Letter 121
Y ou will bring suit against me, I feel sure,
when I set forth for you to-day's little problem, with which we have already
fumbled long enough. You will cry out again: "What has this to do
with character?" Cry out if you like, but let me first of all match you
with other opponents, against whom you may bring suit - such as Posidonius
and Archidemus; these men will stand trial. I shall then go on
to say that whatever deals with character does not necessarily produce
good character. Man needs one thing for his food, another for his exercise,
another for his clothing, another for his instruction, and another for
his pleasure. Everything, however, has reference to man's needs, although
everything does not make him better. Character is affected by different
things in different ways: some things serve to correct and regulate character,
and others investigate its nature and origin. And when I seek the
reason why Nature brought forth man, and why she set him above other animals,
do you suppose that I have left character-study in the rear? No;
that is wrong. For how are you to know what character is desirable, unless
you have discovered what is best suited to man? Or unless you have
studied his nature? You can find out what you should do and what
you should avoid, only when you have learned what you owe to your own nature.
"I desire," you say, "to learn how I may crave less, and fear less.
Rid me of my unreasoning beliefs. Prove to me that so-called felicity is
fickle and empty, and that the word easily admits of a syllable's increase."
I shall fulfil your want, encouraging
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your virtues and lashing your vices. People may decide that I
am too zealous and reckless in this particular; but I shall never cease
to hound wickedness, to check the most unbridled emotions, to soften the
force of pleasures which will result in pain, and to cry down men's prayers.
Of course I shall do this; for it is the greatest evils that we have prayed
for, and from that which has made us give thanks comes all that demands
consolation. Meanwhile, allow me to discuss thoroughly some points
which may seem now to be rather remote from the present inquiry.
We were once debating whether all animals had any feelings about their
"constitution." That this is the case is proved particularly by their
making motions of such fitness and nimbleness that they seem to be trained
for the purpose. Every being is clever in its own line. The skilled
workman handles his tools with an ease born of experience; the pilot knows
how to steer his ship skilfully; the artist can quickly lay on the colours
which he has prepared in great variety for the purpose of rendering the
likeness, and passes with ready eye and hand from palette to canvas.
In the same way an animal is agile in all that pertains to the use of its
body. We are apt to wonder at skilled dancers because their gestures
are perfectly adapted to the meaning of the piece and its accompanying
emotions, and their movements match the speed of the dialogue. But
that which art gives to the craftsman, is given to the animal by nature.
No animal handles its limbs with difficulty, no animal is at a loss how
to use its body. This function they exercise immediately at birth.
They come into the world with this knowledge; they are born full- trained.
But people reply: "The reason why animals are
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so dexterous in the use of their limbs is that if they move them unnaturally,
they will feel pain. They are compelled to do thus, according to
your school, and it is fear rather than will-power which moves them in
the right direction." This idea is wrong. Bodies driven by a compelling
force move slowly; but those which move of their own accord possess alertness.
The proof that it is not fear of pain which prompts them thus, is, that
even when pain cheeks them they struggle to carry out their natural motions.
Thus the child who is trying to stand and is becoming used to carry his
own weight, on beginning to test his strength, falls and rises again and
again with tears until through painful effort he has trained himself to
the demands of nature. And certain animals with hard shells, when
turned on their backs, twist and grope with their feet and make motions
side-ways until they are restored to their proper position. The tortoise
on his back feels no suffering; but he is restless because he misses his
natural condition, and does not cease to shake himself about until he stands
once more upon his feet. So all these animals have a consciousness
of their physical constitution, and for that reason can manage their limbs
as readily as they do; nor have we any better proof that they come into
being equipped with this knowledge than the fact that no animal is unskilled
in the use of its body. But some object as follows: "According to
your account, one's constitution consists of a ruling power in the soul
which has a certain relation towards the body. But how can a child
comprehend this intricate and subtle principle, which I can scarcely explain
even to you? All living creatures should be born logicians, so as
to
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understand a definition which is obscure to the majority of Roman citizens!"
Your objection would be true if I spoke of living creatures as understanding
"a definition of constitution," and not "their actual constitution." Nature
is easier to understand than to explain; hence, the child of whom we were
speaking does not understand what "constitution" is, but understands its
own constitution. He does not know what "a living creature" is, but
he feels that he is an animal. Moreover, that very constitution of
his own he only understands confusedly, cursorily, and darkly. We
also know that we possess souls, but we do not know the essence, the place,
the quality, or the source, of the soul. Such as is the consciousness
of our souls which we possess, ignorant as we are of their nature and position,
even so all animals possess a consciousness of their own constitutions.
For they must necessarily feel this, because it is the same agency by which
they feel other things also; they must necessarily have a feeling of the
principle which they obey and by which they are controlled. Every
one of us understands that there is something which stirs his impulses,
but he does not know what it is. He knows that he has a sense of
striving, although he does not know what it is or its source. Thus
even children and animals have a consciousness of their primary element,
but it is not very clearly outlined or portrayed. "You maintain, do you,"
says the objector, "that every living thing is at the start adapted to
its constitution, but that man's constitution is a reasoning one, and hence
man is adapted to himself not merely as a living, but as a reasoning, being?
For man is dear to himself in respect of that wherein he is a man.
How, then, can a child, being not yet
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gifted with reason, adapt himself to a reasoning constitution? "But
each age has its own constitution, different in the case of the child,
the boy, and the old man; they are all adapted to the constitution wherein
they find themselves. The child is toothless, and he is fitted to
this condition. Then his teeth grow, and he is fitted to that condition
also. Vegetation also, which will develop into grain and fruits, has a
special constitution when young and scarcely peeping over the tops of the
furrows, another when it is strengthened and stands upon a stalk which
is soft but strong enough to bear its weight, and still another when the
colour changes to yellow, prophesies threshing- time, and hardens in the
ear - no matter what may be the constitution into which the plant comes,
it keeps it, and conforms thereto. The periods of infancy, boyhood,
youth, and old age, are different; but I, who have been infant, boy, and
youth, am still the same. Thus, although each has at different times
a different constitution, the adaptation of each to its constitution is
the same. For nature does not consign boyhood or youth, or old age,
to me; it consigns me to them. Therefore, the child is adapted to that
constitution which is his at the present moment of childhood, not to that
which will be his in youth. For even if there is in store for him
any higher phase into which he must be changed, the state in which he is
born is also according to nature. First of all, the living being
is adapted to itself, for there must be a pattern to which all other things
may be referred. I seek pleasure; for whom? For myself.
I am therefore looking out for myself. I shrink from pain; on behalf
of whom? Myself. Therefore, I am looking out for myself.
Since I gauge all my actions with reference
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to my own welfare, I am looking out for myself before all else.
This quality exists in all living beings - not engrafted but inborn.
N ature brings up her own offspring and does
not cast them away; and because the most assured security is that which
is nearest, every man has been entrusted to his own self. Therefore,
as I have remarked in the course of my previous correspondence, even young
animals, on issuing from the mother's womb or from the egg, know at once
of their own accord what is harmful for them, and avoid death-dealing things.
They even shrink when they notice the shadow of birds of prey which flit
overhead. No animal, when it enters upon life, is free from the fear
of death. People may ask: "How can an animal at birth have an understanding
of things wholesome or destructive?" The first question, however, is whether
it can have such understanding, and not how it can understand. And
it is clear that they have such understanding from the fact that, even
if you add understanding, they will act no more adequately than they did
in the first place. Why should the hen show no fear of the peacock
or the goose, and yet run from the hawk, which is a so much smaller animal
not even familiar to the hen? Why should young chickens fear a cat
and not a dog.? These fowls clearly have a presentiment of harm -
one not based on actual experiments; for they avoid a thing before they
can possibly have experience of it. Furthermore, in order that you may
not suppose this to be the result of chance, they do not shrink from certain
other things which you would expect them to fear, nor do they ever forget
vigilance and care in this regard;
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they all possess equally the faculty of avoiding what is destructive.
Besides, their fear does not grow as their lives lengthen.
H ence indeed it is evident that these animals
have not reached such a condition through experience; it is because of
an inborn desire for self-preservation. The teachings of experience
are slow and irregular; but whatever Nature communicates belongs equally
to everyone, and comes immediately. If, however, you require an explanation,
shall I tell you how it is that every living thing tries to understand
that which is harmful? It feels that it is constructed of flesh;
and so it perceives to what an extent flesh may be cut or burned or crushed,
and what animals are equipped with the power of doing this damage; it is
of animals of this sort that it derives an unfavourable and hostile idea.
These tendencies are closely connected; for each animal at the same time
consults its own safety, seeking that which helps it, and shrinks from
that which will harm it. Impulses towards useful objects, and revulsion
from the opposite, are according to nature; without any reflection to prompt
the idea, and without any advice, whatever Nature has prescribed, is done.
Do you not see how skillful bees are in building their cells? How
completely harmonious in sharing and enduring toil? Do you not see
how the spider weaves a web so subtle that man's hand cannot imitate it;
and what a task it is to arrange the threads, some directed straight towards
the centre, for the sake of making the web solid, and others running in
circles and lessening in thickness - for the purpose of tangling and catching
in a sort of net the smaller insects for whose ruin the spider spreads
the web? This art is born, not taught;
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Latin / Greek Original
(1) Litigabis, ego uideo, cum tibi hodiernam quaestiunculam, in quasatis diu haesimus, exposuero; iterum enim exclamabis 'hoc quid ad mores? 'Sed exclama, dum tibi primum alios opponam cum quibus litiges, Posidoniumet Archidemum (hi iudicium accipient) , deinde dicam: non quidquid moraleest mores bonos facit.
(2) Aliud ad hominem alendum pertinet, aliud adexercendum, aliud ad uestiendum, aliud ad docendum, aliud ad delectandum;omnia tamen ad hominem pertinent, etiam si non omnia meliorem eum faciunt. Mores alia aliter attingunt: quaedam illos corrigunt et ordinant, quaedamnaturam eorum et originem scrutantur. (3) Cum <quaero> quare hominemnatura produxerit, quare praetulerit animalibus ceteris, longe me iudicasmores reliquisse? falsum est. Quomodo enim scies qui habendi sint nisiquid homini sit optimum inueneris, nisi naturam eius inspexeris? Tunc demumintelleges quid faciendum tibi, quid uitandum sit, cum didiceris quid naturaetuae debeas. (4) 'Ego' inquis 'uolo discere quomodo minus cupiam, minustimeam. Superstitionem mihi excute; doce leue esse uanumque hoc quod felicitasdicitur, unam illi syllabam facillime accedere. ' Desiderio tuo satis faciam:et uirtutes exhortabor et uitia conuerberabo. Licet aliquis nimium inmoderatumquein hac parte me iudicet, non desistam persequi nequitiam et adfectus efferatissimosinhibere et uoluptates ituras in dolorem conpescere et uotis obstrepere. Quidni? cum maxima malorum optauerimus, et ex gratulatione natum sit quidquidadloquimur.
(5) Interim permitte mihi ea quae paulo remotiora uidentur excutere. Quaerebamus an esset omnibus animalibus constitutionis suae sensus. Esseautem ex eo maxime apparet quod membra apte et expedite mouent non aliterquam in hoc erudita; nulli non partium suarum agilitas est. Artifex instrumentasua tractat ex facili, rector nauis scite gubernaculum flectit, pictorcolores quos ad reddendam similitudinem multos uariosque ante se posuitcelerrime denotat et inter ceram opusque facili uultu ac manu commeat:sic animal in omnem usum sui mobilest.
(6) Mirari solemus saltandi peritosquod in omnem significationem rerum et adfectuum parata illorum est manuset uerborum uelocitatem gestus adsequitur: quod illis ars praestat, hisnatura. Nemo aegre molitur artus suos, nemo in usu sui haesitat. Hoc editaprotinus faciunt; cum hac scientia prodeunt; instituta nascuntur.
(7) 'Ideo' inquit 'partes suas animalia apte mouent quia, si alitermouerint, dolorem sensura sunt. Ita, ut uos dicitis, coguntur, metusqueilla in rectum, non uoluntas mouet. ' Quod est falsum; tarda enim sunt quaenecessitate inpelluntur, agilitas sponte motis est. Adeo autem non adigitilla ad hoc doloris timor ut in naturalem motum etiam dolore prohibentenitantur. (8) Sic infans qui stare meditatur et ferre se adsuescit, simultemptare uires suas coepit, cadit et cum fletu totiens resurgit donec seper dolorem ad id quod natura poscit exercuit. Animalia quaedam tergi duriorisinuersa tam diu se torquent ac pedes exerunt et obliquant donec ad locumreponantur. Nullum tormentum sentit supina testudo, inquieta est tamendesiderio naturalis status nec ante desinit niti, quatere se, quam in pedesconstitit. (9) Ergo omnibus constitutionis suae sensus est et inde membrorumtam expedita tractatio, nec ullum maius indicium habemus cum hac illa aduiuendum uenire notitia quam quod nullum animal ad usum sui rude est.
(10) 'Constitutio' inquit 'est, ut uos dicitis, principale animi quodammodo se habens erga corpus. Hoc tam perplexum et subtile et uobis quoqueuix enarrabile quomodo infans intellegit? Omnia animalia dialectica nascioportet ut istam finitionem magnae parti hominum togatorum obscuram intellegant. '(11) Verum erat quod opponis si ego ab animalibus constitutionis finitionemintellegi dicerem, non ipsam constitutionem. Facilius natura intellegiturquam enarratur. Itaque infans ille quid sit constitutio non nouit, constitutionemsuam nouit; et quid sit animal nescit, animal esse se sentit. (12) Praetereaipsam constitutionem suam crasse intellegit et summatim et obscure. Nosquoque animum habere nos scimus: quid sit animus, ubi sit, qualis sit autunde nescimus. Qualis ad nos (peruenerit) animi nostri sensus, quamuisnaturam eius ignoremus ac sedem, talis ad omnia animalia constitutionissuae sensus est. Necesse est enim id sentiant per quod alia quoque sentiunt;necesse est eius sensum habeant cui parent, a quo reguntur. (13) Nemo nonex nobis intellegit esse aliquid quod impetus suos moueat: quid sit illudignorat. Et conatum sibi esse scit: quis sit aut unde sit nescit. Sic infantibusquoque animalibusque principalis partis suae sensus est non satis dilucidusnec expressus.
(14) 'Dicitis' inquit 'omne animal primum constitutioni suae conciliari,hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse et ideo conciliari hominemsibi non tamquam animali sed tamquam rationali; ea enim parte sibi carusest homo qua homo est. Quomodo ergo infans conciliari constitutioni rationalipotest, cum rationalis nondum sit? ' (15) Unicuique aetati sua constitutioest, alia infanti, alia puero, <alia adulescenti>, alia seni: omnesei constitutioni conciliantur in qua sunt. Infans sine dentibus est: huicconstitutioni suae conciliatur. Enati sunt dentes: huic constitutioni conciliatur. Nam et illa herba quae in segetem frugemque uentura est aliam constitutionemhabet tenera et uix eminens sulco, aliam cum conualuit et molli quidemculmo, sed quo ferat onus suum, constitit, aliam cum flauescit et ad areamspectat et spica eius induruit: in quamcumque constitutionem uenit, eamtuetur, in eam componitur. (16) Alia est aetas infantis, pueri, adulescentis,senis; ego tamen idem sum qui et infans fui et puer et adulescens. Sic,quamuis alia atque alia cuique constitutio sit, conciliatio constitutionissuae eadem est. Non enim puerum mihi aut iuuenem aut senem, sed me naturacommendat. Ergo infans ei constitutioni suae conciliatur quae tunc infantiest, non quae futura iuueni est; neque enim si aliquid illi maius in quodtranseat restat, non hoc quoque in quo nascitur secundum naturam est. (17) Primum sibi ipsum conciliatur animal; debet enim aliquid esse ad quod aliareferantur. Voluptatem peto. Cui? mihi; ergo mei curam ago. Dolorem refugio. Pro quo? pro me; ergo mei curam ago. Si omnia propter curam mei facio,ante omnia est mei cura. Haec animalibus inest cunctis, nec inseritur sedinnascitur. (18) Producit fetus suos natura, non abicit; et quia tutelacertissima ex proximo est, sibi quisque commissus est. Itaque, ut in prioribusepistulis dixi, tenera quoque animalia et materno utero uel ouo modo effusaquid sit infestum ipsa protinus norunt et mortifera deuitant; umbram quoquetransuolantium reformidant obnoxia auibus rapto uiuentibus. Nullum animalad uitam prodit sine metu mortis.
(19) 'Quemadmodum' inquit 'editum animal intellectum habere aut salutarisaut mortiferae rei potest? ' Primum quaeritur an intellegat, non quemadmodumintellegat. Esse autem illis intellectum ex eo apparet quod nihil amplius,si intellexerint, facient. Quid est quare pauonem, quare anserem gallinanon fugiat, at tanto minorem et ne notum quidem sibi accipitrem? quarepulli faelem timeant, canem non timeant? Apparet illis inesse nocituriscientiam non experimento collectam; nam antequam possint experisci, cauent. (20) Deinde ne hoc casu existimes fieri, nec metuunt alia quam debent necumquam obliuiscuntur huius tutelae et diligentiae: aequalis est illis apernicioso fuga. Praeterea non fiunt timidiora uiuendo; ex quo quidem apparetnon usu illa in hoc peruenire sed naturali amore salutis suae. Et tardumest et uarium quod usus docet: quidquid natura tradit et aequale omnibusest et statim. (21) Si tamen exigis, dicam quomodo omne animal perniciosaintellegere cogatur. Sentit se carne constare; itaque sentit quid sit quosecari caro, quo uri, quo obteri possit, quae sint animalia armata ad nocendum:horum speciem trahit inimicam et hostilem. Inter se ista coniuncta sunt;simul enim conciliatur saluti suae quidque et iuuatura petit, laesura formidat. Naturales ad utilia impetus, naturales a contrariis aspernationes sunt;sine ulla cogitatione quae hoc dictet, sine consilio fit quidquid naturapraecepit. (22) Non uides quanta sit subtilitas apibus ad fingenda domicilia,quanta diuidui laboris obeundi undique concordia? Non uides quam nullimortalium imitabilis illa aranei textura, quanti operis sit fila disponere,alia in rectum inmissa firmamenti loco, alia in orbem currentia ex densorara, qua minora animalia, in quorum perniciem illa tenduntur, uelut retibusinplicata teneantur? (23) Nascitur ars ista, non discitur. Itaque nullumest animal altero doctius: uidebis araneorum pares telas, par in fauisangulorum omnium foramen. Incertum est et inaequabile quidquid ars tradit:ex aequo uenit quod natura distribuit. Haec nihil magis quam tutelam suiet eius peritiam tradidit, ideoque etiam simul incipiunt et discere etuiuere. (24) Nec est mirum cum eo nasci illa sine quo frustra nascerentur. Primum hoc instrumentum <in> illa natura contulit ad permanendum, (in) conciliationem et caritatem sui. Non poterant salua esse nisi uellent;nec (non) hoc per se profuturum erat, sed sine hoc nulla res profuisset. Sed in nullo deprendes uilitatem sui, <ne> neglegentiam quidem; tacitisquoque et brutis, quamquam in cetera torpeant, ad uiuendum sollertia est. Videbis quae aliis inutilia sunt sibi ipsa non deesse. Vale.