Roman Letters: A Digital Corpus of Late Antique Correspondence

Vander Galien, Craig

doi:10.5281/zenodo.19142059

Letter 81

You complain that you have met with an ungrateful person. If this is your first experience of that sort, you should offer thanks either to your good luck or to your caution. In this case, however, caution can effect nothing but to make you ungenerous. For if you wish to avoid such a danger, you will not confer benefits; and so, that benefits may not be lost with another man, they will be lost to yourself. It is better, however, to get no return than to confer no benefits. Even after a poor crop one should sow again; for often losses due to continued barrenness of an unproductive soil have been made good by one year's fertility. In order to discover one grateful person, it is worth while to make trial of many ungrateful ones. No man has so unerring <Ep2-219> a hand when he confers benefits that he is not frequently deceived; it is well for the traveller to wander, that he may again cleave to the path. After a shipwreck, sailors try the sea again. The banker is not frightened away from the forum by the swindler. If one were compelled to drop everything that caused trouble, life would soon grow dull amid sluggish idleness; but in your case this very condition may prompt you to become more charitable. For when the outcome of any undertaking is unsure, you must try again and again, in order to succeed ultimately. I have, however, discussed the matter with sufficient fulness in the volumes which I have written, entitled "On Benefits." What I think should rather be investigated is this, - a question which I feel has not been made sufficiently clear: "Whether he who has helped us has squared the account and has freed us from our debt, if be has done us harm later." You may add this question also, if you like: "when the harm done later has been more than the help rendered previously." If you are seeking for the formal and just decision of a strict judge, you will find that he checks off one act by the other, and declares: "Though the injuries outweigh the benefits, yet we should credit to the benefits anything that stands over even after the injury." The harm done was indeed greater, but the helpful act was done first. Hence the time also should be taken into account. Other cases are so clear that I need not remind you that you should also look into such points as: How gladly was the help offered, and how reluctantly was the harm done, - since benefits, as well as injuries, depend on the spirit." I did not wish to confer the benefit; but I was won over by my <Ep2-221> respect for the man, or by the importunity of his request, or by hope." Our feeling about every obligation depends in each case upon the spirit in which the benefit is conferred; we weigh not the bulk of the gift, but the quality of the good-will which prompted it. So now let us do away with guess-work; the former deed was a benefit, and the latter, which transcended the earlier benefit, is an injury. The good man so arranges the two sides of his ledger that he voluntarily cheats himself by adding to the benefit and subtracting from the injury. The more indulgent magistrate, however (and I should rather be such a one), will order us to forget the injury and remember the accommodation. "But surely," you say, "it is the part of justice to render to each that which is his due, - thanks in return for a benefit, and retribution, or at any rate ill-will, in return for an injury!" This, I say, will be true when it is one man who has inflicted the injury, and a different man who has conferred the benefit; for if it is the same man, the force of the injury is nullified by the benefit conferred. Indeed, a man who ought to be pardoned, even though there were no good deeds credited to him in the past, should receive something more than mere leniency if he commits a wrong when he has a benefit to his credit. I do not set an equal value on benefits and injuries. I reckon a beneflt at a higher rate than an injury. Not all grateful persons know what it involves to be in debt for a benefit; even a thoughtless, crude fellow, one of the common herd, may know, especially soon after he has received the gift; but he does not know how deeply he stands in debt therefor. Only the wise man knows exactly what value should be put <Ep2-223> upon everything; for the fool whom I just mentioned, no matter how good his intentions may be, either pays less than he owes, or pays it at the wrong time or the wrong pIace. That for which he should make return he wastes and loses. There is a marvellously accurate phraseology applied to certain subjects, a long- established terminology which indicates certain acts by means of symbols that are most efficient and that serve to outline men's duties. We are, as you know., wont to speak thus: " A. has made a return for the favour bestowed by B." Making a return means handing over of your own accord that which you owe. We do not say, "He has paid back the favour"; for "pay back" is used of a man upon whom a demand for payment is made, of those who pay against their will. Of those who pay under any circumstances whatsoever, and of those who pay through a third party. We do not say, "He has 'restored' the benefit," or 'settled' it; we have never been satisfied with a word which applies properly to a debt of money. Making a return means offering something to him from whom you have received something. The phrase implies a voluntary return; he who has made such a return has served the writ upon himself. The wise man will inquire in his own mind into all the circumstanees: how much he has received, from whom, when, where, how. And so we declare that none but the wise man knows how to make return for a favour; moreover, none but the wise man knows how to confer a benefit, - that man, I mean, who enjoys the giving more than the recipient enjoys the receiving. Now some person will reckon this remark as one of the generally surprising state- <Ep2-225> ments such as we Stoics are wont to make and such as the Greeks call "paradoxes," and will say: "Do you maintain, then, that only the wise man knows how to return a favour? Do you maintain that no one else knows how to make restoration to a creditor for a debt? Or, on buying a commodity, to pay full value to the seller?" In order not to bring any odium upon myself, let me tell you that Epicurus says the same thing. At any rate, Metrodorus remarks that only the wise man knows how to return a favour. Again, the objector mentioned above wonders at our saying: "The wise man alone knows how to love, the wise man alone is a real friend." And yet it is a part of love and of friendship to return favours ; nay, further, it is an ordinary act, and happens more frequently than real friendship. Again, this same objector wonders at our saying, "There is no loyalty except in the wise man," just as if he himself does not say the same thing! Or do you think that there is any loyalty in him who does not know how to return a favour? These men, accordingly, should cease to discredit us, just as if we were uttering an impossible boast; they should understand that the essence of honour resides in the wise man, while among the crowd we find only the ghost and the semblance of honour. None but the wise man knows how to return a favour. Even a fool can return it in proportion to his knowledge and his power; his fault would be a lack of knowledge rather than a lack of will or desire. To will does not come by teaching. The wise man will compare all things with one another; for the very same object becomes greater or smaller, according to the time, the place, and the cause. Often the riches that are spent in profusion upon a palace cannot accomplish as much as a <Ep2-227> thousand denarii given at the right time. Now it makes a great deal of difference whether you give outright, or come to a man's assistance, whether your generosity saves him, or sets him up in life. Often the gift is small, but the consequences great. And what a distinction do you imagine there is between taking something which one lacks, - something which was offered, - and receiving a benefit in order to confer one in return? But we should not slip back into the subject which we have already sufficiently investigated. In this balancing of benefits and injuries, the good man will, to be sure, judge with the highest degree of fairness, but he will incline towards the side of the benefit; he will turn more readily in this direction. Moreover, in affairs of this kind the person concerned is wont to count for a great deal. Men say: "You conferred a benefit upon me in that matter of the slave, but you did me an injury in the case of my father or, "You saved my son, but robbed me of a father." Similarly, he will follow up all other matters in which comparisons can be made, and if the difference be very slight, he will pretend not to notice it. Even though the difference be great, yet if the concession can be made without impairment of duty and loyalty, our good man will overlook that is, provided the injury exclusively affects the good man himself. To sum up, the matter stands thus: the good man will be easy-going in striking a balance; he will allow too much to be set against his credit. He will be unwilling to pay a benefit by balancing the injurv against it. The side towards which he will lean, the tendency which he will exhibit, is the desire to be under obligations for the favour, and the desire to make return therefor. For <Ep2-229> anyone who receives a benefit more gladly than he repays it is mistaken. By as much as he who pays is more light-hearted than he who borrows, by so much ought he to be more joyful who unburdens himself of the greatest debt - a benefit received -than he who incurs the greatest obligations. For ungrateful men make mistakes in this respect also: they have to pay their creditors both capital and interest, but thel think that benefits are currency which they can use without interest. So the debts grow through postponement, and the later the action is postponed the more remains to be paid. A man is an ingrate if he repays a favour without interest. Therefore, interest also should be allowed for, when you compare your receipts and your expenses. We should try by all means to be as grateful as possible. For gratiiude is a good thing for ourselves, in a sense in which justice, that is commonly supposed to concern other persons, is not; gratitude returns in large measure unto itself. There is not a man who, when he has benefited his neighbour, has not benefited himself, - I do not mean for the reason that he whom you have aided will desire to aid you, or that he whom you have defended will desire to protect you, or that an example of good conduct returns in a circle to benefit the doer, just as examples of bad conduct recoil upon their authors, and as men find no pity if they suffer wrongs which they themselves have demonstrated the possibility of committing; but that the reward for all the virtues lies in the virtues themselves. For they are not practised with a view to recompense; the wages of a good deed is to have done it. I am grateful, not in order that my neighbour, provoked by the earlier act of kindness, may be more ready to benefit me, but simply <Ep2-231> in order that I may perform a most pleasant and beautiful act; I feel grateful, not because it profits me, but because it pleases me. And, to prove the truth of this to you, I declare that even if I way not be grateful without seeming ungrateful, even if I am able to retain a benefit only by an act which resembles an injury; even so, I shall strive in the utmost calmness of spirit toward the purpose which honour demands, in the very midst of disgrace. No one, I think, rates virtue higher or is mnore consecrated to virtue than he who has lost his reputation for being a good man in order to keep from losing the approval of his conscience. Thus, as I have said, your being grateful is more conducive to your own good than to your neighbour's good. For while your neighbour has had a common, everyday experience, - namely, receiving back the gift which he had bestowed, - you have had a great experience which is the outcome of an utterly happy condition of soul, - to have felt gratitude. For if wickedness makes men unhappy and virtue makes men blest, and if it is a virtue to be grateful, then the return which you have made is only the customary thing, but the thing to which you have attained is priceless, - the consciousness of gratitude , which comes only to the soul that is divine and blessed. The opposite feeling to this, however, is immediately attended by the greatest unhappiness; no man, if he be ungrateful, will be unhappy in the future. I allow him no day of grace; he is unhappy forthwith. Let us therefore avoid being ungrateful, not for the sake of others but for our own sakes. When we do wrong, only the least and lightest portion of it flows back upon our neighbour; the worst and, if <Ep2-233> I may use the term, the densest portion of it stays at home and troubles the owner. My master Attalus used to say: "Evil herself drinks the largest portion of her own poison." The poison which serpents carry for the destruction of others, and secrete without harm to themselves, is not like this poison; for this sort is ruinous to the possessor. The ungrateful man tortures and torments himself; he hates the gifts which he has accepted, because he must make a return for them, and he tries to belittle their value, but he really enlarges and exaggerates the injuries which he has received. And what is more wretched than a man who forgets his benefits and clings to his injuries? Wisdom, on the other hand, lends grace to every benefit, and of her own free will commends it to her own favour, and delights her soul by continued recollection thereof. Evil men have but one pleasure in benefits, and a very short-lived pleasure at that; it lasts only while they are receiving them. But the wise man derives therefrom an abiding and eternal joy. For he takes delight not so much in receiving the gift as in having received it; and this joy never perishes; it abides with him always. He despises the wrongs done him; he forgets them, not accidentally, but voluntarily. He does not put a wrong construction upon everything, or seek for someone whom he may hold responsible for each happening; he rather ascribes even the sins of men to chance. He will not misinterpret a word or a look; he makes light of all mishaps by interpreting them in a generous way. He does not remember an injury rather than a service. As far as possible, he lets his memory rest upon the earlier and the better deed, never changing his attitude towards those who have <Ep2-235> deserved well of him, except in climes where the bad deeds far outdistance the good, and the space between them is obvious even to one who closes his eyes to it; even then only to this extent, that he strives, after receiving the preponderant injury, to resume the attitude which he held before he received the benefit. For when the injury merely equals the benefit, a certain amount of kindly feeling is left over. Just as a defendant is acquitted when the votes are equal, and just as the spirit of kindliness always tries to bend every doubtful case toward the better interpretation, so the mind of the wise man, when another's merits merely equal his bad deeds, will, to be sure, cease to feel an obligation, but does not cease to desire to feel it, and acts precisely like the man who pays his debts even after they have been legally cancelled. But no man can be grateful unless he has learned to scorn the things which drive the common herd to distraction; if you wish to make return for a favour, you must be willing to go into exile, - or to pour forth your blood, or to undergo poverty, or - and this will frequently bappen, - even to let your very innocence be stained and exposed to shameful slanders. It is no slight price that a man must pay for being grateful. We hold nothing dearer than a benefit, so long as we are seeking one; we hold nothing cheaper after we have received it. Do you ask what it is that makes us forget benefits received? It is our extreme greed for receiving others. We consider not what we have obtained, but what we are to seek. We are deflected from the right course by riches, titles, power, and everything which is valuable in our opinion but worthless when rated at its real value. We do not know how to weigh matters; <Ep2-237> we should take counsel regarding them, not with their reputation but with their nature; those things possess no grandeur wherewith to enthral our minds, except the fact that we have become accustomed to marvel at them. For they are not praised because they ought to be desired, but they are desired because they have been praised; and when the error of individuals has once created error on the part of the public, then the public error goes on creating error on the part of individuals. But just as we take on faith such estimates of values, so let us take on the faith of the people this truth that nothing is more honourable than a grateful heart. This phrase will be echoed by all cities, and by all races, even those from savage countries. Upon this point - good and bad will agree. Some praise pleasure, some prefer toil; some say that pain is the greatest of evils, some say it is no evil at all; some will include riches in the Supreme Good, others will say that their discovery meant harm to the human race, and that none is richer than he to whom Fortune has found nothing to give. Amid all this diversity of opinion all men will yet with one voice, as the saying is, vote "aye" to the proposition that thanks should be returned to those who have deserved well of us. On this question the common herd, rebellious as they are, will all agree, but at present we keep paying back injuries instead of benefits, and the primary reason why a man is ungrateful is that he has found it impossible to be grateful enough. Our madness has gone to such lengths that it is a very dangerous thing to confer great benefits upon a person; for just because he thinks it shameful not to repay, so he would have none left alive whom he should repay. "Keep for yourself what you <Ep2-239>

[1] Quereris incidisse te in hominem ingratum: si hoc nunc primum, age aut fortunae aut diligentiae tuae gratias. Sed nihil facere hoc loco diligentia potest nisi te malignum; nam si hoc periculum vitare volueris, non dabis beneficia; ita ne apud alium pereant, apud te peribunt. Non respondeant potius quam non dentur: et post malam segetem serendum est. Saepe quidquid perierat adsidua infelicis soli sterilitate unius anni restituit ubertas. [2] Est tanti, ut gratum invenias, experiri et ingratos. Nemo habet tam certam in beneficiis manum ut non saepe fallatur: aberrent, ut aliquando haereant. Post naufragium maria temptantur; feneratorem non fugat a foro coctor. Cito inerti otio vita torpebit, si relinquendum est quidquid offendit. Te vero benigniorem haec ipsa res faciat; nam cuius rei eventus incertus est, id ut aliquando procedat saepe temptandum est. [3] Sed de isto satis multa in iis libris locuti sumus qui de beneficiis inscribuntur: illud magis quaerendum videtur, quod non satis, ut existimo, explicatum est, an is qui profuit nobis, si postea nocuit, paria fecerit et nos debito solverit. Adice, si vis, et illud: multo plus postea nocuit quam ante profuerat. [4] Si rectam illam rigidi iudicis sententiam quaeris, alterum ab altero absolvet et dicet, 'quamvis iniuriae praeponderent, tamen beneficiis donetur quod ex iniuria superest'. Plus nocuit, sed prius profuit; itaque habeatur et temporis ratio. [5] Iam illa manifestiora sunt quam ut admoneri debeas quaerendum esse quam libenter profuerit, quam invitus nocuerit, quoniam animo et beneficia et iniuriae constant. 'Nolui beneficium dare; victus sum aut verecundia aut instantis pertinacia aut spe.' [6] Eo animo quidque debetur quo datur, nec quantum sit sed a quali profectum voluntate perpenditur. Nunc coniectura tollatur: et illud beneficium fuit et hoc, quod modum beneficii prioris excessit, iniuria est. Vir bonus utrosque calculos sic ponit ut se ipse circumscribat: beneficio adicit, iniuriae demit. Alter ille remissior iudex, quem esse me malo, iniuriae oblivisci iubebit, officii meminisse. [7] 'Hoc certe' inquis 'iustitiae convenit, suum cuique reddere, beneficio gratiam, iniuriae talionem aut certe malam gratiam.' Verum erit istud cum alius iniuriam fecerit, alius beneficium dederit; nam si idem est, beneficio vis iniuriae extinguitur. Nam cui, etiam si merita non antecessissent, oportebat ignosci, post beneficia laedenti plus quam venia debetur. [8] Non pono utrique par pretium: pluris aestimo beneficium quam iniuriam. Non omnes esse grati sciunt: debere beneficium potest etiam inprudens et rudis et unus e turba, utique dum prope est ab accepto, ignorat autem quantum pro eo debeat. Uni sapienti notum est quanti res quaeque taxanda sit. Nam ille de quo loquebar modo stultus, etiam si bonae voluntatis est, aut minus quam debet aut <alio quam debet> tempore aut quo non debet loco reddit; id quod referendum est effundit atque abicit. [9] Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quaedam efficacissimis et officia docentibus notis signat. Sic certe solemus loqui: 'ille illi gratiam rettulit'. Referre est ultro quod debeas adferre. Non dicimus 'gratiam reddidit'; reddunt enim et qui reposcuntur et qui inviti et qui ubilibet et qui per alium. Non dicimus 'reposuit beneficium' aut 'solvit': nullum nobis placuit quod aeri alieno convenit verbum. [10] Referre est ad eum a quo acceperis rem ferre. Haec vox significat voluntariam relationem: qui rettulit, ipse se appellavit. Sapiens omnia examinabit secum, quantum acceperit, a quo, <quare,> quando, ubi, quemadmodum. Itaque negamus quemquam scire gratiam referre nisi sapientem, non magis quam beneficium dare quisquam scit nisi sapiens -- hic scilicet qui magis dato gaudet quam alius accepto. [11] Hoc aliquis inter illa numerat quae videmur inopinata omnibus dicere (paradoxa Graeci vocant) et ait, 'nemo ergo scit praeter sapientem referre gratiam? ergo nec quod debet creditori suo reponere quisquam scit alius nec, cum emit aliquam rem, pretium venditori persolvere?' <Ne> nobis fiat invidia, scito idem dicere Epicurum. Metrodorus certe ait solum sapientem referre gratiam scire. [12] Deinde idem admiratur cum dicimus, 'solus sapiens scit amare, solus sapiens amicus est'. Atqui et amoris et amicitiae pars est referre gratiam, immo hoc magis vulgare est et in plures cadit quam vera amicitia. Deinde idem admiratur quod dicimus fidem nisi in sapiente non esse, tamquam non ipse idem dicat. An tibi videtur fidem habere qui referre gratiam nescit? [13] Desinant itaque infamare nos tamquam incredibilia iactantes et sciant apud sapientem esse ipsa honesta, apud vulgum simulacra rerum honestarum et effigies. Nemo referre gratiam scit nisi sapiens. Stultus quoque, utcumque scit et quemadmodum potest, referat; scientia illi potius quam voluntas desit: velle non discitur. [14] Sapiens omnia inter se comparabit; maius enim aut minus fit, quamvis idem sit, tempore, loco, causa. Saepe enim hoc <non> potuere divitiae in domum infusae quod opportune dati mille denarii. Multum enim interest donaveris an succurreris, servaverit illum tua liberalitas an instruxerit; saepe quod datur exiguum est, quod sequitur ex eo magnum. Quantum autem existimas interesse utrum aliquis quod daret a se [quod praestabat] sumpserit an beneficium acceperit ut daret? [15] Sed ne in eadem quae satis scrutati sumus revolvamur, in hac comparatione beneficii et iniuriae vir bonus iudicabit quidem quod erit aequissimum, sed beneficio favebit; in hanc erit partem proclivior. [16] Plurimum autem momenti persona solet adferre in rebus eiusmodi: 'dedisti mihi beneficium in servo, iniuriam fecisti in patre; servasti mihi filium, sed patrem abstulisti'. Alia deinceps per quae procedit omnis conlatio prosequetur, et si pusillum erit quod intersit, dissimulabit; etiam si multum fuerit, sed si id donari salva pietate ac fide poterit, remittet, id est si ad ipsum tota pertinebit iniuria. [17] Summa rei haec est: facilis erit in commutando; patietur plus inputari sibi; invitus beneficium per compensationem iniuriae solvet; in hanc partem inclinabit, huc verget, ut cupiat debere gratiam, cupiat referre. Errat enim si quis beneficium accipit libentius quam reddit: quanto hilarior est qui solvit quam qui mutuatur, tanto debet laetior esse qui se maximo aere alieno accepti benefici exonerat quam qui cum maxime obligatur. [18] Nam in hoc quoque falluntur ingrati, quod creditori quidem praeter sortem extra ordinem numerant, beneficiorum autem usum esse gratuitum putant: et illa crescunt mora tantoque plus solvendum est quanto tardius. Ingratus est qui beneficium reddit sine usura; itaque huius quoque rei habebitur ratio, cum conferentur accepta et expensa. [19] Omnia facienda sunt ut quam gratissimi simus. Nostrum enim hoc bonum est, quemadmodum iustitia non est (ut vulgo creditur) ad alios pertinens: magna pars eius in se redit. Nemo non, cum alteri prodest, sibi profuit, non eo nomine dico, quod volet adiuvare adiutus, protegere defensus, quod bonum exemplum circuitu ad facientem revertitur (sicut mala exempla recidunt in auctores nec ulla miseratio contingit iis qui patiuntur iniurias quas posse fieri faciendo docuerunt), sed quod virtutum omnium pretium in ipsis est. Non enim exercentur ad praemium: recte facti fecisse merces est. [20] Gratus sum non ut alius mihi libentius praestet priori inritatus exemplo, sed ut rem iucundissimam ac pulcherrimam faciam; gratus sum non quia expedit, sed quia iuvat. Hoc ut scias ita esse, si gratum esse non licebit nisi ut videar ingratus, si reddere beneficium non aliter quam per speciem iniuriae potero, aequissimo animo ad honestum consilium per mediam infamiam tendam. Nemo mihi videtur pluris aestimare virtutem, nemo illi magis esse devotus quam qui boni viri famam perdidit ne conscientiam perderet. [21] Itaque, ut dixi, maiore tuo quam alterius bono gratus es; illi enim vulgaris et cotidiana res contigit, recipere quod dederat, tibi magna et ex beatissimo animi statu profecta, gratum fuisse. Nam si malitia miseros facit, virtus beatos, gratum autem esse virtus est, rem usitatam reddidisti, inaestimabilem consecutus es, conscientiam grati, quae nisi in animum divinum fortunatumque non pervenit. [In] Contrarium autem huic adfectum summa infelicitas urget: nemo sibi gratus est qui alteri non fuit. Hoc me putas dicere, qui ingratus est miser erit? non differo illum: statim miser est. [22] Itaque ingrati esse vitemus non aliena causa sed nostra. Minimum ex nequitia levissimumque ad alios redundat: quod pessimum ex illa est et, ut ita dicam, spississimum, domi remanet et premit habentem, quemadmodum Attalus noster dicere solebat, 'malitia ipsa maximam partem veneni sui bibit'. Illud venenum quod serpentes in alienam perniciem proferunt, sine sua continent, non est huic simile: hoc habentibus pessimum est. [23] Torquet se ingratus et macerat; odit quae accepit, quia redditurus est, et extenuat, iniurias vero dilatat atque auget. Quid autem eo miserius cui beneficia excidunt, haerent iniuriae? At contra sapientia exornat omne beneficium ac sibi ipsa commendat et se adsidua eius commemoratione delectat. [24] Malis una voluptas est et haec brevis, dum accipiunt beneficia, ex quibus sapienti longum gaudium manet ac perenne. Non enim illum accipere sed accepisse delectat, quod inmortale est et adsiduum. Illa contemnit quibus laesus est, nec obliviscitur per neglegentiam sed volens. [25] Non vertit omnia in peius nec quaerit cui inputet casum, et peccata hominum ad fortunam potius refert. Non calumniatur verba nec vultus; quidquid accidit benigne interpretando levat. Non offensae potius quam offici meminit; quantum potest in priore ac meliore se memoria detinet, nec mutat animum adversus bene meritos nisi multum male facta praecedunt et manifestum etiam coniventi discrimen est; tunc quoque in hoc dumtaxat, ut talis sit post maiorem iniuriam qualis ante beneficium. Nam cum beneficio par est iniuria, aliquid in animo benivolentiae remanet. [26] Quemadmodum reus sententiis paribus absolvitur et semper quidquid dubium est humanitas inclinat in melius, sic animus sapientis, ubi paria maleficiis merita sunt, desinit quidem debere, sed non desinit velle debere, et hoc facit quod qui post tabulas novas solvunt. [27] Nemo autem esse gratus potest nisi contempsit ista propter quae vulgus insanit: si referre vis gratiam, et in exilium eundum est et effundendus sanguis et suscipienda egestas et ipsa innocentia saepe maculanda indignisque obicienda rumoribus. Non parvo sibi constat homo gratus. [28] Nihil carius aestimamus quam beneficium quamdiu petimus, nihil vilius cum accepimus. Quaeris quid sit quod oblivionem nobis acceptorum faciat? cupiditas accipiendorum; cogitamus non quid inpetratum sed quid petendum sit. Abstrahunt a recto divitiae, honores, potentia et cetera quae opinione nostra cara sunt, pretio suo vilia. [29] Nescimus aestimare res, de quibus non cum fama sed cum rerum natura deliberandum est; nihil habent ista magnificum quo mentes in se nostras trahant praeter hoc, quod mirari illa consuevimus. Non enim quia concupiscenda sunt laudantur, sed concupiscuntur quia laudata sunt, et cum singulorum error publicum fecerit, singulorum errorem facit publicus. [30] Sed quemadmodum illa credidimus, sic et hoc eidem populo credamus, nihil esse grato animo honestius; omnes hoc urbes, omnes etiam ex barbaris regionibus gentes conclamabunt; in hoc bonis malisque conveniet. [31] Erunt qui voluptates laudent, erunt qui labores malint; erunt qui dolorem maximum malum dicant, erunt qui ne malum quidem appellent; divitias aliquis ad summum bonum admittet, alius illas dicet malo vitae humanae repertas, nihil esse eo locupletius cui quod donet fortuna non invenit: in tanta iudiciorum diversitate referendam bene merentibus gratiam omnes tibi uno, quod aiunt, ore adfirmabunt. In hoc tam discors turba consentiet, cum interim iniurias pro beneficiis reddimus, et prima causa est cur quis ingratus sit si satis gratus esse non potuit. [32] Eo perductus est furor ut periculosissima res sit beneficia in aliquem magna conferre; nam quia putat turpe non reddere, non vult esse cui reddat. Tibi habe quod accepisti; non repeto, non exigo: profuisse tutum sit. Nullum est odium perniciosius quam e beneficii violati pudore. Vale.

◆

You complain that you have met with an
ungrateful person. If this is your first experience of that sort,
you should offer thanks either to your good luck or to your caution.
In this case, however, caution can effect nothing but to make you ungenerous.
For if you wish to avoid such a danger, you will not confer benefits; and
so, that benefits may not be lost with another man, they will be lost to
yourself. It is better, however, to get no return than to confer no benefits.
Even after a poor crop one should sow again; for often losses due to continued
barrenness of an unproductive soil have been made good by one year's fertility.
In order to discover one grateful person, it is worth while to make trial
of many ungrateful ones. No man has so unerring
<Ep2-219>

a hand when he confers benefits that he is not frequently deceived;
it is well for the traveller to wander, that he may again cleave to the
path. After a shipwreck, sailors try the sea again. The banker
is not frightened away from the forum by the swindler. If one were
compelled to drop everything that caused trouble,
life would soon grow dull amid sluggish idleness; but in your case this
very condition may prompt you to become more charitable. For when
the outcome of any undertaking is unsure, you must try again and again,
in order to succeed ultimately. I have, however, discussed the matter
with sufficient fulness in the volumes which I have written, entitled "On
Benefits."
What I think should rather be investigated
is this, - a question which I feel has not been made sufficiently clear:
"Whether he who has helped us has squared the account and has freed us
from our debt, if be has done us harm later." You may add this question
also, if you like: "when the harm done later has been more than the
help rendered previously." If you are seeking for the formal and just decision
of a strict judge, you will find that he checks off one act by the other,
and declares: "Though the injuries outweigh the benefits, yet we
should credit to the benefits anything that stands over even after the
injury." The harm done was indeed greater, but the helpful act was done
first. Hence the time also should be taken into account. Other
cases are so clear that I need not remind you that you should also look
into such points as: How gladly was the help offered, and how reluctantly
was the harm done, - since benefits, as well as injuries, depend on the
spirit." I did not wish to confer the benefit; but I was won over by my
<Ep2-221>

respect for the man, or by the importunity of his request, or by hope."
Our feeling about every obligation depends in each case upon the spirit
in which the benefit is conferred; we weigh not the bulk of the gift, but
the quality of the good-will which prompted it. So now let us do
away with guess-work; the former deed was a benefit, and the latter, which
transcended the earlier benefit, is an injury. The good man so arranges
the two sides of his ledger that he voluntarily cheats himself by adding
to the benefit and subtracting from the injury.
The more indulgent magistrate, however
(and I should rather be such a one), will order us to forget the injury
and remember the accommodation. "But surely," you say, "it is the
part of justice to render to each that which is his due, - thanks in return
for a benefit, and retribution, or at any rate ill-will, in return for
an injury!" This, I say, will be true when it is one man who has inflicted
the injury, and a different man who has conferred the benefit; for if it
is the same man, the force of the injury is nullified by the benefit conferred.
Indeed, a man who ought to be pardoned, even though there were no good
deeds credited to him in the past, should receive something more than mere
leniency if he commits a wrong when he has a benefit to his credit.
I do not set an equal value on benefits and injuries. I reckon a
beneflt at a higher rate than an injury. Not all grateful persons
know what it involves to be in debt for a benefit; even a thoughtless,
crude fellow, one of the common herd, may know, especially soon after he
has received the gift; but he does not know how deeply he stands in debt
therefor. Only the wise man knows exactly what value should be put
<Ep2-223>

upon everything; for the fool whom I just mentioned, no matter how good
his intentions may be, either pays less than he owes, or pays it at the
wrong time or the wrong pIace. That for which he should make return
he wastes and loses. There is a marvellously accurate phraseology
applied to certain subjects, a long- established terminology which indicates
certain acts by means of symbols that are most efficient and that serve
to outline men's duties. We are, as you know., wont to speak thus:
" A. has made a return for the favour bestowed by B." Making a return means
handing over of your own accord that which you owe. We do not say,
"He has paid back the favour"; for "pay back" is used of a man upon whom
a demand for payment is made, of those who pay against their will.
Of those who pay under any circumstances whatsoever, and of those who pay
through a third party. We do not say, "He has 'restored' the benefit,"
or 'settled' it; we have never been satisfied with a word which applies
properly to a debt of money. Making a return means offering something
to him from whom you have received something. The phrase implies
a voluntary return; he who has made such a return has served the writ upon
himself.
The wise man will inquire in his own
mind into all the circumstanees: how much he has received, from whom, when,
where, how. And so we declare that none but the wise man knows
how to make return for a favour; moreover, none but the wise man knows
how to confer a benefit, - that man, I mean, who enjoys the giving more
than the recipient enjoys the receiving.
Now some person will reckon this remark as one of the generally surprising
state-
<Ep2-225>

ments such as we Stoics are wont to make and such as the Greeks call
"paradoxes," and will say: "Do you maintain, then, that only the
wise man knows how to return a favour? Do you maintain that no one
else knows how to make restoration to a creditor for a debt? Or,
on buying a commodity, to pay full value to the seller?" In order not to
bring any odium upon myself, let me tell you that Epicurus says the same
thing. At any rate, Metrodorus remarks that only the wise man knows
how to return a favour. Again, the objector mentioned above wonders at
our saying: "The wise man alone knows how to love, the wise man alone
is a real friend." And yet it is a part of love
and of friendship to return
favours ; nay, further, it is an ordinary act, and happens more frequently
than real friendship. Again, this same objector wonders at our saying,
"There is no loyalty except in the wise man," just as if he himself does
not say the same thing! Or do you think that there is any loyalty
in him who does not know how to return a favour? These men, accordingly,
should cease to discredit us, just as if we were uttering an impossible
boast; they should understand that the essence of honour
resides in the wise man, while among the crowd we find only the ghost and
the semblance of honour. None but the wise man knows how to return
a favour. Even a fool can return it in proportion to his knowledge
and his power; his fault would be a lack of knowledge rather than a lack
of will or desire. To will does not come by teaching.
The wise man will compare all things
with one another; for the very same object becomes greater or smaller,
according to the time, the place, and the cause. Often the riches
that are spent in profusion upon a palace cannot accomplish as much as
a
<Ep2-227>

thousand denarii given at the right time. Now it makes a great
deal of difference whether you give outright, or come to a man's assistance,
whether your generosity saves him, or sets him up in life. Often
the gift is small, but the consequences great. And what a distinction
do you imagine there is between taking something which one lacks, - something
which was offered, - and receiving a benefit in order to confer one in
return?
But we should not slip back into the
subject which we have already sufficiently investigated. In this
balancing of benefits and injuries, the good man will, to be sure, judge
with the highest degree of fairness, but he will incline towards the side
of the benefit; he will turn more readily in this direction. Moreover,
in affairs of this kind the person concerned is wont to count for a great
deal. Men say: "You conferred a benefit upon me in that matter
of the slave, but you did me an injury in the case of my father or, "You
saved my son, but robbed me of a father." Similarly, he will follow up
all other matters in which comparisons can be made, and if the difference
be very slight, he will pretend not to notice it. Even though the
difference be great, yet if the concession can be made without impairment
of duty and loyalty, our good man will overlook that is, provided the injury
exclusively affects the good man himself. To sum up, the matter stands
thus: the good man will be easy-going in striking a balance; he will allow
too much to be set against his credit. He will be unwilling to pay
a benefit by balancing the injurv against it. The side towards which
he will lean, the tendency which he will exhibit, is the desire to be under
obligations for the favour, and the desire to make return therefor.
For
<Ep2-229>

anyone who receives a benefit more gladly than he repays it is mistaken.
By as much as he who pays is more light-hearted than he who borrows, by
so much ought he to be more joyful who unburdens himself of the greatest
debt - a benefit received -than he who incurs the greatest obligations.
For ungrateful men make mistakes in this respect also: they have to pay
their creditors both capital and interest, but thel think that benefits
are currency which they can use without interest. So the debts grow
through postponement, and the later the action is postponed the more remains
to be paid. A man is an ingrate if he repays a favour without interest.
Therefore, interest also should be allowed for, when you compare your receipts
and your expenses. We should try by all means to be as grateful as
possible.
For gratiiude
is a good thing for ourselves, in a sense in which justice, that is commonly
supposed to concern other persons, is not; gratitude returns in large measure
unto itself. There is not a man who, when he has benefited his neighbour,
has not benefited himself, - I do not mean for the reason that he whom
you have aided will desire to aid you, or that he whom you have defended
will desire to protect you, or that an example of good conduct returns
in a circle to benefit the doer, just as examples of bad conduct recoil
upon their authors, and as men find no pity if they suffer wrongs which
they themselves have demonstrated the possibility of committing; but that
the reward for all the virtues lies in the virtues themselves. For
they are not practised with a view to recompense; the wages of a good deed
is to have done it. I am grateful, not in order that my neighbour, provoked
by the earlier act of kindness, may be more ready to benefit me, but simply
<Ep2-231>

in order that I may perform a most pleasant and beautiful act; I feel
grateful, not because it profits me, but because it pleases me. And,
to prove the truth of this to you, I declare that even if I way not be
grateful without seeming ungrateful, even if I am able to retain a benefit
only by an act which resembles an injury; even so, I shall strive in the
utmost calmness of spirit toward the purpose which honour demands, in the
very midst of disgrace. No one, I think, rates virtue higher or is
mnore consecrated to virtue than he who has lost his reputation for being
a good man in order to keep from losing the approval of his conscience.
Thus, as I have said, your being grateful is more conducive to your own
good than to your neighbour's good. For while your neighbour has
had a common, everyday experience, - namely, receiving back the gift which
he had bestowed, - you have had a great experience which is the outcome
of an utterly happy condition of soul, - to have felt gratitude.
For if wickedness makes men unhappy and virtue makes men blest, and if
it is a virtue to be grateful, then the return which you have made is only
the customary thing, but the thing to which you have attained is priceless,
- the consciousness of gratitude , which
comes only to the soul that is divine and blessed. The opposite feeling
to this, however, is immediately attended by the greatest unhappiness;
no man, if he be ungrateful, will be unhappy in the future. I allow
him no day of grace; he is unhappy forthwith. Let us therefore avoid
being ungrateful, not for the sake of others but for our own sakes.
When we do wrong, only the least and lightest portion of it flows back
upon our neighbour; the worst and, if
<Ep2-233>

I may use the term, the densest portion of it stays at home and troubles
the owner. My master Attalus used to say: "Evil herself drinks
the largest portion of her own poison." The poison which serpents carry
for the destruction of others, and secrete without harm to themselves,
is not like this poison; for this sort is ruinous to the possessor.
The ungrateful man tortures and torments himself; he hates the gifts which
he has accepted, because he must make a return for them, and he tries to
belittle their value, but he really enlarges and exaggerates the injuries
which he has received. And what is more wretched than a man who forgets
his benefits and clings to his injuries?
Wisdom, on the other hand, lends grace
to every benefit, and of her own free will commends it to her own favour,
and delights her soul by continued recollection thereof. Evil men
have but one pleasure in benefits, and a very short-lived pleasure at that;
it lasts only while they are receiving them. But the wise man derives
therefrom an abiding and eternal joy. For he takes delight not so
much in receiving the gift as in having received it; and this joy never
perishes; it abides with him always. He despises the wrongs done
him; he forgets them, not accidentally, but voluntarily.
He does not put a wrong construction upon everything, or seek for someone
whom he may hold responsible for each happening; he rather ascribes even
the sins of men to chance. He will not misinterpret a word or a look;
he makes light of all mishaps by interpreting them in a generous way.
He does not remember an injury rather than a service. As far as possible,
he lets his memory rest upon the earlier and the better deed, never changing
his attitude towards those who have
<Ep2-235>

deserved well of him, except in climes where the bad deeds far outdistance
the good, and the space between them is obvious even to one who closes
his eyes to it; even then only to this extent, that he strives, after receiving
the preponderant injury, to resume the attitude which he held before he
received the benefit. For when the injury merely equals the benefit,
a certain amount of kindly feeling is left over. Just as a defendant
is acquitted when the votes are equal, and just as the spirit of kindliness
always tries to bend every doubtful case toward the better interpretation,
so the mind of the wise man, when another's merits merely equal his bad
deeds, will, to be sure, cease to feel an obligation, but does not cease
to desire to feel it, and acts precisely like the man who pays his debts
even after they have been legally cancelled. But no man can be grateful
unless he has learned to scorn the things which drive the common herd to
distraction; if you wish to make return for a favour, you must be willing
to go into exile, - or to pour forth your blood, or to undergo poverty,
or - and this will frequently bappen, - even to let your very innocence
be stained and exposed to shameful slanders. It is no slight price
that a man must pay for being grateful. We hold nothing dearer than
a benefit, so long as we are seeking one; we hold nothing cheaper after
we have received it. Do you ask what it is that makes us forget benefits
received? It is our extreme greed for receiving others. We
consider not what we have obtained, but what we are to seek. We are
deflected from the right course by riches, titles, power, and everything
which is valuable in our opinion but worthless when rated at its real value.
We do not know how to weigh matters;
<Ep2-237>

we should take counsel regarding them, not with their reputation but
with their nature; those things possess no grandeur wherewith to enthral
our minds, except the fact that we have become accustomed to marvel at
them. For they are not praised because they ought to be desired,
but they are desired because they have been praised; and when the error
of individuals has once created error on the part of the public, then the
public error goes on creating error on the part of individuals.
But just as we take on faith such estimates
of values, so let us take on the faith of the people this truth that nothing
is more honourable than a grateful heart. This phrase will be echoed
by all cities, and by all races, even those from savage countries.
Upon this point - good and bad will agree. Some praise pleasure,
some prefer toil; some say that pain is the greatest of evils, some say
it is no evil at all; some will include riches in the Supreme Good, others
will say that their discovery meant harm to the human race, and that none
is richer than he to whom Fortune has found nothing to give. Amid
all this diversity of opinion all men will yet with one voice, as the saying
is, vote "aye" to the proposition that thanks should be returned to those
who have deserved well of us. On this question the common herd, rebellious
as they are, will all agree, but at present we keep paying back injuries
instead of benefits, and the primary reason why a man is ungrateful is
that he has found it impossible to be grateful enough. Our madness
has gone to such lengths that it is a very dangerous thing to confer great
benefits upon a person; for just because he thinks it shameful not to repay,
so he would have none left alive whom he should repay. "Keep for
yourself what you
<Ep2-239>

Latin / Greek Original

[1] Quereris incidisse te in hominem ingratum: si hoc nunc primum, age aut fortunae aut diligentiae tuae gratias. Sed nihil facere hoc loco diligentia potest nisi te malignum; nam si hoc periculum vitare volueris, non dabis beneficia; ita ne apud alium pereant, apud te peribunt. Non respondeant potius quam non dentur: et post malam segetem serendum est. Saepe quidquid perierat adsidua infelicis soli sterilitate unius anni restituit ubertas. [2] Est tanti, ut gratum invenias, experiri et ingratos. Nemo habet tam certam in beneficiis manum ut non saepe fallatur: aberrent, ut aliquando haereant. Post naufragium maria temptantur; feneratorem non fugat a foro coctor. Cito inerti otio vita torpebit, si relinquendum est quidquid offendit. Te vero benigniorem haec ipsa res faciat; nam cuius rei eventus incertus est, id ut aliquando procedat saepe temptandum est.

[3] Sed de isto satis multa in iis libris locuti sumus qui de beneficiis inscribuntur: illud magis quaerendum videtur, quod non satis, ut existimo, explicatum est, an is qui profuit nobis, si postea nocuit, paria fecerit et nos debito solverit. Adice, si vis, et illud: multo plus postea nocuit quam ante profuerat. [4] Si rectam illam rigidi iudicis sententiam quaeris, alterum ab altero absolvet et dicet, 'quamvis iniuriae praeponderent, tamen beneficiis donetur quod ex iniuria superest'. Plus nocuit, sed prius profuit; itaque habeatur et temporis ratio. [5] Iam illa manifestiora sunt quam ut admoneri debeas quaerendum esse quam libenter profuerit, quam invitus nocuerit, quoniam animo et beneficia et iniuriae constant. 'Nolui beneficium dare; victus sum aut verecundia aut instantis pertinacia aut spe.' [6] Eo animo quidque debetur quo datur, nec quantum sit sed a quali profectum voluntate perpenditur. Nunc coniectura tollatur: et illud beneficium fuit et hoc, quod modum beneficii prioris excessit, iniuria est. Vir bonus utrosque calculos sic ponit ut se ipse circumscribat: beneficio adicit, iniuriae demit. Alter ille remissior iudex, quem esse me malo, iniuriae oblivisci iubebit, officii meminisse. [7] 'Hoc certe' inquis 'iustitiae convenit, suum cuique reddere, beneficio gratiam, iniuriae talionem aut certe malam gratiam.' Verum erit istud cum alius iniuriam fecerit, alius beneficium dederit; nam si idem est, beneficio vis iniuriae extinguitur. Nam cui, etiam si merita non antecessissent, oportebat ignosci, post beneficia laedenti plus quam venia debetur. [8] Non pono utrique par pretium: pluris aestimo beneficium quam iniuriam. Non omnes esse grati sciunt: debere beneficium potest etiam inprudens et rudis et unus e turba, utique dum prope est ab accepto, ignorat autem quantum pro eo debeat. Uni sapienti notum est quanti res quaeque taxanda sit. Nam ille de quo loquebar modo stultus, etiam si bonae voluntatis est, aut minus quam debet aut <alio quam debet> tempore aut quo non debet loco reddit; id quod referendum est effundit atque abicit.

[9] Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quaedam efficacissimis et officia docentibus notis signat. Sic certe solemus loqui: 'ille illi gratiam rettulit'. Referre est ultro quod debeas adferre. Non dicimus 'gratiam reddidit'; reddunt enim et qui reposcuntur et qui inviti et qui ubilibet et qui per alium. Non dicimus 'reposuit beneficium' aut 'solvit': nullum nobis placuit quod aeri alieno convenit verbum. [10] Referre est ad eum a quo acceperis rem ferre. Haec vox significat voluntariam relationem: qui rettulit, ipse se appellavit. Sapiens omnia examinabit secum, quantum acceperit, a quo, <quare,> quando, ubi, quemadmodum. Itaque negamus quemquam scire gratiam referre nisi sapientem, non magis quam beneficium dare quisquam scit nisi sapiens -- hic scilicet qui magis dato gaudet quam alius accepto. [11] Hoc aliquis inter illa numerat quae videmur inopinata omnibus dicere (paradoxa Graeci vocant) et ait, 'nemo ergo scit praeter sapientem referre gratiam? ergo nec quod debet creditori suo reponere quisquam scit alius nec, cum emit aliquam rem, pretium venditori persolvere?' <Ne> nobis fiat invidia, scito idem dicere Epicurum. Metrodorus certe ait solum sapientem referre gratiam scire. [12] Deinde idem admiratur cum dicimus, 'solus sapiens scit amare, solus sapiens amicus est'. Atqui et amoris et amicitiae pars est referre gratiam, immo hoc magis vulgare est et in plures cadit quam vera amicitia. Deinde idem admiratur quod dicimus fidem nisi in sapiente non esse, tamquam non ipse idem dicat. An tibi videtur fidem habere qui referre gratiam nescit? [13] Desinant itaque infamare nos tamquam incredibilia iactantes et sciant apud sapientem esse ipsa honesta, apud vulgum simulacra rerum honestarum et effigies. Nemo referre gratiam scit nisi sapiens. Stultus quoque, utcumque scit et quemadmodum potest, referat; scientia illi potius quam voluntas desit: velle non discitur. [14] Sapiens omnia inter se comparabit; maius enim aut minus fit, quamvis idem sit, tempore, loco, causa. Saepe enim hoc <non> potuere divitiae in domum infusae quod opportune dati mille denarii. Multum enim interest donaveris an succurreris, servaverit illum tua liberalitas an instruxerit; saepe quod datur exiguum est, quod sequitur ex eo magnum. Quantum autem existimas interesse utrum aliquis quod daret a se [quod praestabat] sumpserit an beneficium acceperit ut daret?

[15] Sed ne in eadem quae satis scrutati sumus revolvamur, in hac comparatione beneficii et iniuriae vir bonus iudicabit quidem quod erit aequissimum, sed beneficio favebit; in hanc erit partem proclivior. [16] Plurimum autem momenti persona solet adferre in rebus eiusmodi: 'dedisti mihi beneficium in servo, iniuriam fecisti in patre; servasti mihi filium, sed patrem abstulisti'. Alia deinceps per quae procedit omnis conlatio prosequetur, et si pusillum erit quod intersit, dissimulabit; etiam si multum fuerit, sed si id donari salva pietate ac fide poterit, remittet, id est si ad ipsum tota pertinebit iniuria. [17] Summa rei haec est: facilis erit in commutando; patietur plus inputari sibi; invitus beneficium per compensationem iniuriae solvet; in hanc partem inclinabit, huc verget, ut cupiat debere gratiam, cupiat referre. Errat enim si quis beneficium accipit libentius quam reddit: quanto hilarior est qui solvit quam qui mutuatur, tanto debet laetior esse qui se maximo aere alieno accepti benefici exonerat quam qui cum maxime obligatur. [18] Nam in hoc quoque falluntur ingrati, quod creditori quidem praeter sortem extra ordinem numerant, beneficiorum autem usum esse gratuitum putant: et illa crescunt mora tantoque plus solvendum est quanto tardius. Ingratus est qui beneficium reddit sine usura; itaque huius quoque rei habebitur ratio, cum conferentur accepta et expensa.

[19] Omnia facienda sunt ut quam gratissimi simus. Nostrum enim hoc bonum est, quemadmodum iustitia non est (ut vulgo creditur) ad alios pertinens: magna pars eius in se redit. Nemo non, cum alteri prodest, sibi profuit, non eo nomine dico, quod volet adiuvare adiutus, protegere defensus, quod bonum exemplum circuitu ad facientem revertitur (sicut mala exempla recidunt in auctores nec ulla miseratio contingit iis qui patiuntur iniurias quas posse fieri faciendo docuerunt), sed quod virtutum omnium pretium in ipsis est. Non enim exercentur ad praemium: recte facti fecisse merces est. [20] Gratus sum non ut alius mihi libentius praestet priori inritatus exemplo, sed ut rem iucundissimam ac pulcherrimam faciam; gratus sum non quia expedit, sed quia iuvat. Hoc ut scias ita esse, si gratum esse non licebit nisi ut videar ingratus, si reddere beneficium non aliter quam per speciem iniuriae potero, aequissimo animo ad honestum consilium per mediam infamiam tendam. Nemo mihi videtur pluris aestimare virtutem, nemo illi magis esse devotus quam qui boni viri famam perdidit ne conscientiam perderet. [21] Itaque, ut dixi, maiore tuo quam alterius bono gratus es; illi enim vulgaris et cotidiana res contigit, recipere quod dederat, tibi magna et ex beatissimo animi statu profecta, gratum fuisse. Nam si malitia miseros facit, virtus beatos, gratum autem esse virtus est, rem usitatam reddidisti, inaestimabilem consecutus es, conscientiam grati, quae nisi in animum divinum fortunatumque non pervenit.

[In] Contrarium autem huic adfectum summa infelicitas urget: nemo sibi gratus est qui alteri non fuit. Hoc me putas dicere, qui ingratus est miser erit? non differo illum: statim miser est. [22] Itaque ingrati esse vitemus non aliena causa sed nostra. Minimum ex nequitia levissimumque ad alios redundat: quod pessimum ex illa est et, ut ita dicam, spississimum, domi remanet et premit habentem, quemadmodum Attalus noster dicere solebat, 'malitia ipsa maximam partem veneni sui bibit'. Illud venenum quod serpentes in alienam perniciem proferunt, sine sua continent, non est huic simile: hoc habentibus pessimum est. [23] Torquet se ingratus et macerat; odit quae accepit, quia redditurus est, et extenuat, iniurias vero dilatat atque auget. Quid autem eo miserius cui beneficia excidunt, haerent iniuriae? At contra sapientia exornat omne beneficium ac sibi ipsa commendat et se adsidua eius commemoratione delectat. [24] Malis una voluptas est et haec brevis, dum accipiunt beneficia, ex quibus sapienti longum gaudium manet ac perenne. Non enim illum accipere sed accepisse delectat, quod inmortale est et adsiduum. Illa contemnit quibus laesus est, nec obliviscitur per neglegentiam sed volens. [25] Non vertit omnia in peius nec quaerit cui inputet casum, et peccata hominum ad fortunam potius refert. Non calumniatur verba nec vultus; quidquid accidit benigne interpretando levat. Non offensae potius quam offici meminit; quantum potest in priore ac meliore se memoria detinet, nec mutat animum adversus bene meritos nisi multum male facta praecedunt et manifestum etiam coniventi discrimen est; tunc quoque in hoc dumtaxat, ut talis sit post maiorem iniuriam qualis ante beneficium. Nam cum beneficio par est iniuria, aliquid in animo benivolentiae remanet. [26] Quemadmodum reus sententiis paribus absolvitur et semper quidquid dubium est humanitas inclinat in melius, sic animus sapientis, ubi paria maleficiis merita sunt, desinit quidem debere, sed non desinit velle debere, et hoc facit quod qui post tabulas novas solvunt.

[27] Nemo autem esse gratus potest nisi contempsit ista propter quae vulgus insanit: si referre vis gratiam, et in exilium eundum est et effundendus sanguis et suscipienda egestas et ipsa innocentia saepe maculanda indignisque obicienda rumoribus. Non parvo sibi constat homo gratus. [28] Nihil carius aestimamus quam beneficium quamdiu petimus, nihil vilius cum accepimus. Quaeris quid sit quod oblivionem nobis acceptorum faciat? cupiditas accipiendorum; cogitamus non quid inpetratum sed quid petendum sit. Abstrahunt a recto divitiae, honores, potentia et cetera quae opinione nostra cara sunt, pretio suo vilia. [29] Nescimus aestimare res, de quibus non cum fama sed cum rerum natura deliberandum est; nihil habent ista magnificum quo mentes in se nostras trahant praeter hoc, quod mirari illa consuevimus. Non enim quia concupiscenda sunt laudantur, sed concupiscuntur quia laudata sunt, et cum singulorum error publicum fecerit, singulorum errorem facit publicus. [30] Sed quemadmodum illa credidimus, sic et hoc eidem populo credamus, nihil esse grato animo honestius; omnes hoc urbes, omnes etiam ex barbaris regionibus gentes conclamabunt; in hoc bonis malisque conveniet. [31] Erunt qui voluptates laudent, erunt qui labores malint; erunt qui dolorem maximum malum dicant, erunt qui ne malum quidem appellent; divitias aliquis ad summum bonum admittet, alius illas dicet malo vitae humanae repertas, nihil esse eo locupletius cui quod donet fortuna non invenit: in tanta iudiciorum diversitate referendam bene merentibus gratiam omnes tibi uno, quod aiunt, ore adfirmabunt. In hoc tam discors turba consentiet, cum interim iniurias pro beneficiis reddimus, et prima causa est cur quis ingratus sit si satis gratus esse non potuit. [32] Eo perductus est furor ut periculosissima res sit beneficia in aliquem magna conferre; nam quia putat turpe non reddere, non vult esse cui reddat. Tibi habe quod accepisti; non repeto, non exigo: profuisse tutum sit. Nullum est odium perniciosius quam e beneficii violati pudore. Vale.

Translation source →

Lucius Annaeus Seneca→Lucilius Juniorc. 63 · seneca #40

Lucius Annaeus Seneca→Lucilius Juniorc. 63 · seneca #29

Lucius Annaeus Seneca→Lucilius Juniorc. 64 · seneca #63

Lucius Annaeus Seneca→Lucilius Juniorc. 64 · seneca #50

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