Letter 124
Full many an ancient precept could I give,
Didst thou not shrink, and feel it shame to learn
Such lowly duties.
But you do not shrink, nor are you deterred by, any subtleties of study.
For your cultivated mind -------- a Vergil, Georg. i. 176 f.
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is not wont to investigate such important subjects in a free-and- easy
manner. I approve your method in that you make everything count towards
a certain degree of progress, and in that you are disgruntled only when
nothing can be accomplished by the greatest degree of subtlety. And
I shall take pains to show that this is the case now also. Our question
is, whether the Good is grasped by the senses or by the understanding;
and the corollary thereto is that it does not exist in dumb animals or
little children.
T hose who rate pleasure as the supreme ideal
hold that the Good is a matter of the senses; but we Stoics maintain that
it is a matter of the understanding, and we assign it to the mind.
If the senses were to pass judgment on what is good, we should never reject
any pleasure; for there is no pleasure that does not attract, no pleasure
that does not please. Conversely, we should undergo no pain voluntarily;
for there is no pain that does not clash with the senses. Besides,
those who are too fond of pleasure and those who fear pain to the greatest
degree would in that case not deserve reproof. But we condemn men
who are slaves to their appetites and their lusts, and we scorn men who,
through fear of pain, will dare no manly deed. But what wrong could
such men be committing if they looked merely to the senses as arbiters
of good and evil? For it is to the senses that you and yours have
entrusted the test of things to be sought and things to be avoided!
R eason, however, is surely the governing
element in such a matter as this; as reason has made the decision concerning
the happy life, and concerning virtue and honour also, so she has made
the decision
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with regard to good and evil. For with them the vilest part
is allowed to give sentence about the better, so that the senses - dense
as they are, and dull, and even more sluggish in man than in the other
animals, - pass judgment on the Good. Just suppose that one should
desire to distinguish tiny objects by the touch rather than by the eyesight!
There is no special faculty more subtle and acute than the eye, that would
enable us to distinguish between good and evil. You see, therefore,
in what ignorance of truth a man spends his days and how abjectly he has
overthrown lofty and divine ideals, if he thinks that the sense of touch
can pass judgment upon the nature of the Supreme Good and the Supreme Evil!
He says: "Just as every science and every art should possess an element
that is palpable and capable of being grasped by the senses (their source
of origin and growth), even so the happy life derives its foundation and
its beginnings from things that are palpable, and from that which falls
within the scope of the senses. Surely you admit that the happy life takes
its beginnings from things palpable to the senses." But we define as "happy"
those things that are in accord with Nature. And that which is in
accord with Nature is obvious and can be seen at once - just as easily
as that which is complete. That which is according to Nature, that
which is given us as a gift immediately at our birth, is, I maintain, not
a Good, but the beginning of a Good. You, however, assign the Supreme
Good, pleasure, to mere babies, so that the child at its birth begins at
the point whither the perfected man arrives. You are placing the tree-top
where the root ought to be. If anyone should say that the child,
hidden in its mother's womb, of unknown sex too, delicate,
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EPISTLE
CXXIV. unformed, and shapeless - if one should say that this child is
already in a state of goodness, he would clearly seem to be astray in his
ideas. And yet how little difference is there between one who has
just lately received the gift of life, and one who is still a hidden burden
in the bowels of the mother! They are equally developed, as far as
their understanding of good or evil is concerned; and a child is as yet
no more capable of comprehending the Good than is a tree or any dumb beast.
B ut why is the Good non-existent in a tree
or in a dumb beast? Because there is no reason there, either.
For the same cause, then, the Good is non-existent in a child, for the
child also has no reason; the child will reach the Good only when he reaches
reason. There are animals without reason, there are animals not yet endowed
with reason, and there are animals who possess reason, but only incompletely
; in none of these does the Good exist, for it is reason that brings
the Good in its company. What, then, is the distinction between the
classes which I have mentioned? In that which does not possess reason,
the Good will never exist. In that which is not yet endowed with
reason, the Good cannot be existent at the time. And in that which
possesses reason but only incompletely, the Good is capable of existing,
but does not yet exist. This is what I mean, Lucilius: the Good cannot
be discovered in any random person, or at any random age; and it is as
far removed from infancy as last is from first, or as that which is complete
from that which has just sprung into being. Therefore, it cannot
exist in the delicate body, when the little frame has only just begun to
knit together. Of course not - no more than in the seed. Granting
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the truth of this, we understand that there is a certain kind of Good
of a tree or in a plant; but this is not true of its first growth, when
the plant has just begun to spring forth out of the ground. There
is a certain Good of wheat: it is not yet existent, however, in the swelling
stalk, nor when the soft ear is pushing itself out of the husk, but only
when summer days and its appointed maturity have ripened the wheat.
Just as Nature in general does not produce her Good until she is brought
to perfection, even so man's Good does not exist in man until both reason
and man are perfected. And what is this Good? I shall tell
you: it is a free mind, an upright mind, subjecting other things to itself
and itself to nothing. So far is infancy from admitting this Good
that boyhood has no hope of it, and even young manhood cherishes the hope
without justification; even our old age is very fortunate if it has reached
this Good after long and concentrated study. If this, then, is the
Good, the good is a matter of the understanding. "But," comes the retort,"
you admitted that there is a certain Good of trees and of grass; then surely
there can be a certain Good of a child also." But the true Good is not
found in trees or in dumb animals the Good which exists in them is called
good only by courtesy. "Then what is it?" you say. Simply that
which is in accord with the nature of each. The real Good cannot
find a place in dumb animals - not by any means; its nature is more blest
and is of a higher class. And where there is no place for reason,
the Good does not exist. There are four natures which we should mention
here: of the tree, animal, man, and God. The last two, having reasoning
power, are of the
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same nature, distinct only by virtue of the immortality of the one and
the mortality of the other. Of one of these, then - to wit God -
it is Nature that perfects the Good; of the other - to wit man - pains
and study do so. All other things are perfect only in their particular
nature, and not truly perfect, since they lack reason.
I ndeed, to sum up, that alone is perfect
which is perfect according to nature as a whole, and nature as a whole
is possessed of reason. Other things can be perfect according to
their kind. That which cannot contain the happy life cannot contain
that which produces the happy life; and the happy life is produced by Goods
alone. In dumb animals there is not a trace of the happy life, nor of the
means whereby the happy life is produced; in dumb animals the Good does
not exist. The dumb animal comprehends the present world about him through
his senses alone. He remembers the past only by meeting with something
which reminds his,senses; a horse, for example, remembers the right road
only when he is placed at the starting-point. In his stall, however,
he has no memory of the road, no matter how often he may have stepped along
it. The third state - the future - does not come within the ken of
dumb beasts. How, then, can we regard as perfect the nature of those
who have no experience of time in its perfection? For time is three-fold,
- past, present, and future. Animals perceive only the time which
is of greatest moment to them within the limits of their coming and going
- the present. Rarely do they recollect the past - and that only
when they are confronted with present reminders. Therefore the Good
of a perfect nature cannot exist in an im-
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perfect nature; for if the latter sort of nature should possess the
Good, so also would mere vegetation. I do not indeed deny that dumb
animals have strong and swift impulses toward actions which seem according
to nature, but such impulses are confused and disordered. The Good
however, is never confused or disordered. "What!" you say, "do dumb animals
move in disturbed and ill-ordered fashion?" I should say that they moved
in disturbed and ill-ordered fashion, if their nature admitted of order;
as it is, they move in accordance with their nature. For that is
said to be "disturbed" which can also at some other time be "not disturbed";
so, too, that is said to be in a state of trouble which can be in a state
of peace. No man is vicious except one who has the capacity of virtue;
in the case of dumb animals their motion is such as results from their
nature. But, not to weary you, a certain sort of good will be found
in a dumb animal, and a certain sort of virtue, and a certain sort of perfection
- but neither the Good, nor virtue, nor perfection in the absolute sense.
For this is the privilege of reasoning beings alone, who are permitted
to know the cause, the degree, and the means. Therefore, good can
exist only in that which possesses reason.
D o you ask now whither our argument is tending,
and of what benefit it will be to your mind? I will tell you: it
exercises and sharpens the mind, and ensures, by occupying it honourably,
that it will accomplish some sort of good. And even that is beneficial
which holds men back when they are hurrying into wickedness. However,
I will say this also: I can be of no greater benefit to you than
by revealing the Good that is rightly yours, by
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taking you out of the class of dumb animals, and by placing you on a
level with God. Why, pray, do you foster and practise your bodily
strength? Nature has granted strength in greater degree to cattle and wild
beasts. Why cultivate your beauty? After all your efforts, dumb animals
surpass you in comeliness. Why dress your hair with such unending
attention? Though you let it down in Parthian fashion, or tie it
up in the German style, or, as the Scythians do, let it flow wild - yet
you will see a mane of greater thickness tossing upon any horse you choose,
and a mane of greater beauty bristling upon the neck of any lion.
And even after training yourself for speed, you will be no match for the
hare. Are you not willing to abandon all these details - wherein
you must acknowledge defeat, striving as you are for something that is
not your own and come back to the Good that is really yours?
A nd what is this Good? It is a clear
and flawless mind, which rivals that of God, raised far above mortal
concerns, and counting nothing of its own to be outside itself. You
are a reasoning animal. What Good, then, lies within you? Perfect
reason. Are you willing to develop this to its farthest limits -
to its greatest degree of increase? Only consider yourself happy when all
your joys are born of reason, and when - having marked all the objects
which men clutch at, or pray for, or watch over - you find nothing which
you will desire; mind, I do not say prefer. Here is a short rule
by which to measure yourself, and by the test of which you may feel that
you have reached perfection: "You will come to your own when you shall
understand that those whom the world calls
fortunate are really the most unfortunate of all." Farewell.
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Latin / Greek Original
(1) Possum multa tibi ueterum praecepta referre,
ni refugis tenuisque piget cognoscere curas.
Non refugis autem nec ulla te subtilitas abigit: non est elegantiae tuae tantum magna sectari, sicut illud probo, quod omnia ad aliquem profectum redigis et tunc tantum offenderis ubi summa subtilitate nihil agitur. Quod ne nunc quidem fieri laborabo.
Quaeritur utrum sensu conprendatur an intellectu bonum; huic adiunctumest in mutis animalibus et infantibus non esse. (2) Quicumque uoluptatem in summo ponunt sensibile iudicant bonum, nos contra intellegibile, qui illud animo damus. Si de bono sensus iudicarent, nullam uoluptatem reiceremus; nulla enim non inuitat, nulla non delectat; et e contrario nullum dolorem uolentes subiremus; nullus enim non offendit sensum. (3) Praeterea non essent digni reprehensione quibus nimium uoluptas placet quibusque summus est doloris timor. Atqui inprobamus gulae ac libidini addictos et contemni musillos qui nihil uiriliter ausuri sunt doloris metu. Quid autem peccant si sensibus, id est iudicibus boni ac mali, parent? his enim tradidistis ad petitionis et fugae arbitrium. (4) Sed uidelicet ratio isti rei praeposita est: illa quemadmodum de beata uita, quemadmodum de uirtute, de honesto, sic et de bono maloque constituit. Nam apud istos uilissimae parti datur de meliore sententia, ut de bono pronuntiet sensus, obtunsa res et hebes et in homine quam in aliis animalibus tardior. (5) Quid si quis uellet non oculis sed tactu minuta discernere? Subtilior adhoc acies nulla quam oculorum et intentior daret bonum malumque dinoscere. Vides in quanta ignorantia ueritatis uersetur et quam humi sublimia ac diuina proiecerit apud quem de summo, bono malo, iudicat tactus. (6) 'Quemadmodum' inquit 'omnis scientia atque ars aliquid debet habere manifestum sensuque conprehensum ex quo oriatur et crescat, sic beata uita fundamentum et initium a manifestis ducit et eo quod sub sensum cadat. Nempe uos a manifestis beatam uitam initium sui capere dicitis. ' (7) Dicimus beata esse quae secundum naturam sint; quid autem secundum naturam sit palam et protinus apparet, sicut quid sit integrum. Quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico bonum, sed initium boni. Tu summum bonum, uoluptatem, infantiae donas, ut inde incipiat nascens quo consummatus homo peruenit; cacumen radicis loco ponis. (8) Si quis diceret illum in materno utero latentem, sexus quoque incerti, tenerum et inperfectum et informem iam in aliquo bono esse, aperte uideretur errare. Atqui quantulum interest inter eum qui cum (que) maxime uitam accipit et illum qui maternorum uiscerum latens onus est? Uterque, quantum ad intellectum boni ac mali, aeque maturus est, et non magis infans adhoc boni capax est quam arbor aut mutum aliquod animal. Quare autem bonum in arbore animalique muto non est? quia nec ratio. Ob hoc in infante quoque non est; nam et huic deest. Tunc ad bonum perueniet cum ad rationem peruenerit. (9) Est aliquod inrationale animal, est aliquod nondum rationale, est rationale sed inperfectum: in nullo horum bonum, ratio illud secum adfert. Quid ergo inter ista quaeret tuli distat? In eo quod inrationale est numquam erit bonum; in eo quod nondum rationale est tunc esse bonum non potest; <in eo quod rationale est> sed inperfectum iam potest bonum <esse>, sed non est. (10) Ita dico, Lucili: bonum non in quolibet corpore, non in qualibet aetate inuenitur et tantum abest ab infantia quantum a primo ultimum, quantum ab initio perfectum; ergo nec in tenero, modo coalescente corpusculo est. Quidni non sit? non magis quam in semine. (11) Hoc sic dicas: aliquod arboris ac sati bonum nouimus: hoc non est in prima fronde quae emissa cum maxime solum rumpit. Est aliquod bonum tritici: hoc nondum est in herba lactente nec cum folliculo se exerit spica mollis, sed cum frumentum aestas et debita maturitas coxit. Quemadmodum omnis natura bonum suum nisi consummata non profert, ita hominis bonum non est in homine nisi cum illi ratio perfecta est. (12) Quod autem hoc bonum? Dicam: liber animus, erectus, alia subiciens sibi, se nulli. Hoc bonum adeo non recipit infantia ut pueritia non speret, adulescentia inprobe speret; bene agitur cum senectute si ad illud longo studio intentoque peruenit. Si hoc est bonum, et intellegibile est. (13) 'Dixisti' inquit 'aliquod bonum esse arboris, aliquod herbae; potest ergo aliquod esse et infantis. ' Verum bonum nec in arboribus nec in mutis animalibus: hoc quod in illis bonum est precario bonum dicitur. 'Quod est? ' inquis. Hoc quod secundum cuiusque naturam est. Bonum quidem cadere in mutum animal nullo modo potest; felicioris meliorisque naturae est. Nisi ubi rationi locus est, bonum non est. (14) Quattuor hae naturae sunt, arboris, animalis, hominis, dei: haec duo, quae rationalia sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diuersa sunt quod alterum inmortale, alterum mortale est. Ex his ergo unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis. Cetera tantum in sua natura perfecta sunt, non uere perfecta, a quibus abest ratio. Hoc enim demum perfectum est quod secundum uniuersam naturam perfectum, uniuersa autem natura rationalis est: cetera possunt in suo genere esse perfecta. (15) In quo non potest beata uita esse nec id potest quo beata uita efficitur; beata autem uita bonis efficitur. Inmuto animali non est beata uita <nec id quo beata uita> efficitur: inmuto animali bonum non est. (16) Mutum animal sensu conprendit praesentia; praeteritorum reminiscitur cum <in> id incidit quo sensus admoneretur, tamquam equus reminiscitur uiae cum ad initium eius admotus est. In stabulo quidem nulla illi uia est quamuis saepe calcatae memoria (est) . Tertium uero tempus, id est futurum, ad muta non pertinet. (17) Quomodo ergo potest eorum uideri perfecta natura quibus usus perfecti temporis non est? Tempus enim tribus partibus constat, praeterito, praesente, uenturo. Animalibus tantum quod breuissimum est <et> in transcursu datum, praesens: praeteriti rara memoria est nec umquam reuocatur nisi praesentium occursu. (18) Non potest ergo perfectae naturae bonum in inperfecta esse natura, aut si natura talis (habet) hoc habet, habent et sata. Nec illud nego, ad ea quae uidentur secundum naturam magnos esse mutis animalibus impetus et concitatos, sed inordinatos ac turbidos; numquam autem aut inordinatum est bonum aut turbidum. (19) 'Quid ergo?' inquis 'muta animalia perturbate et indisposite mouentur?' Dicerem illa perturbate et indisposite moueri si natura illorum ordinem caperet: nunc mouentur secundum naturam suam. Perturbatum enim id est quod esse aliquando et non perturbatum potest; sollicitum est quod potest esse securum. Nulli uitium est nisi cui uirtus potest esse: mutis animalibus talis ex natura sua motus est. (20) Sed ne te diu teneam, erit aliquod bonum in muto animali, erit aliqua uirtus, erit aliquid perfectum, sed nec bonum absolute nec uirtus nec perfectum. Haec enim rationalibus solis contingunt, quibus datum est scire quare, quatenus, quemadmodum. Ita bonum in nullo est nisi in quo ratio. (21) Quo nunc pertineat ista disputatio quaeris, et quid animo tuo profutura sit? Dico: et exercet illum et acuit et utique aliquid acturum occupatione honesta tenet. Prodest autem etiam quo moratur ad praua properantes. Sed <et> illud dico: nullo modo prodesse possum magis quam si tibi bonum tuum ostendo, si te a mutis animalibus separo, si cum deo pono. (22) . (23) Vis tu relictis in quibus uinci te necesse est, dum in aliena niteris, ad bonum reuerti tuum? Quod est hoc? animus scilicet emendatus ac purus, aemulator dei, super humana se extollens, nihil extra se sui ponens. Rationale animal es. Quod ergo in te bonum est? perfecta ratio. Hanc tu ad suum finem hinc euoca, <sine> in quantum potest plurimum crescere. (24) Tunc beatum esse te iudica cum tibi ex te gaudium omne nascetur, cum uisis quae homines eripiunt, optant, custodiunt, nihil inueneris, nondico quod malis, sed quod uelis. Breuem tibi formulam dabo qua te metiaris, qua perfectum esse iam sentias: tunc habebis tuum cum intelleges infelicissimos esse felices. Vale.
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