Letter 383: Theodore Studite, Letter 383; Greek heading: Ἀθανασίῳ τέκνῳ.

Among the other blessings, this too is good for us in these days, as we contend for the truth of God: to hear one another's voice more frequently through letters, and to share with one another the dispositions that are in our hearts. For you see, beloved brother, how the letters are, as it were, daily journals, binding us together more affectionately. See how many good things the persecution for Christ's sake has afforded, and may yet afford, if it should find us more ardent for what lies ahead, cowering before none of the things of men, but eager to bear sufferings in imitation of God [theomimeta], for the sake of which you too, borne hither and thither, are contending. But it shall go well with those who help you and share with you in carrying your struggles, on whose behalf I have already rightly made my defense, and shall make it again. But since I take up the question, leaving aside the rebuttals I should make concerning the gift for which you praise me, lest I be thought to assent to the praises (for I am bereft of every good thing): where, then, the Great Basil [Basil of Caesarea, c. 330-379, the great Cappadocian father], the light of the world, gives a verdict, who, having any mind at all, must dare to set himself against it? The matter is found in the question of the Ascetica [Basil's Asketikon, his monastic rules], as you indicated, namely: whether one ought to lie, supposedly for some useful dispensation [oikonomia, the principle of accommodating circumstances]. To this he says: the declaration of our Lord Jesus Christ does not permit this, since He once for all said that falsehood is from the devil, indicating no distinction of falsehood whatsoever. And the Apostle too bears witness, having written that, even if someone contends [as in the athletic contest], he is not crowned unless he contends lawfully. These things, then, are from the father. But you said that a scholion is appended in the chapter, that the question concerns the useful, not the necessary; for the two are not the same. And again, in another chapter, that the same luminary says that one must lay down one's soul for one's friends even unto death, whether the friend be a sinner or a righteous man; so that from this you are at a loss as to how one is both not to lie at all in the necessities that befall, when they come to the death of a brother, and again to lay down one's soul for him. "For if I do not lie," you say, "my friend dies; and by lying I do not contend lawfully, and I fall away from God." This chapter, then, is a perplexity to me also, and, I think, to many. Nevertheless I will attempt, as far as I am able, to give an answer to your charity, with God's good pleasure. That, then, according to the scholion the useful and the necessary are not the same, is true; for the one is contingent. For example: it is useful for me to discuss such-and-such with so-and-so; but indeed, even if I do not discuss it, it is possible to attain what is sought. And again: it is useful that so-and-so be turned away; but even if I do not turn him away today, I may be able to turn him away tomorrow. Such is the useful, that is, the contingent. But the necessary is unavoidable, that which can in no way go either way: for example, if I am uninitiated [unbaptized], it is not possible for me to be saved without being baptized. And again: if I say "I can not breathe and yet live," that is a falsehood; for breathing is necessary, without which there is no living. The commandments of God, therefore, were proclaimed according to the necessary by the mouth that cannot lie, and of necessity they must be kept, not turning into being keepable in one case and not in another, or by this person yes, by that person no, or at one time yes, at another no, but always and in every person and season. In this sense the Great Basil said "indicating no distinction of falsehood whatsoever," inasmuch as the declaration is from the necessary, even though the question was put forward as contingent; for, as I said, the useful and the contingent are the same. Then what will happen, as you stated before, in the eventuality of the brother dying because I do not choose to lie? But this is not a lie, as I think. For example, I transfer to myself something of this sort: a girl came to me, pursued by some seducer, asking, "Do not reveal to the seducer, when he asks, that you are keeping me, since he will utterly ruin me." Therefore, when the seducer comes and questions, "Did a girl come here to you?", I, saying "No," do not lie -- not reckoning that I do not have the girl, but that he shall not work that wickedness near me, by saying it according to what is left unspoken. And again another case: someone deposited a sword with me in order to kill himself, then, coming, seeks it from me. If, then, I say "I do not know, nor did I take it," I do not speak falsely. For I say, "I do not know, nor did I take it for the purpose of handing the sword over to you unto death"; since, if I say "Yes," the girl is ruined and the one who gave the sword has slaughtered himself; and this is evil. But the evil is not from good, but from falsehood; for the father of falsehood is the inventor of wickedness. But that the girl not be ruined and the sword-giver not destroy himself is good, and the good is the truth; for God is at once good and truth. The apparent lie, then, was found to be confessedly truth; and I laid down my soul in the supposedly apparent falsehood on behalf of my friend, and the commandment was confirmed on both sides, perfected not in falsehood but in truth. Yet one must not do this for one's own sake, that one may not die (for that would be a falsehood here), nor indeed swear at all, neither concerning one's own salvation nor concerning another's; for the transgression is manifest. So stands the matter as it appears to me. Since Sarah too said to Abimelech that "I am the sister of Abraham"; and the prophet Jeremiah, to the rulers who questioned him, "What did the king say to you?", answered one thing in place of another, since the king had charged him, out of fear of death, and that of his own household. And in the Sayings of the Fathers [Apophthegmata Patrum] such a thing is reported. But if you yourself find anything, from yourself or from another, do not decline to reveal it to us, toward the knowledge of truth and the illumination of our dim mind. I greet him who suffers hardship together with you. He who is with me greets you beforehand.

Πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις ἀγωνιζομένοις ὑπὲρ ἀληθείας θεοῦ, συχνότερον τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων φωνῆς διὰ τοῦ γράμματος ἀκούειν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι τὰς ἐν καρδίᾳ διαθέσεις. ὁρᾷς γάρ, ἀδελφὲ ἠγαπημένε, ὅπως ὡσανεὶ ἐφημερίδες αἱ ἐπιστολαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν, συνάπτουσαι ἡμᾶς φιλικώτερον; ἴδε πόσα καλὰ ὁ ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ διωγμὸς παρέσχετο καὶ ἔτι παράσχοιεν, ἐπὰν θερμοτέρους ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὸ ἑξῆς λάβοιεν, μηδὲν ὑποπτήσσοντας τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, ἀλλὰ γλιχομένους τὰ θεομίμητα ὑποίσειν παθήματα, δι' ἃ ὧδε κἀκεῖσε φερόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ἀθλεῖς. ἀλλ' εὖ ἔσται τοῖς βοηθοῦσι καὶ συνδιαφέρουσί σοι τὰ ἀγωνίσματα, οἷς καὶ καλῶς προαπελογησάμην καὶ αὖθις δὴ ἀπολογήσομαι. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἐρώτησιν μέτειμι, ἐῶν ὑπὲρ ὧν δῶρον ἐγκωμιάζεις με τὰς ἀντιλέξεις ἀποίσειν, ὡς μὴ οἰηθῆναί με συγκαταθέσθαι τοῖς ἐπαίνοις· εἰμὶ γὰρ ἔρημος παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ὅπου οὖν ὁ Μέγας Βασί λειος, τὸ φῶς τοῦ κόσμου, ἀποφήσειεν, τίνι τολμητέον ἔχοντι νοῦν ὅλως ἀντιφέρεσθαι; ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ ἐρωτήσει τῶν ἀσκητικῶν, καθὼς ὑπεσημήνω, ἤγουν· εἰ χρὴ οἰκονομίας δῆθεν χρησίμου ψεύδεσθαι. πρὸς ὅν φησιν· ἡ ἀπόφασις τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦτο οὐ συγχωρεῖ, ἅπαξ εἰπόντος ὅτι τὸ ψεῦδος ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστίν, διαφορὰν ψεύδους μηδεμίαν ἐμφήναντος. καὶ ὁ ἀπόστολος δὲ μαρτυρεῖ γράψας ὅτι, κἂν ἀθλῇ τις, οὐ στεφανοῦται, ἐὰν μὴ νομίμως ἀθλήσῃ. Ταῦτα μὲν παρὰ τοῦ πατρός. ἔφης δὲ προσκεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ κεφαλαίῳ σχόλιον, ὅτι χρησίμου ἕνεκεν ἡ ἐρώτησις, οὐκ ἀναγκαίου· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἀμφότερα. καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἑτέρῳ κεφαλαίῳ τὸν αὐτὸν φωστῆρα λέγειν ὅτιπερ δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων μέχρι θανάτου, εἴτε ἁμαρτωλοῦ εἴτε δικαίου ὄντος τοῦ φίλου, ὡς ἐντεῦθεν ἀπορεῖν σε πῶς καὶ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι ὅλως ἐν ταῖς συμβαινούσαις ἀνάγκαις, εἰς θάνατον ἡκούσαις ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τιθέναι· "4ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ ψεύσωμαι"5, φῆς, "4ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν φίλον, καὶ ψευδόμενος οὐκ ἀθλῶ νομίμως καὶ ἐκπίπτω τοῦ θεοῦ"5. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κεφάλαιον καὶ ἐμοὶ ἠπορημένον ἐστί, δοκῶ δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς. πειράσομαι δ' οὖν ὅμως, ὡς οἷόν τέ μοι, δοῦναι ἀπόκρισιν τῇ ἀγάπῃ σου, εὐδοκοῦντος θεοῦ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ σχόλιον οὐ ταὐτὸν χρήσιμον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀληθές· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστιν· οἷον, χρήσιμον δὴ διαλεχθῆναί με τῷ δεῖνι περὶ τοῦδε· ἀλλὰ μήν, κἂν οὐ διαλέξοιμι, ἔστι δυνατὸν ἐπιτυχεῖν τοῦ ζητουμένου. καὶ πάλιν· χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἀποστραφῆναι τὸν ὁ δεῖνα· ἀλλὰ γάρ, κἂν σήμερον μὴ ἀποστραφῶ, δυναίμην αὐτὸν αὔριον ἀποστραφῆναι. τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ χρήσιμον, ἤτοι ἐνδεχόμενον. τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἀπαραίτητόν ἐστι, τὸ πάντως μὴ ἀμφοτερίζειν· οἷον, ἐάν εἰμι ἀμύητος, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ βαπτισθησόμενον σωθῆναί με. καὶ πάλιν· ἐὰν εἴπω "4δύναμαι μὴ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ζῆν"5, ψεῦδος· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τὸ ἀναπνεῖν, οὗ χωρὶς οὐκ ἔστι ζῆν. Αἱ τοίνυν ἐντολαὶ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον παρὰ τοῦ ἀψευδοῦς στόματος διηγορεύθησαν καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλουσι φυλάττεσθαι, οὐ τρεπόμεναι εἰς τὸ πῇ μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι φυλάττεσθαι, πῇ δὲ οὔ, ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦδε μὲν ναί, ὑπὸ τοῦδε δὲ οὔ, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ναί, ποτὲ δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς προσώπου καὶ καιροῦ. κατὰ τοῦτο εἴρηκεν ὁ Μέγας Βασίλειος "4διαφορὰν ψεύδους μηδεμίαν ἐμφήναντος"5, ὡς ὅτι ἐξ ἀναγκαίου ἡ ἀπόφασις, κἂν ἡ ἐρώτησις προετάθη ὡς ἐνδεχομένη· ταὐτὸν γάρ, ὡς ἔφην, χρήσιμον καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον. εἶτα τί γενήσεται, καθὰ προέφης, ἐν τῇ συμβάσει τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν ἀδελφὸν τῷ μὴ αἱρήσασθαί με ψεύσασθαι; τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος, ὡς δοκῶ. οἷον, μετασχηματίζω εἰς ἐμαυτὸν τοιοῦτόν τι· ἦλθεν κόρη πρός με διωκομένη ὑπό τινος φθορέως, αἰτοῦσα "4μὴ φανερῶσαι τῷ φθορεῖ ἐρωτῶντι ὅτι με φυλάττοις, ἐπεὶ φθείρει με πάντως"5. τοίνυν ἐλθόντος τοῦ φθορέως καὶ ἀνακρίναντος "4ἦλθεν ὧδε κόρη πρὸς σέ;"5, λέγων ἐγὼ "4οὒ"5 οὐ ψεύδομαι, οὐχ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω τὴν κόρην λογιζόμενος, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ ποιήσει τοῦτο ἐγγύς μου τὸ πονηρὸν κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον λέξας. καὶ πάλιν ἄλλο· παρέθετό μοί τις ξίφος πρὸς τὸ ἀναιρεῖν ἑαυτόν, εἶτα ἐλθὼν ἐπιζητεῖ τοῦτο παρ' ἐμοῦ. ἐὰν οὖν εἴπω ὅτι "4οὐκ οἶδα οὐδὲ ἔλαβον"5 οὐ ψευδοεπῶ. "4οὐκ οἶδα"5 γάρ, λέγω, "4οὐδὲ ἔλαβον πρὸς τὸ ἐπιδοῦναί μέ σοι τὸ ξίφος εἰς θάνατον"5· ἐπεί, ἐὰν εἴπω "4ναί"5, ἐφθάρη ἡ κόρη καὶ ἔσφαξεν ἑαυτὸν ὁ δοὺς τὸ ξίφος· καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο κακόν. τὸ δὲ κακὸν οὐκ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐκ ψεύδους· πατὴρ γὰρ τοῦ ψεύδους ὁ τῆς κακίας εὑρετής. τὸ δὲ μὴ φθαρῆναι τὴν κόρην καὶ μὴ ἀναιρεῖν ἑαυτὸν τὸν ξιφοδότην ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἀλήθεια· ὁ θεὸς γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀλήθεια. εὑρέθη οὖν τὸ δοκοῦν ψεῦδος ἀλήθεια ὁμολογουμένη εἶναι· καὶ ἔθηκα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ δῆθεν δοκοῦντι ψεύσματι ὑπὲρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ ἔρρωται ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἡ ἐντολή, οὐκ ἐν ψεύσματι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀληθείᾳ τελειωθεῖσα. οὐ μέντοι γε εἵνεκα ἑαυτοῦ, ἵνα μὴ ἀποθάνω, τοῦτο ποιεῖν χρὴ (ψεῦδος γὰρ ὧδε) οὔτε μὴν ὁμόσαι τὸ καθόλου οὔτε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε περὶ ἄλλου σωτηρίας· προφανὴς γὰρ ἡ παράβασις. Οὕτω τὸ ἐμοὶ φαινόμενον ἔχει. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ Σάρρα εἶπεν τῷ Ἀβιμέλεχ ὅτι ἀδελφή εἰμι τοῦ Ἀβραάμ· καὶ ὁ προφήτης Ἱερεμίας τοῖς ἐρωτῶσιν αὐτὸν ἄρχουσι, τί σοι εἶπεν ὁ βασιλεύς; ἄλλο ἀντ' ἄλλου ἀπεκρίθη, καθότι ὑπέθετο αὐτῷ ὁ βασιλεύς, δέει θανάτου καὶ τότε τοῦ οἰκείου. καὶ εἰς τὰ ἀποφθέγματα τῶν πατέρων ἐμφέρεται τὸ τοιοῦτον. εἰ δέ τι αὐτὸς παρὰ σεαυτοῦ ἢ παρ' ἑτέρου εὕροις, φανερῶσαι ἡμῖν μὴ παραιτήσῃ πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας καὶ φωτισμὸν νοὸς ἡμῶν ἀμυδροῦ. Τὸν συγκακοπαθοῦντά σοι προσαγορεύω. ὁ σὺν ἐμοὶ προαγορεύει σε.