Letter 6: 1. Your letters I have great pleasure in keeping as carefully as my own eyes. For they are great, not indeed in length, but in the greatness of the subjects discussed in them, and in the great ability with which the truth in regard to these subjects is demonstrated.

Letter 6 (389 AD) To Augustine — Nebridius sends greetings. 1. I treasure your letters as carefully as I treasure my own eyes. They are great — not in length, but in the greatness of the subjects they discuss and the brilliance with which they demonstrate the truth about those subjects. They bring to my ears the voice of Christ and the teaching of Plato and Plotinus [the Neoplatonist philosopher, c. 204-270 AD, whose work deeply influenced Augustine]. To me, therefore, they will always be pleasant for their eloquence, easy to read for their brevity, and profitable to understand for the wisdom they contain. So please — keep teaching me everything that strikes you as holy or good. As for this particular letter, answer it when you are ready to discuss a subtle problem about memory and the images formed by the imagination. My view is this: although mental images can exist independently of memory, there is no exercise of memory that does not involve such images. You will object: "What about when memory recalls an act of understanding or a thought?" I answer that such acts can be recalled by memory precisely because in the original moment of understanding or thinking, we produced something conditioned by space or time — something the imagination can reproduce. Either we connected words with our understanding and thoughts (and words exist in time, so they fall within the domain of the senses and imagination), or even without words, our intellect still experienced something in the act of thinking that was capable of generating an image the imagination could later recall. I have stated these ideas, as usual, without much careful thought and somewhat confusedly. Please examine them, reject what is false, and let me know by letter what you hold to be the truth on this subject. 2. Listen to this further question too: why do we not say that the imagination generates all its images from within itself, rather than saying it receives them from the senses? It is possible that just as the intellect owes nothing to the senses for the objects it contemplates, but only for the prompting that awakens it to see those objects, the imagination too may owe the senses nothing for its images, but only for the prompting that awakens it to contemplate them. Perhaps this is how we should explain the fact that the imagination perceives things the senses have never perceived — which would show that it has all its images within itself, and from itself. Please let me know what you think about this question as well.

Letter 6 (A.D. 389) To Augustine Nebridius Sends Greeting. 1. Your letters I have great pleasure in keeping as carefully as my own eyes. For they are great, not indeed in length, but in the greatness of the subjects discussed in them, and in the great ability with which the truth in regard to these subjects is demonstrated. They shall bring to my ear the voice of Christ, and the teaching of Plato and of Plotinus. To me, therefore, they shall ever be pleasant to hear, because of their eloquent style; easy to read, because of their brevity; and profitable to understand, because of the wisdom which they contain. Be at pains, therefore, to teach me everything which, to your judgment, commends itself as holy or good. As to this letter in particular, answer it when you are ready to discuss a subtle problem in regard to memory, and the images presented by the imagination. My opinion is, that although there can be such images independently of memory, there is no exercise of memory independently of such images. You will say, What, then, takes place when memory is exercised in recalling an act of understanding or of thought? I answer this objection by saying, that such acts can be recalled by memory for this reason, that in the supposed act of understanding or of thought we gave birth to something conditioned by space or by time, which is of such a nature that it can be reproduced by the imagination: for either we connected the use of words with the exercise of the understanding and with the thoughts, and words are conditioned by time, and thus fall within the domain of the senses or of the imaginative faculty; or if we did not join words with the mental act, our intellect at all events experienced in the act of thinking something which was of such a nature as could produce in the mind that which, by the aid of the imaginative faculty, memory could recall. These things I have stated, as usual, without much consideration, and in a somewhat confused manner: do you examine them, and, rejecting what is false, acquaint me by letter with what you hold as the truth on this subject. 2. Listen also to this question: Why, I should like to know, do we not affirm that the phantasy [imaginative faculty] derives all its images from itself, rather than say that it receives these from the senses? For it is possible that, as the intellectual faculty of the soul is indebted to the senses, not for the objects upon which the intellect is exercised, but rather for the admonition arousing it to see these objects, in the same manner the imaginative faculty may be indebted to the senses, not for the images which are the objects upon which it is exercised, but rather for the admonition arousing it to contemplate these images. And perhaps it is in this way that we are to explain the fact that the imagination perceives some objects which the senses never perceived, whereby it is shown that it has all its images within itself, and from itself. You will answer me what you think of this question also.

EPISTOLA 6 Scripta eodem tempore (388-91). Nebridius scribit sibi videri memoria sine phantasia esse non posse (n. 1); hanc autem imagines non a sensibus sed a semetipsa adsumere (n. 2).   Augustino Nebridius Quae memoriae ratio ad phantasiam. 1. Epistolas tuas perplacet ita servare ut oculos meos. Sunt enim magnae, non quantitate, sed rebus, et magnarum rerum magnas continent probationes. Illae mihi Christum, illae Platonem, illae Plotinum sonabunt. Erunt igitur mihi, et ad audiendum propter eloquentiam dulces, et ad legendum propter brevitatem faciles, et ad intellegendum propter sapientiam salubres. Curabis ergo quod tuae menti sanctum bonumque fuerit visum, me docere. His autem litteris respondebis, cum de phantasia et memoria subtilius aliquid disputaris. Mihi enim ita videtur, quod quamvis non omnis phantasia cum memoria sit, omnis tamen memoria sine phantasia esse non possit. Sed dicis: Quid, cum recordamur nos intellexisse, aut cogitasse aliquid? Contra haec ego respondeo, et dico propterea hoc evenisse, quia cum intelleximus vel cogitavimus corporeum ac temporale aliquid, genuimus quod ad phantasiam pertinet: nam aut verba intellectui cogitationibusque nostris adiunximus, quae verba sine tempore non sunt, et ad sensum vel phantasiam pertinent: aut tale aliquid intellectus noster cogitatione passa est, quod in animo phantastico memoriam facere potuisset. Haec ego inconsiderate ac perturbate, ut soleo, dixi: tu explorabis, et falso reiecto, veritatem in litteris conferes. Phantasiae imagines unde sint. 2. Audi aliud: cur, quaeso te, non a se potius quam a sensu phantasiam habere omnes imagines dicimus? Potest enim, quemadmodum animus intellectualis ad intellegibilia sua videnda a sensu admonetur potius quam aliquid accipit, ita et phantasticus animus ad imagines suas contemplandas, a sensu admoneri potius quam aliquid assumere. Nam forte inde contingit, ut ea quae sensus non videt, ille tamen aspicere possit: quod signum est, in se et a se habere omnes imagines. De hac re quoque quid sentias, respondebis.