Letter 6029: Avidius Quietus, who loved me like a brother, and - what was equally gratifying to me - approved my general conduct,...

To Quadratus. Avidius Quietus, who loved me like a brother, and - what was equally gratifying to me - approved my general conduct, used to quote a number of the sayings of Thrasea, with whom he was on terms of intimacy. Among them was this maxim - a favourite one of his - that a pleader ought to undertake either the causes of his friends, or those which others refused to touch, or those which were likely to be quoted as precedents. No explanation is needed why one should espouse the cause of one's friends, while the second class of causes should be undertaken as the best means of proving one's resolution and humanity, and the third class because it is a matter of the highest importance whether a good or bad precedent is created. Personally, though it may seem rather ambitious on my part, I should add to these separate classes a fourth - viz., causes which are distinguished and eminent in themselves. For it is only right that a pleader should sometimes work for glory and fame - that is to say, should plead his own cause. As you have asked my advice, these are the bounds which I should set to your dignity and modesty. I do not forget that practice both is and is considered to be the best teacher of the art of pleading, and I see many persons who, with little natural ability and absolutely no literary skill, have by constant practice acquired the art of speaking well. None the less, I find that the saying of Pollio, or the saying which is attributed to him, is perfectly true: "By pleading well I obtained great practice, but my great practice made me plead less well" - for the truth is, that if we practise too much we acquire fluency rather than point, and develop rashness rather than confidence. It did not stand in the way of Isocrates being considered a consummate orator that his voice was so weak and his timidity so great as to prevent his speaking in public. So my advice is:- Read, write, and study all you can, so that you may be able to speak when you desire to, and you will then only speak when you ought to desire to. I myself have kept to this rule ; sometimes I have bowed to necessity, which itself ranks as a reason. For I have undertaken certain causes at the bidding of the senate, among them being some which would fall into the class described by Thrasea as cases which were likely to form precedents. I appeared for the Baetici against Baebius Massa, * when the question was whether their request for an examination into their charges should be allowed. It was allowed. I appeared for the same clients against Caecilius Classicus, ** when the question was whether the provincials ought to be punished as partners and ministers of the pro-consul's in his crimes. They were punished. I accused Marius Priscus, † who, on being condemned for extortion, was availing himself of the clemency of the law, though the magnitude of his offences more than merited the severest punishment to which he was liable under the terms of that law. He was banished. I defended Julius Bassus, †† as one who had been grossly careless and off his guard, but without a thought of deliberate malice. His demand to be tried by judges was granted, and he retained his place in the senate. Lastly, I spoke on behalf of Varenus, ‡ who asked permission that he too should be allowed to bring witnesses from his province. Permission was given. For the future, I hope when I am ordered to take up a case it may always be one which it would become me to have taken up on my own initiative. Farewell. [Note: In 93 A.D.; see letter vii.33. ] [Note: In 101 A.D.; see letter iii.9. ] (†) In 99-100 A.D.; see letter ii.11. (††) In 102-3 A.D.; see letter iv.9. (‡) In 106-7 A.D.; see letter vi.5.

L To Quadratus. Avidius Quietus, who loved me like a brother, and - what was equally gratifying to me - approved my general conduct, used to quote a number of the sayings of Thrasea, with whom he was on terms of intimacy. Among them was this maxim - a favourite one of his - that a pleader ought to undertake either the causes of his friends, or those which others refused to touch, or those which were likely to be quoted as precedents. No explanation is needed why one should espouse the cause of one's friends, while the second class of causes should be undertaken as the best means of proving one's resolution and humanity, and the third class because it is a matter of the highest importance whether a good or bad precedent is created. Personally, though it may seem rather ambitious on my part, I should add to these separate classes a fourth - viz., causes which are distinguished and eminent in themselves. For it is only right that a pleader should sometimes work for glory and fame - that is to say, should plead his own cause. As you have asked my advice, these are the bounds which I should set to your dignity and modesty. I do not forget that practice both is and is considered to be the best teacher of the art of pleading, and I see many persons who, with little natural ability and absolutely no literary skill, have by constant practice acquired the art of speaking well. None the less, I find that the saying of Pollio, or the saying which is attributed to him, is perfectly true: "By pleading well I obtained great practice, but my great practice made me plead less well" - for the truth is, that if we practise too much we acquire fluency rather than point, and develop rashness rather than confidence. It did not stand in the way of Isocrates being considered a consummate orator that his voice was so weak and his timidity so great as to prevent his speaking in public. So my advice is:- Read, write, and study all you can, so that you may be able to speak when you desire to, and you will then only speak when you ought to desire to. I myself have kept to this rule ; sometimes I have bowed to necessity, which itself ranks as a reason. For I have undertaken certain causes at the bidding of the senate, among them being some which would fall into the class described by Thrasea as cases which were likely to form precedents. I appeared for the Baetici against Baebius Massa, * when the question was whether their request for an examination into their charges should be allowed. It was allowed. I appeared for the same clients against Caecilius Classicus, ** when the question was whether the provincials ought to be punished as partners and ministers of the pro-consul's in his crimes. They were punished. I accused Marius Priscus, † who, on being condemned for extortion, was availing himself of the clemency of the law, though the magnitude of his offences more than merited the severest punishment to which he was liable under the terms of that law. He was banished. I defended Julius Bassus, †† as one who had been grossly careless and off his guard, but without a thought of deliberate malice. His demand to be tried by judges was granted, and he retained his place in the senate. Lastly, I spoke on behalf of Varenus, ‡ who asked permission that he too should be allowed to bring witnesses from his province. Permission was given. For the future, I hope when I am ordered to take up a case it may always be one which it would become me to have taken up on my own initiative. Farewell. (*) In 93 A.D.; see letter vii.33. (**) In 101 A.D.; see letter iii.9. (†) In 99-100 A.D.; see letter ii.11. (††) In 102-3 A.D.; see letter iv.9. (‡) In 106-7 A.D.; see letter vi.5.