non nostrum qui laudamur: atqui hoc quaerebatur. '[11] Respondebo nunc singulis cursim. Primum an sit aliquod ex distantibus bonum etiamnunc quaeritur et pars utraque sententias habet. Deinde claritas desiderat multa suffragia? potest et unius boni viri iudicio esse contenta: nos bonus bonos iudicat. [12] 'Quid ergo? ' inquit 'et fama erit unius hominis existimatio et infamia unius malignus sermo? Gloriam quoque' inquit 'latius fusam intellego; consensum enim multorum exigit. ' Diversa horum condicio est et illius. Quare? quia si de me bene vir bonus sentit, eodem loco sum quo si omnes boni idem sentirent; omnes enim, si me cognoverint, idem sentient. Par illis idemque iudicium est, aeque vero inficiscitur. Dissidere nonpossunt; ita pro eo est ac si omnes idem sentiant, quia aliud sentire non possunt. [13] Ad gloriam aut famam non est satis unius opinio. Illic idem potest una sententia quod omnium, quia omnium, si perrogetur, una erit:hic diversa dissimilium iudicia sunt. Difficiles adsensus, dubia omnia invenies, levia, suspecta. Putas tu posse unam omnium esse sententiam? non est unius una sententia. Illic placet verum, veritatis una vis, una facies est: apud hos falsa sunt quibus adsentiuntur. Numquam autem falsis constantia est; variantur et dissident. [14] 'Sed laus' inquit 'nihil aliud quam vox est, vox autem bonum non est. ' Cum dicunt claritatem esse laudem bonorum a bonis redditam, non advocem referunt sed ad sententiam. Licet enim vir bonus taceat sed aliquem iudicet dignum laude esse, laudatus est. [15] Praeterea aliud est laus, aliud laudatio, haec et vocem exigit; itaque nemo dicit laudem funebrem sed laudationem, cuius officium oratione constat. Cum dicimus aliquem laude dignum, non verba illi benigna hominum sed iudicia promittimus. Ergo laus etiam taciti est bene sentientis ac bonum virum apud se laudantis. [16] Deinde, ut dixi, ad animum refertur laus, non ad verba, quae conceptam laudem egerunt et in notitiam plurium emittunt. Laudat qui laudandum esse iudicat. Cum tragicus ille apud nos ait magnificum esse 'laudari a laudato viro', laude digno ait. Et cum aeque antiquus poeta ait 'laus alit artis', non laudationem dicit, quae corrumpit artes; nihil enim aeque et eloquentiam et omne aliud studium auribus deditum vitiavit quam popularis adsensio. [17] Fama vocem utique desiderat, claritas potest etiam citra vocem contingere contenta iudicio; plena est non tantum inter tacentis sed etiam inter reclamantis. Quid intersit inter claritatem et gloriam dicam: gloria multorum iudicis constat, claritas bonorum. [18] 'Cuius' inquit 'bonum est claritas, id est laus bono a bonis reddita? utrum laudati an laudantis? ' Utriusque. Meum, qui laudor; quia natura mea mantem omnium genuit, et bene fecisse gaudeo et gratos me invenisse virtutum interpretes laetor. Hoc plurium bonum est quod grati sunt, sed et meum;ita enim animo compositus sum ut aliorum bonum meum iudicem, utique eorum quibus ipse sum boni causa. [19] Est istud laudantium bonum; virtute enim geritur; omnis autem virtutis actio bonum est. Hoc contingere illis non potuisset nisi ego talis essem. Itaque utriusque bonum est merito laudari, tam mehercules quam bene iudicasse iudicantis bonum est et eius secundum quem iudicatum est. Numquid dubitas quin iustitia et habentis bonum sitet autem sit eius cui debitum solvit? Merentem laudare iustitia est; ergo utriusque bonum est. [20] Cavillatoribus istis abunde responderimus. Sed non debet hoc nobis esse propositum, arguta disserere et philosophiam in has angustias ex sua maiestate detrahere: quanto satius est ire aperta via et recta quam sibi ipsum flexus disponere quos cum magna molestia debeas relegere? Neque enim quicquam aliud istae disputationes sunt quam inter se perite captantium lusus. [21] Dic potius quam naturale sit in immensum mentem suam extendere. Magna et generosa res est humanus animus; nullos sibi poni nisi communeset cum deo terminos patitur. Primum humilem non accipit patriam, Ephesum aut Alexandriam aut si quod est etiamnunc frequentius accolis laetius vetectis solum: patria est illi quodcumque suprema et universa circuitu suo cingit, hoc omne convexum intra quod iacent maria cum terris, intra quod aer humanis divina secernens etiam coniungit, in quo disposita tot numina in actus suos excubant. [22] Deinde artam aetatem sibi dari non sinit: 'omnes' inquit 'anni mei sunt; nullum saeculum magnis ingeniis clusum est, nullum non cogitationi pervium tempus. Cum venerit dies ille qui mixtum hoc divini humanique secernat, corpus hic ubi inveni relinquam, ipse mediis reddam. Nec nunc sine illis sum, sed gravi terrenoque detineor.' [23] Per has mortalis aevi moras illi meliori vitae longiorique proluditur. Quemadmodum decem mensibus tenet nos maternus uterus et praeparat non sibi sed illi loco in quem videmur emitti iam idonei spiritum trahere et inaperto durare, sic per hoc spatium quod ab infantia patet in senectutem in alium mature scimus partum. Alia origo nos expectat, alius rerum status. [24] Nondum caelum nisi ex intervallo pati possumus. Proinde intrepidus horam illam decretoriam prospice: non est animo suprema, sed corpori. Quidquid circa te iacet rerum tamquam hospitalis loci sarcinas specta: transeundumest. Excutit redeuntem natura sicut intrantem. [25] Non licet plus efferrequam intuleris, immo etiam ex eo quod ad vitam adtulisti pars magna ponenda est: detrahetur tibi haec circumiecta, novissimum velamentum tui, cutis; detrahetur caro et suffusus sanguis discurrensque per totum; detrahentur ossa nervique, firmamenta fluidorum ac labentium. [26] Dies iste quem tamquam extremum reformidas aeterni natalis est. Depone onus: quid cunctaris, tamquam non prius quoque relicto in quo latebas corpore exieris? Haeres, reluctaris:tum quoque magno nisu matris expulsus es. Gemis, ploras: et hoc ipsum flerenascentis est, sed tunc debebat ignosci: rudis et inperitus omnium veneras. Ex maternorum viscerum calido mollique fomento emissum adflavit aura liberior, deinde offendit durae manus tactus, tenerque adhuc et nullius rei gnarus obstipuisti inter ignota: [27] nunc tibi non est novum separari ab eo cuius ante pars fueris; aequo animo membra iam supervacua dimitte et istuc corpus inhabitatum diu pone. Scindetur, obruetur, abolebitur: quid contristaris? ita solet fieri: pereunt semper velamenta nascentium. Quid ista sic diligis quasi tua? Istis opertus es: veniet qui te revellat dies et ex contubernio foedi atque olidi ventris educat. [28] Huic nunc quoque tu quantum potessub<duc te> voluptatique nisi quae * * * necessariisque cohaerebit alienus iam hinc altius aliquid sublimiusque meditare: aliquando naturae tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo et lux undique clara percutiet. Imaginare tecum quantus ille sit fulgor tot sideribus inter se lumen miscentibus. Nulla serenum umbra turbabit; aequaliter splendebit omne caeli latus: dieset nox aeris infimi vices sunt. Tunc in tenebris vixisse te dices cum totam lucem et totus aspexeris, quam nunc per angustissimas oculorum vias obscure intueris, et tamen admiraris illam iam procul: quid tibi videbitur divina lux cum illam suo loco videris? [29] Haec cogitatio nihil sordidum animo subsidere sinit, nihil humile, nihil crudele. Deos rerum omnium esse testes ait; illis nos adprobari, illis in futurum parari iubet et aeternitatem proponere. Quam qui mente concepit nullos horret exercitus, non terretur tuba, nullis ad timorem minis agitur. [30] Quidni non timeat qui mori sperat? is quoque qui animum tamdiu iudicat manere quamdiu retinetur corporis vinculo, solutum statim spargi, id agit ut etiam post mortem utilis esse possit. Quamvis enim ipse ereptus sit oculis, tamen Cogita quantum nobis exempla bona prosint: scies magnorum virorum non minus praesentiam esse utilem quam memoriam. Vale.