Letter 233: I know. "Why do you tell me what I already know?

To Priscianus. (360?) I know it. Why do you proclaim everything to me when I am already informed? For do not suppose that you yourself know what you are doing better than we who hear of it do. For there are those who bring us reports, and there are we who ask the questions. Now as for the rest, someone has already inquired whether the burden of office has not pressed you down; but I, for my part, ask whether your body is in good health, and when I learn that it is in good health, I take it that I have thereby heard that you are also stronger than the burden. For you are a man, very much a man, and a ruler who knows very well how to rule. And if you must handle many matters and must of necessity fly about sleepless, by this you make known to me what I long ago yearned for: that sleeping and sitting idle belong to the many, but you must be among those who are not of the many. In all else, then, I am confident; but I fear one thing only, the multitude of the guest-gifts, which those who are good at eating demand back as though they were debts. For this is not a matter for a mind that knows how to rule, but for a means that has the power to give. But in your case, what advocacy in the courts has provided, ruling has spent. I have sent the book; and you, if you have leisure, look to the philosophers.

Πρισκιανῷ. (360?) Οἷδα. τίη μοι ἐπισταμένῳ πάντ᾿ ἀγορεύεις; μὴ γὰρ οἴου μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἃ πράττεις εἰδδέναι τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡμῶν. οἴ τε γὰρ ἀγγέλλοντές εἰσιν οἴ τε ἐρωτῶντες ἡμεῖς. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων ἤδη τις ἤρετο εἰ μή σε τὸ φορτίον ἐπίεσεν, ἐγὼ δ’ εἰ σοι τὸ σῶμα ἔρρωται πυνθανόμενος ἐπειδὰν ὡς ἔρρω- ται γνῶ, τὸ καὶ τοῦ φορτίου σε κρείττω εἶναι ἀκηκοέναι ἡγοῦ- μαὶ. ἀνὴρ γὰρ εἶ, μάλα ἀνήρ, καὶ ἄρχων εἰδὼς μάλα ἄρχειν εἰ δὲ πολλὰ δεῖ μεταχειρίζειν καὶ ἄγρυπνον ἀνάγκη πέτεσθαι, τούτῳ μηνύεις ὃ πάλαι ἐπόθουν, ὡς τὸ καθεύδειν τε καὶ καθ- ῆσθαι τῶν πολλῶν, σὲ δὲ εἶναι δεῖ τῶν οὐ πολλῶν. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ θαρρῶ, δέδοικα δὲ ἓν μόνον, τῶν ξενίων τὸ πλῆ- θος, ἃ ὥσπερ ὀφειλήματα ἀπαιτοῦσιν οἱ φαγεῖν ἀγαθοί. τουτὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι διανοίας ἄρχειν ἐπισταμένης, ἀλλ’ εὐπορίας δοῦ- ναι δυναμένης. σοὶ δὲ ἃ δέδωκε τὸ συναγορεύειν, ἀνήλωκε τὸ ἄρχειν. ἔπεμψα τὸ βιβλίον, σὺ δέ, εἰ σχολή, τοὺς φιλοσό- φους ορα.