Letter 9: 1. Speech is really an image of mind: so I have learned to know you from your letters, just as the proverb tells us we may know the lion from his claws. I am delighted to find that your strong inclinations lie in the direction of the first and greatest of good things — love both to God and to your neighbour.

To Maximus the Philosopher 1. Speech is truly an image of the mind, so I have come to know you through your letters — just as the proverb says we can know the lion by his claws. I am delighted to find that your strongest inclinations point toward the first and greatest of good things: love for God and love for your neighbor. Of the second I find proof in your kindness to me; of the first, in your passion for knowledge. Every disciple of Christ knows that everything is contained in these two. 2. You ask about the writings of Dionysius. They did reach me — a great many of them — but I do not have the books with me and so have not sent them. My opinion, however, is this: I do not admire everything he wrote; indeed, I flatly reject some of it. It may well be that the heresy we hear so much about now — the Anomoean position — received its first seeds from him, as far as I can tell. I do not attribute this to any wickedness on his part, but only to his fierce determination to resist Sabellius. I often compare him to a woodsman trying to straighten a crooked sapling who pulls so hard in the opposite direction that he bends it past straight and warps it the other way. This is very much what happened with Dionysius. While forcefully opposing the heresy of the Libyan, he was carried away by his zeal into the opposite error. It would have been perfectly sufficient for him to point out that the Father and the Son are not identical in substance, and thereby defeat the blasphemer. But to win an overwhelming and unmistakable victory, he was not satisfied with establishing a difference of persons; he had to assert a difference of substance, a diminished power, and a varying glory. So he traded one error for another and veered off the straight line of doctrine. His writings show a mixed inconsistency: at one point he rejects the term "co-substantial" because his opponent had misused it to collapse the distinct persons, and at another point he accepts it in his defense addressed to his namesake. On top of this, he made deeply inappropriate statements about the Spirit, separating Him from the Godhead that is to be worshipped and assigning Him a lower rank alongside created and subordinate nature. Such is the character of his work. 3. If I must give my own view, it is this. The phrase "like in essence," if read with the qualification "without any difference," I accept as conveying the same meaning as "co-substantial" (homoousios), understood in its proper sense. With this understanding, the Fathers at Nicaea called the Only-begotten "Light from Light, true God from true God," and so on, and then consistently added "co-substantial." It is impossible to think of light as varying from light, or truth from truth, or the essence of the Only-begotten as varying from the essence of the Father. But if anyone strips away the qualification "without any difference" from the word "like" — as was done at Constantinople — then I regard the phrase with suspicion, as diminishing the dignity of the Only-begotten. We are accustomed to thinking of "likeness" in cases of vague resemblances that fall far short of the original. I myself prefer "co-substantial," as it is less open to misinterpretation. But why not come visit me, my dear sir, so we can discuss these great subjects face to face instead of committing them to lifeless letters — especially since I have resolved not to publish my views? And please do not quote Diogenes' remark to Alexander at me: that "it is as far from you to me as from me to you." I am practically forced by poor health to stay in one place, like a plant; besides, I consider living in obscurity one of life's chief blessings. You, I am told, are in good health. You have made yourself a citizen of the world, and in coming to see me you might consider that you are coming home. It is perfectly right for you, a man of action, to live amid crowds and cities where you can display your good works. For me, quiet is the best aid for the contemplation and mental exercise by which I cling to God — and this quiet I cultivate abundantly in my retreat, with the help of its giver, God. Yet if you insist on courting the great and looking down on me lying here on the ground, then at least write to me, and in that way make my life a happier one.

ST. BASIL OF CAESAREA To Maximus the Philosopher. 1. Speech is really an image of mind: so I have learned to know you from your letters, just as the proverb tells us we may know the lion from his claws. I am delighted to find that your strong inclinations lie in the direction of the first and greatest of good things — love both to God and to your neighbour. Of the latter I find proof in your kindness to myself; of the former, in your zeal for knowledge. It is well known to every disciple of Christ that in these two all is contained. 2. You ask for the writings of Dionysius; they did indeed reach me, and a great many they were; but I have not the books with me, and so have not sent them. My opinion is, however, as follows. I do not admire everything that is written; indeed of some things I totally disapprove. For it may be, that of the impiety of which we are now hearing so much, I mean the Anomœan, it is he, as far as I know, who first gave men the seeds. I do not trace his so doing to any mental depravity, but only to his earnest desire to resist Sabellius. I often compare him to a woodman trying to straighten some ill-grown sapling, pulling so immoderately in the opposite direction as to exceed the mean, and so dragging the plant awry on the other side. This is very much what we find to be the case with Dionysius. While vehemently opposing the impiety of the Libyan, he is carried away unawares by his zeal into the opposite error. It would have been quite sufficient for him to have pointed out that the Father and the Son are not identical in substance, and thus to score against the blasphemer. But, in order to win an unmistakable and superabundant victory, he is not satisfied with laying down a difference of hypostases, but must needs assert also difference of substance, diminution of power, and variableness of glory. So he exchanges one mischief for another, and diverges from the right line of doctrine. In his writings he exhibits a miscellaneous inconsistency, and is at one time to be found disloyal to the homoousion, because of his opponent who made a bad use of it to the destruction of the hypostases, and at another admitting it in his Apology to his namesake. Besides this he uttered very unbecoming words about the Spirit, separating Him from the Godhead, the object of worship, and assigning Him an inferior rank with created and subordinate nature. Such is the man's character. 3. If I must give my own view, it is this. The phrase like in essence, if it be read with the addition without any difference, I accept as conveying the same sense as the homoousion, in accordance with the sound meaning of the homoousion. Being of this mind the Fathers at Nicæa spoke of the Only-begotten as Light of Light, Very God of very God, and so on, and then consistently added the homoousion. It is impossible for any one to entertain the idea of variableness of light in relation to light, of truth in relation to truth, nor of the essence of the Only begotten in relation to that of the Father. If, then, the phrase be accepted in this sense, I have no objection to it. But if any one cuts off the qualification without any difference from the word like, as was done at Constantinople, then I regard the phrase with suspicion, as derogatory to the dignity of the Only-begotten. We are frequently accustomed to entertain the idea of likeness in the case of indistinct resemblances, coming anything but close to the originals. I am myself for the homoousion, as being less open to improper interpretation. But why, my dear sir, should you not pay me a visit, that we may talk of these high topics face to face, instead of committing them to lifeless letters — especially when I have determined not to publish my views? And pray do not adopt, to me, the words of Diogenes to Alexander, that it is as far from you to me as from me to you. I am almost obliged by ill-health to remain like the plants, in one place; moreover I hold the living unknown to be one of the chief goods. You, I am told, are in good health; you have made yourself a citizen of the world, and you might consider in coming to see me that you are coming home. It is quite right for you, a man of action, to have crowds and towns in which to show your good deeds. For me, quiet is the best aid for the contemplation and mental exercise whereby I cling to God. This quiet I cultivate in abundance in my retreat, with the aid of its giver, God. Yet if you cannot but court the great, and despise me who lie low upon the ground, then write, and in this way make my life a happier one.

[Πρός: Μαξίμῳ φιλοσόφῳ] Εἰκόνες ὄντως τῶν ψυχῶν εἰσὶν οἱ λόγοι. κατεμάθομεν οὖν σε διὰ τοῦ γράμματος, ὅσον φασίν, ἐξ ὀνύχων τὸν λέοντα· καὶ ἥσθημεν εὑρόντες περὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀργῶς διακείμενον, τήν τε πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἀγάπην καὶ πρὸς τὸν πλησίον. σημεῖον δὲ ποιούμεθα τοῦ μέν, τὴν περὶ ἡμᾶς δεξιότητά σου, τοῦ δέ, τὴν περὶ τὴν γνῶσιν σπουδήν. ὅτι δὲ ἐν δυοῖν τούτοιν ἐστὶ τὰ ὅλα, γνώριμον παντὶ Χριστοῦ μαθητῇ. Ἃ δὲ ἐπιζητεῖς τῶν Διονυσίου ἦλθε μὲν εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ πάνυ πολλά· οὐ πάρεστί γε μὴν τὰ βιβλία, διόπερ οὐκ ἀπεστείλαμεν. ἔχομεν δὲ γνώμης οὕτως. οὐ πάντα θαυμάζομεν τοῦ ἀνδρός· ἔστι δὲ ἃ καὶ παντελῶς διαγράφομεν. σχεδὸν γὰρ ταυτησὶ τῆς νῦν περιθρυλλουμένης ἀσεβείας, τῆς κατὰ τὸ Ἀνόμοιον λέγω, οὗτός ἐστιν, ὅσα γε ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν, ὁ πρῶτος ἀνθρώποις τὰ σπέρματα παρασχών. αἴτιον δέ, οἶμαι, οὐ πονηρία γνώμης, ἀλλὰ τὸ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι ἀντιτείνειν τῷ Σαβελλίῳ. εἴωθα γοῦν ἀπεικάζειν ἐγὼ φυτοκόμῳ, νεαροῦ φυτοῦ διαστροφὴν ἀπευθύνοντι, εἶτα τῇ ἀμετρίᾳ τῆς ἀνθολκῆς διαμαρτόντι τοῦ μέσου καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ἀπαγαγόντι τὸ βλάστημα. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον ὅτι γεγενημένον εὕρομεν. ἀντιβαίνων γὰρ σφοδρῶς τῇ ἀσεβείᾳ τοῦ Λίβυος, ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ἄγαν φιλοτιμίας ὑπενεχθείς. ᾧ γε τοσοῦτον ἐξαρκοῦν δεῖξαι, ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ Πατὴρ καὶ Υἱός, καὶ ταύτῃ ἔχειν κατὰ τοῦ βλασφημοῦντος τὰ νικητήρια, ὁ δέ, ἵνα πάνυ ἐναργῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ περιόντος κατακρατῇ, οὐχ ἑτερότητα μόνον τῶν ὑποστάσεων τίθεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐσίας διαφορὰν καὶ δυνάμεως ὕφεσιν καὶ δόξης παραλλαγήν. ὥστε ἐκ τούτου συνέβη, κακοῦ μὲν αὐτὸν κακὸν διαμεῖψαι, τῆς δὲ ὀρθότητος τοῦ λόγου διαμαρτεῖν. ταύτῃ τοι καὶ παντοδαπός ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν, νῦν μὲν ἀναιρῶν τὸ ὁμοούσιον, διὰ τὸν ἐπʼ ἀθετήσει τῶν ὑποστάσεων κακῶς αὐτῷ κεχρημένον, νῦν δὲ προσιέμενος ἐν οἷς ἀπολογεῖται πρὸς τὸν ὁμώνυμον. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ περὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἀφῆκε φωνὰς ἥκιστα πρεπούσας τῷ Πνεύματι, τῆς προσκυνουμένης αὐτὸ θεότητος ἐξορίζων καὶ κάτω που τῇ κτιστῇ καὶ λειτουργῷ φύσει συναριθμῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀνὴρ τοιοῦτος. Ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ χρὴ τοὐμὸν ἴδιον εἰπεῖν, τὸ ὅμοιον κατʼ οὐσίαν, εἰ μὲν προσκείμενον ἔχει τὸ ἀπαραλλάκτως, δέχομαι τὴν φωνὴν ὡς εἰς ταὐτὸν τῷ ὁμοουσίῳ φέρουσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑγιῆ δηλονότι τοῦ ὁμοουσίου διάνοιαν. ὅπερ καὶ τοὺς ἐν Νικαίᾳ νοήσαντας, Φῶς ἐκ Φ.ωτὸς καὶ Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸν Μονογενῆ προσειπόντας, ἐπαγαγεῖν ἀκολούθως τὸ ὁμοούσιον. οὔτε οὖν φωτὸς πρὸς φῶς, οὔτε ἀληθείας πρὸς ἀλήθειάν ποτε, οὔτε τῆς τοῦ Μονογενοῦς οὐσία πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐπινοῆσαί τινα παραλλαγὴν δυνατόν. εἴ τις οὖν οὕτως, ὡς εἶπον, ἐκδέχοιτο, προσίεμαι τὴν φωνήν. εἰ δέ τις τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ ἀπαράλλακτον ἀποτέμνοι, ὅπερ οἱ κατὰ τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν πεποιήκασιν, ὑποπτεύω τὸ ῥῆμα ὡς τοῦ Μονογενοῦς τὴν δόξαν κατασμίκρυνον. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἀμυδραῖς ἐμφερείαις, καὶ πλεῖστον τῶν ἀρχετύπων ἀποδεούσαις, τὸ ὅμοιον πολλάκις ἐπινοεῖν εἰώθαμεν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἧττον οἶμαι κακουργεῖσθαι τὸ ὁμοούσιον, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς τίθεμαι. Ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπιφοιτᾷς ἡμῖν, ὦ ἄριστε, ὥστε παρόντας ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεχθῆναι, καὶ μὴ γράμμασιν ἀψύχοις καταπιστεύειν τὰ τηλικαῦτα, ἄλλως τε μήτε πάνυ δημοσιεύειν τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἐγνωκότας; ὅπως οὖν μὴ τὸ τοῦ Διογένους πρὸς τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἴπῃς, ὅτι ἴσον ἐστὶ παρʼ ὑμῶν τὸ δεῦρο καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐνθένδε. ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀῤῥωστίας, μικροῦ δεῖν, ὥσπερ τὰ φυτὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας ἀεὶ κατεχόμεθα· καὶ ἅμα τὸ λαθεῖν βιώσαντες ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄγομεν. σὺ δὲ ἔῤῥωσαί τε, ὥς φασι, καὶ ἅμα πολίτην σεαυτὸν τῆς οἰκουμένης ποιήσας δίκαιος ἂν εἴης καὶ δεῦρο φοιτᾷν ὡς εἰς μέρος τῆς σεαυτοῦ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ὑμῖν πρέπουσι δῆμοι καὶ πόλεις, αἷς τὰς κατʼ ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἐνεπιδείκνυσθε, ἀλλά γε πρὸς θεωρίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ νοῦν ἐνέργειαν, δι’ ἧς συναπτόμεθα τῷ Θεῷ, ἀγαθὴ συνεργὸς ἡ ἡσυχία· ἣν πολλὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐσχατιᾶς καὶ ἄφθονον γεωργοῦμεν σὺν αὐτῷ γε εἰπεῖν τῷ παρασχομένῳ ἡμῖν Θεῷ. εἰ δὲ πάντως δεῖ περιέπειν τὰς δυναστείας καὶ περιφρονεῖν τοὺς χαμαὶ κειμένους ἡμᾶς, σὺ δὲ ἀλλὰ γράφε ἡμῖν, καὶ ταύτῃ ποίει ἡδίους.